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MODEL STANDARDS
ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including the Preamble and the
Comments, were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in August 1983, and appear here as amended through February
1994. The Model Code Comparisons, which are included here to assist the
reader in comparing the Model Rules with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, were never considered by the House of Delegates and are not
official ABA policy. The Model Rules are copyrighted by the American Bar
Association.
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
[1] A lawyer is a representative of cli-
ents, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibili-
ty for the quality of justice.
[21 As a representative of clients, a
lawyer performs various functions. As
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with
an informed understanding of the cli-
ent's legal rights and obligations and ex-
plains their practical implications. As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the
client's position under the rules of the
adversary system. As negotiator, a law-
yer seeks a result advantageous to the
client but consistent with requirements
of honest dealing with others. As inter-
mediary between clients, a lawyer seeks
to reconcile their divergent interests as
an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a
spokesperson for each client. A lawyer
acts as evaluator by examining a client's
legal affairs and reporting about them to
the client or to others.
[3] In all professional functions a law-
yer should be competent, prompt and dil-
igent. A lawyer should maintain commu-
nication with a client concerning the rep-
resentation. A lawyer should keep in
confidence information relating to repre-
sentation of a client except so far as dis-
closure is required or permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.
[4] A lawyer's conduct should conform
to the requirements of the law, both in
professional service to clients and in the
lawyer's business and personal affairs. A
lawyer should use the law's procedures
only for legitimate purposes and not to
harass or intimidate others. A lawyer
should demonstrate respect for the legal
system and for those who serve it, in-
cluding judges, other lawyers and public
officials. While it is a lawyer's duty,
when necessary, to challenge the recti-
tude of official action, it is also a lawyer's
duty to uphold legal process.
[5] As a public citizen, a lawyer should
seek improvement of the law, the admin-
istration of justice and the quality of
service rendered by the legal profession.
As a member of a learned profession, a
lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the
law beyond its use for clients, employ
that knowledge in reform of the law and
work to strengthen legal education. A
lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies
in the administration of justice and of
the fact that the poor, and sometimes
persons who are not poor, cannot afford
adequate legal assistance, and should
therefore devote professional time and
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civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer
should aid the legal profession in pursu-
ing these objectives and should help the
bar regulate itself in the public interest.
[6) Many of a lawyer's professional re-
sponsibilities are prescribed in the Rules
of Professional Conduct, as well as sub-
stantive and procedural law. However, a
lawyer is also guided by personal con-
science and the approbation of profes-
sional peers. A lawyer should strive to
attain the highest level of skill, to im-
prove the law and the legal profession
and to exemplify the legal profession's
ideals of public service.
[7] A lawyer's responsibilities as a rep-
resentative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen are usu-
ally harmonious. Thus, when an oppos-
ing party is well represented, a lawyer
can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a
client and at the same time assume that
justice is being done. So also, a lawyer
can be sure that preserving client confi-
dences ordinarily serves the public inter-
est because people are more likely to seek
legal advice, and thereby heed their legal
obligations, when they know their com-
munications will be private.
[8] In the nature of law practice, how-
ever, conflicting responsibilities are en-
countered. Virtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the
legal system and to the lawyer's own in-
terest in remaining an upright person
while earning a satisfactory living. The
Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe
terms for resolving such conflicts. With-
in the framework of these Rules many
difficult issues of professional discretion
can arise. Such issues must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive profes-
sional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying the Rules.
[9] The legal profession is largely self-
governing. Although -other professions I
also have been granted powers of self- I
government, the legal profession is
unique in this respect because of the
close relationship between the profession
and the processes of government and law
enforcement. This connection is mani-
fested in the fact that ultimate authority
over the legal profession is vested largely
in the courts.
[10] To the extent that lawyers meet
the obligations of their professional call-
ing, the occasion for government regula-
tion is obviated. Self-regulation also
helps maintain the legal profession's in-
dependence from government domina-
tion. An independent legal profession is
an important force in preserving govern-
ment under law, for abuse of legal au-
thority is more readily challenged by a
profession whose members are not de-
pendent on government for the right to
practice.
[11] The legal profession's relative au-
tonomy carries with it special responsi-
bilities of self-government. The profes-
sion has a responsibility to assure that
its regulations are conceived in the pub-
lic interest and not in furtherance of pa-
rochial or self-interested concerns of the
bar. Every lawyer is responsible for ob-
servance of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in se-
curing their observance by other law-
yers. Neglect of these responsibilities
compromises the independence of the
profession and the public interest which
it serves.
[12] Lawyers play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of
this role requires an understanding by
lawyers of their relationship to our legal
system. The Rules of Professional Con-
luct, when properly applied, serve to de-
ine that relationship.
3cope
[13] The Rules of Professional Conduct
ire rules of reason. They should be inter-
reted with reference to the purposes of
egal representation and of the law itself.
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Some of the Rules are imperatives. cast
in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These
define proper conduct for purposes of
professional discipline. Others, generally
cast in the term "may," are permissive
and define areas under the Rules in
which the lawyer has professional dis-
cretion. No disciplinary action should be
taken when the lawyer chooses not to act
or acts within the bounds of such discre-
tion. Other Rules define the nature of re-
lationships between the lawyer and
others. The Rules are thus partly obliga-
tory and disciplinary and partly consti-
tutive and descriptive in that they define
a lawyer's professional role. Many of the
Comments use the term "should." Com-
ments do not add obligations to the
Rules but provide guidance for practic-
ing in compliance with the Rules.
(14) The Rules presuppose a larger le-
gal context shaping the lawyer's role.
That context includes court rules and
statutes relating to matters of licensure,
laws defining specific obligations of law-
yers and substantive and procedural law
in general. Compliance with the Rules. as
with all law in an open society, depends
primarily upon understanding and vol-
untary compliance, secondarily upon re-
inforcement by peer and public opinion
and finally, when necessary, upon en-
forcement through disciplinary proceed-
ings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust
the moral and ethical considerations
that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be com-
pletely defined by legal rules. The Rules
simply provide a framework for the ethi-
cal practice of law.
[15] Furthermore, for purposes of de-
termining the lawyer's authority and re-
sponsibility, principles of substantive
law external to these Rules determine
whether a dient-lawye relationship ex-
ists. Most of the duties flowing from the
client-lawyer relationship attach only
after the client has requested the lawyer
to render.legal services and the lawyer
has agreed to do so. But there are some
duties, such as that of confidentiality un-
der Rule 1.6, that may attach when the
lawyer agrees to consider whether a cli-
ent-lawyer relationship shall be estab-
lished. Whether a client-lawyer relation-
ship exists for any specific purpose can
depend on the circumstances and may be
a question of fact.
[161 Under various legal provisions, in-
cluding constitutional, statutory and
common law, the responsibilities of gov-
ernment lawyers may include authority
concerning legal matters that ordinarily
reposes in the client in private client-
lawyer relationships. For example, a
lawyer for a government agency may
have authority on behalf of the govern-
ment to decide upon settlement or
whether to appeal from an adverse judg-
ment. Such authority in various respects
is generally vested in the attorney gener-
al and the state's attorney in state gov-
ernment, and their federal counterparts,
and the same may be true of other gov-
ernment law officers. Also, lawyers under
the supervision of these officers may be
authorized to represent several govern-
ment agencies in intragovernmental le-
gal controversies in circumstances where
a private lawyer could not represent
multiple private clients. They also may
have authority to represent the "public
interest" in circumstances where a pri-
vate lawyer would not be authorized to
do so. These Rules do not abrogate any
such authority.
[17] Failure to comply with an obliga-
tion or prohibitionimposed by a Rule is
a basis for invoking the disciplinary pro-
cess. The Rules presuppose that disci-
plinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct
will be made on the basis of the facts and
circumstances as they existed at the time
of the conduct in question and in recog-
nition of the fact that a lawyer often has
to act upon uncertain or incomplete evi-
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dence of the situation. Moreover, the
Rules presuppose that whether or not
discipline should be imposed for a viola-
tion, and the severity of a sanction, de-
pend on all the circumstances, such as
the willfulness and seriousness of the vi-
olation, extenuating factors and whether
there have been previous violations.
[18] Violation of a Rule should not give
rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty
has been breached. The Rules are de-
signed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating
'conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose
of the Rules can be subverted when they
are invoked by opposing parties as proce-
dural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a
just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment,
or for sanctioning a lawyer under the ad-
ministration of a disciplinary authority,
does not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has
standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should
be deemed to augment any substantive
legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disci-
plinary consequences of violating such
duty.
[19] Moreover, these Rules are not in-
tended to govern or affect judicial appli-
cation of either the attorney-client or
work product privilege. Those privileges
were developed to promote compliance
with law and fairness in litigation. In
reliance on the attorney-client privilege,
clients are entitled to expect that com-
munications within the scope of the priv-
ilege will be protected against compelled
disclosure. The attorney-client privilege
is that of the *client and not of the law-
yer. The fact that in exceptional situa--
tions the lawyer under the Rules has a
limited discretion to disclose a client
confidence does not vitiate the proposi-
tion that, as a general matter, the client
has a reasonable expectation that infor-
mation relating to the client will not be
voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure
of such information may be judicially
compelled only in accordance with recog-
nized exceptions to the attorney-client
and work product privileges.
[20] The lawyer's exercise of discretion
not to disclose information under Rule
1.6 should not be subject to reexamina-
tion. Permitting such reexamination
would be incompatible with the general
policy of promoting compliance with law
through assurances that communica-
tions will be protected against disclosure.
[21] The Comment accompanying each
Rule explains and illustrates the mean-
ing and purpose of the Rule. The Pream-
ble and this note on Scope provide gener-
al orientation. The Comments are in-
tended as guides to interpretation, but
the text of each Rule is authoritative- Re-
search notes were prepared to compare
counterparts in the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (adopted
1969, as amended) and to provide selected
references to other authorities. The notes
have not been adopted, do not constitute
part of the Model Rules, and are not in-
tended to affect the application or inter-
pretation of the Rules and Comments.
Terminology
"Belief" or "Believes" denotes that the
person involved actually supposed the
fact in question to be true. A person's
belief may be inferred from circum-
stances. I
"Consult" or "Consultation" denotes
communication of information reason-
ably sufficient to permit the client to ap-
preciate the significance of the matter in
question.
"Firm" or "Law firm" denotes a law-
yerer lawyers in a private firm, lawyers
employed in the legal department of a
corporation or other organization and
lawyers employed in a legal services or-
ganization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
ABA/ONA LA--4m* N.s".aI. Ptreu cgsaif Conduct
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"Fraud" or "'Fraudulent" denotes con- "Reasonable belief" or "Reasonabi
duct having a purpose to deceive and not believes" when used in reference to
merely negligent misrepresentation or lawyer denotes that the lawyer believe
failure to apprise another of relevant in- the matter in question and that the cir
formation. cumstances are such that the belief is
"Knowingly." "Known," or "Knows" reasonable.
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person's knowledge may be "Reasonably should know" when used
inferred from circumstances. in reference to a lawyer denotes that a
"Partner" denotes a member of a part- lawyer of reasonable prudence and com-
nership and a shareholder in a law firm petence would ascertain the matter in
organized as a professional corporation. question.
"Reasonable" or "Reasonably" when
used in relation to conduct by a lawyer "Substantial" when used in reference
denotes the conduct of a reasonably pru- to degree or extent denotes a material
dent and competent lawyer. matter of clear and weighty importance.
Model Rules Of Professional Conduct
CLIENT-LAW" ER RELATIONSHIP which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
RULE 1.1 Compe ce admitted lawyer can be as competent as
A lawyer shall pr vide competent a practitioner with long experience.
representation to a cli L Competent Some important legal skills, such as the
representation requir the legal analysis of precedent, the evaluation of
knowledge, skill. thorou ness and evidence and legal drafting, are required
preparation reasonably nee sary for in all legal problems. Perhaps the most
the representation. fundamental legal skill consists of deter-
COMMENT mining what kind of legal problems a
Legal Knowledge and Skill situation may involve, a skill that neces-
In dterinin whthera lwyere -sarily transcends any particular special-
ploys the requisite knowledge and skill in zed knowledge. A lawyer can provide ad-• _.__-_,,_ _ ___ t ..... equate representation in a wholly novel
a particular matter, relevant factors in- ea rd th
clude the relative complexity and special- Id through necessary study. Competent
ized nature of the matter., the lawyers re esentation can also be provided
general experience, the lawyer's training thro h the association of a lawyer of
establi ed competence in the field inand experininthe field in question, !,
the preparation and study the lawyer is question-
able to give the matter and whether it is In an em ency a lawyer may give ad-
feasible to refer the matter to, or asso- vice or assi nee in a matter in which
ciate or consult with, a lawyer of estab- the lawyer d not have the skill ordi-
lished competence in the field in question. narily required ere referral to or con-
In many instances, the required profi- sultation or asso iation with another
ciency is that of a general practitioner. lawyer would be imp ctical. Even in an
Expertise in a particular field of law may emergency, however, sistance should
be required in some circumstances, be limited to that reaso ably necessary
A lawyer need not necessarily have in the circumstances, for *11 considered
special training or prior experience to action under emergency co ditions can
handle legal problems of a type with jeopardize the client's interes
2-21-J6 Publish"[ by the Amtricau Bar Aisociatioa ad T Bureau of Natisus Affair. loc. 7
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Paragraph (a) rmits a lawyer to
disclose informatio where impliedly
authorized to do so order to carry out
the representation. nder DR 4-101(B)
and (C), a lawyer w not permitted to
reveal "confidences' unless the client
first consented after isclosure.
Paragraph (b) r efines the excep-
tions to the requirem nt of confidential-
ity. Regarding par aph (bgl), DR 4-
101(CX3) provided th t a lawyer "may
reveal ... (tihe intent n of his client to
commit a crime an( the information
necessary to prevent the crime." This
option existed regardl ss of the serious-
ness of the proposed c ime.
With regard to pa raph (bX2), DR 4-
101(CX4) provided th t a lawyer may
reveal "(cjonfidences or secrets neces-
sary to establish or a llect his fee or to
defend himself or his mployers or asso-
ciates against an acu tion of wrongful
conduct." Paragraph ( X2) enlarges the
exception to include d lscosure of infor-
mation relating to clai by the lawyer
other than for the I twyer's fee; for
example, recovery of property from the
dient.
RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest:- Gener-
al Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship
with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after con-
sultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to an-
other client or to a third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves the representation %%ill not
be adversely affected, and
(2) the client consents after con-
sultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter
is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the
implications of the common repre-
sentation and the advantages and
risks involved.
COMMENT
Loyalty to a Client
Loyalty is an essential element in the
lawyer's relationship to a client. An
impermissible conflict of interest may
exist before representation is undertak-
en, in which event the representation
should be declined. The lawyer should
adopt reasonable procedures, appropri-
ate for the size and type of firm and
practice, to determine in both litigation
and non-litigation matters the parties
and issues involved and to determine
whether there are actual or potential
conflicts of interest.
If such a conflict arises after represen-
tation has been undertaken, the lawyer
should withdraw from the representa-
tion. See Rule 1.16. Where more than
one client is involved and the lawyer
withdraws because a conflict arises after
representation, whether the lawyer may
continue to represent any of the clients
is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule
2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists or, having once been
established, is continuing, see Comment
to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
As a general propositiojn. loyalty to a
client prohibits undertaking representa-
tion directly adverse to that client with-
out that client's consent. Paragraph (a)
expresses that general rule. Thus. a
lawyer ordinarily may. not act as advo-
cate against a person the lawyer repre-
sents in some other matter, even if it is
wholly unrelated. On the other hand.
3-1-7 P,. yl4,d by Anw'ican Bar Assocaioa/The Bum'&ue of NationaI An'airS. Inc.
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simultaneous representation in unrelat-
ed matters of clients whose interests are
only generally adverse, such as compet-
ing economic enterprises, does not re-
quire consent of the respective clients.
Paragraph (a) applies only when the
representation of one client would be
directly adverse to the other.
Loyalty to a client is also impaired
when a lawyer cannot consider, recom-
mend or carry out an appropriate course
of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or inter-
ests. The conflict in effect forecloses
alternatives that would otherwise be
available to the client. Paragraph (b)
addresses such situations. A possible
conflict does not itself preclude the
representation. The critical questions
are the likelihood that a conflict will
eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should
be pursued on behalf of the client.
Consideration should be given to wheth-
er the client wishes to accommodate the
other interest involved.
Consultation and Consent
A client may consent to representa-
tion notwithstanding a conflict. How-
ever, as indicated in paragraph (aXI)
with respect to representation directly
adverse to a client, and paragraph (bX1)
with respect to material limitations on
representation of a client, when a disin-
terested lawyer would conclude that the
client should not agree to the represen-
tation under the circumstances, the law-
yer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representa-
tion on the basis of the client's consent.
When more than one client is involved.
the question of conflict must be resolved
as to each client. Moreover, there may
be circumstances where it is impossible
to make the disclosure necessary to
obtain consent. For example, when the
lawyer represents different clients in
related matters and one of the clients
refuses to consent to the disclosure nec-
essary to permit the other client to
make an informed decision, the lawyer
cannot properly ask the latter to con-
sent.
Lawyer's Interests
The lawyer's own interests should not
be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation of a client. For example,
a lawyer's need for income should not
lead the lawyer to undertake matters
that cannot be handled competently and
at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and
1.5. If the probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious
question, it may be difficult or impossi-
ble for the lawyer to give a client
detached advice. A lawyer may not
allow related business interests to affect
representation, for example, by refer-
ring clients to an enterprise in which
the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.
Conflicts in Litigation
Paragraph (a) prohibits representa-
tion of opposing parties in litigation.
Simultaneous representation of parties
whose interests in litigation zhay con-
flict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defen-
dants , is governed by paragraph (b). An
impermissible conflict may exist by rea-
son of substantial discrepancy in the
parties* testimony, incompatibility in
positions in relation to an opposing
party or the fact that there are substan-
ABA/BNA LA.yers" ManueI on Ps[eshona Cnduct
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tially different possibilities of settle-
ment of the claims or liabilities in
question. Such conflicts can arise in
criminal cases as well as civil. The
potential for conflict of interest in repre-
senting multiple defendants in a crimi-
nal case is so grave that ordinarily a
lawyer should decline to represent more
than one codefendant. On the other
hand, common representation of per-
sons having similar interests is proper if
the risk of adverse effect is minimal and
the requirements of paragraph (b) are
met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving in-
termediation between clients.
Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as
advocate against a client the lawyer
represents in some other matter, even if
the other matter is wholly unrelated.
However, there are circumstances in
which a lawyer may act as advocate
against a client. For example, a lawyer
representing an enterprise with diverse
operations may accept employment as
an advocate against the enterprise in an
unrelated matter if doing so will not
adversely affect the lawyer's relation-
ship with the enterprise or conduct of
the suit and if both clients consent upon
consultation. By the same token, gov-
ernment lawyers in some circumstances
may represent government employees
in proceedings in which a government
agency is the opposing party. The pro-
priety of concurrent representation can
depend on the nature of the litigation.
For example, a suit charging fraud en-
tails conflict to a degree not involved in
a suit for a declaratory judgment con-
cerning statutory interpretation.
A lawyer may represent parties hay-
ing antagonistic positions on a legal
question that has arisen in different
cases, unless representation of either
client would be adversely affected- Thus.
it is ordinarily not improper to assert
such positions in cases pending in differ-
ent trial courts, but it may be improper
to do so in cases pending at the same
time in an appellate court.
Interest of Person Paying for a Law-
yer's Service
A lawyer may be paid from a source
other than the client, if the client is
informed of that fact and consents and
the arrangement does not compromise
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.
See Rule 1.8(0. For example, when an
insurer and its insured have conflicting
interests in a matter arising from a
liability insurance agreement, and the
insurer is required to provide special
counsel for the insured, the arrange-
ment should assure the special counsel's
professional independence. So also,
when a corporation and its directors or
employees are involved in a controversy
in which they have conflicting interests,
the corporation may provide funds for
separate legal representation of the di-
rectors or employees, if the clients con-
sent after consultation and the arrange-
ment ensures the lawyer's professional
independence.
Other Conflict Situations
Conflicts of interest in contexts other
than litigation sometimes may be diffi-
cult to assess. Relevant factors in deter-
mining whether there is potential for
adverse effect include the duration and
intimacy of the lawyer's relationship
with the client or clients involved, the
functions being performed by the law-
yer, the likelihood that actual conflict
will arise and the likely prejudice to the
client from the conflict if it does arise.
The question is often one of proximity
and degree.
For example, a lawyer may not repre-
sent multiple parties to a negotiation
whose interests are fuhdamentally anta-
gonistic to each other, but common
representation is permissible where the
clients are generally aligned in interest
even though there is some difference of
interest among them.
tbtished by the American Bar Assoc"ioa ad The Bureau o( Natio"nl AffaiMa. Inc.
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Conflict questions may also arise in
estate planning and estate administra-
tion. A lawyer may be called upon to
prepare wills for several family mem-
bers, such as husband and wife, and,
depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict of interest may arise. In estate
administration the identity of the client
may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view,
the client is the fiduciary; under anoth-
er view the client is the estate or trust,
including its beneficiaries. The lawyer
should make clear the relationship to
the parties involved.
A lawyer for a corporation or other
organization who is also a member of its
board of directors should determine
whether the responsibilities of the two
roles may conflict. The lawyer may be
called on to advise the corporation in
matters involving actions of the direc-
tors. Consideration should be given to
the frequency with which such situa-
tions may arise, the potential intensity
of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's
resignation from the board and the
possibility of the corporation's obtaining
legal advice from another lawyer in
such situations. If there is material risk
that the dual role will compromise the
lawyer's independence of professional
judgment, the lawyer should not serve
as a director.
Conflict Charged by an Opposing
Party
Resolving questions of conflict of in-
terest is primarily the responsibility of
the lawyer undertaking the representa-
tion. In litigation, a court may raise the
question when there is reason to infer
that the lawyer has neglected the re-
sponsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry
by the court is generally required when
a lawyer represents multiple defen-
dants. Where the conflict is such as
clearly to call in question the fair or
efficient administration of justice, op-
posing counsel may properly raise the
question. Such an objection should be
viewed with caution, however, for it can
be misused as a technique of harass-
ment. See Scope.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-101(A) provided that "iexcept
with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment on behalf of the client
will be or reasonably may be affected by
his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests." DR 5-105(A) provid-
ed that a lawyer "shall decline proffered
employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf
of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment, or if it would
be likely to involve him in representing
differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5-
105(C) provided that "a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious
that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to
the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effect of such representa-
tion on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of
each." DR 5-107(B) provided that a law-
yer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays him to
render legal services for another to
direct or regulate his professional judg-
ment in rendering such services.-
Rule 1.7 clarifies DR 5-105(A) by re-,
quiring that, when the lawyer's other
interests are involved, not only must the
client consent after consultation but
also that, independent of such consent,
the representation reasonably appears
not to be adversely affected by the
lawyer's other interests. This require-
ment appears to be the intended mean-
ing of the provision in DR 5-105(C) that
"it is obvious that he can adequately
ABA/BNA .a-yers" Manual on Professional Conduct(
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represent" the client, and was implicit
in EC 5-2. which stated that a lawyer
"'should not accept proffered employ-
ment if his personal interests or desires
will, or there is a reasonable probability
that they will, affect adversely the ad-
vice to be given or services to be ren-
dered the prospective client.**
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represent" the cli t. and was implicit
in EC 5-2. which tated that a lawyer
'should not acce t proffered employ-
ment if his person I interests or desires
will, or there is a r asonable probability
that they will. aff ct adversely the ad-
vice to be given o services to be ren-
dered the prospecti e client."
RULE 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohi-
bited Transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a
business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuni-
ary interest adverse to a client
unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on
which the lawyer acquires the in-
terest are fair and reasonable to
the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the
client.
(2) the client is given a reason-
able opportunity to seek the advice
of independent counsel in the
transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing
thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use informa-
tion relating to representation of a
client to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client consents after
consultation, except as permitted or
required by Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3.
(c A lawyer shall not prepare an
instrument giving the lawyer or a
person related to the lawyer as par-
ent. child, sibling, or spouse any
substantial gift from a client, includ-
ing a testamentary gift, except where
the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of repre-
sentation of a client. a lawyer shall
not make or negotiate an agreement
giving the lawyer literary or media
rights to a portrayal or account
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
based in substantial part on informa-
tion relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide fi-
nancial assistance to a client in con-
nection with pending or contemplat-
ed litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court
costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be
contingent on the outcome of the
matter;, and
(2) a lawyer representing an indi-
gent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on be-
half of the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept com-
pensation for representing a client
from one other than the client
unless:
(1) the client consents after con-
sultation;
(2) there is no interference with
the lawyer's independence of pro-
fessional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to repre-
sentation of a client is protected as
required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or
more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of
the claims of or against the clients,
or in a criminal case an aggregated
agreement as to guilty or nolo con-
tendere pleas, unless each client con-
sents after consultation, including
disclosure of the existence and na-
ture of all the claims or pleas in-
volved and of th6 participation of
each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer's liability to a client for mal-
practice unless permitted by law and
the client is independently repre-
sented in making the agreement, or
-settle -a claim for such liability with
an unrepresented client or former
client without first advising that per-
son in writing that independent rep-
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resentation is appropriate in connec-
tion therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another
lawyer as parent, child, sibling or
spouse shall not represent a client in
a representation directly adverse to
a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer ex-
cept upon consent by the client after
consultation regarding the relation-
ship.
(J A lawyer shall not acquire a
proprietary interest in the cause of
action or subject matter of litigation
the lawyer is conducting for a client,
except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law
to secure the lawyer's fee or ex-
penses; and
(2) contract with a client for a
reasonable contingent fee in a civil
case.
COMMENT:
Transactions Between Client and
Lawyer
As a general principle, all transac-
tions between client and lawyer should
be fair and reasonable to the client- In
such transactions a review by indepen-
dent counsel on behalf of the client is
often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer
may not exploit information relating to
the representation to the client's disad-
vantage. For example, a lawyer who has
learned that the client is investing in
specific real estate may not, without the
client's consent seek to acquire nearby
property where doing so would adverse-
ly affect the client's plan for investment.
Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply
to standard commercial transactions be-
tween the lawyer and the client for
products or services that the client gen-
erally markets to others, for example,
banking or brokerage services, medical
services, products manufactured or dis-
tributed by the client, and- utilities ser-
vices. In such transactions, the lawyer
has no advantage in dealing with the
client, and the restrictions in paragraph
(a) are unnecessary and impracticable.
A lawyer may accept a gift from a
client, if the transaction meets general
standards of fairness. For example, a
simple gift such as a present given at a
holiday or as a token of appreciation is
permitted. If effectuation of a substan-
tial gift requires preparing a legal in-
strument such as a will or conveyance,
however, the client should have the
detached advice that another lawyer
can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an
exception where the client is a relative
of the donee or the gift is not substan-
tial.
Literary Rights
An agreement by which a lawyer
acquires literary or media rights con-
cerning the conduct of the representa-
tion creates a conflict between the inter-
ests of the client and the personal inter-
ests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in
the representation of the client may
detract from the publication value of an
account of the representation. Para-
graph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer
representing a client in a transaction
concerning literary property from
agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall
consist of a share in ownership in the
property, if the arrangement conforms
to Rule 1.5 and paragraph ().
Person Paying for Lawyeres Services
Rule 1.8(f) requires disclosure of the
fact that the lawyer's services are being
paid for by a third party. Such an
arrangement must also conform to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning
confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning
conflict of interest. Where the client is a
class, consent may be obtained on behalf
of the class by court-supervised proce-
dure.
Family Relationships Between Law-
yer-s
Rule 1.8(i applies to related lawyers
who are in different firms. Related law-
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yers in the same firm are governed by
Rules 1.7. 1.9. and 1.10. The disqualifica-
tion stated in Rule 1.8(i) is personal and
is not imputed to members of firms with
whom the lawyers are associated.
Acquisition of Interest in Litigation
Paragraph (j) states the traditional
general rule that lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring a proprietary interest in
litigation. This general rule, which has
its basis in common law champerty and
maintenance, is subject to specific excep-
tions developed in decisional law and
continued in these Rules, such as the ex-
ception for reasonable contingent fees set
forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for
certain advances of the costs of litigation
set forth in paragraph (e).
This Rule is not intended to apply to
customary qualification and limitations
in legal opinions and memoranda.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 5-
104(A) provided that a lawyer "shall not
enter into a business transaction with a
client if they have differing interests
therein and if the client expects the law-
yer to exercise his professional judgment
therein for the protection of the client
unless the client has consented after full
disclosure." EC 5-3 stated that a lawyer
"should not seek to persuade his client to
permit him to invest in an undertaking
of his client nor make improper use of
his professional relationship to influence
his client to invest in an enterprise in
which the lawyer is interested."
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 4-
101(BK3) provided that a lawyer should
not use -a confidence or secret of his cli-
ent for the advantage of himself, or of a
third person, unless the client consents
after full disclosure."
There was no counterpart to para-
graph (c) in the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. EC 5-5 stated that a lawyer
"should not suggest to his client that a
gift be made to himself or for his benefit.
If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client.
he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge
that he unduly influenced or overreached
the client. If a client voluntarily offers to
make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer
may accept the gift, but before doing so.
he should urge that the client secure dis-
interested advice from an independent.
competent person who is cognizant of all
the circumstances. Other than in excep-
tional circumstances, a lawyer should in-
sist that an instrument in which his cli-
ent desires to name him beneficially be
prepared by another lawyer selected by
the client."
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar
to DR 5-104(B), but refers to "literary or
media" rights, a more generally inclusive
term than "publication" rights.
Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5-
103(B), but eliminates the requirement
that "the client remains ultimately liable
for such expenses."
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in
the Model Code.
Paragraph (f) is substantially identi-
cal to DR 5-107(A)(1).
Paragraph (g) is substantially identi-
cal to DR 5-106.
The first clause of paragraph (h) is
similar to DR 6-102(A). There was no
counterpart in the Model Code to the sec-
ond clause of paragraph (h).
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in
the Model Code.
Paragraph (j) is substantially identi-
cal to DR 5-103(A).
RULE 1.9 Conflict of nteresL For-
mer Client
(a) A lawyer tWho formerly rep-
resented a client in a atter shall not
thereafter represent another person
in the same or a sub antially related
matter in which th person's inter-
ests are materially verse to the in-
terests of the former client unless the
former client consen after consulta-
tion.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly
represent a person i the same or a
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yers in the sa firm are governed by he is peculiarly suscepti le to the charge
Rules 1.7. 1.9. a d 1.10. The disqualifica- that he unduly influenceJ or overreached
tion stated in R le 1.8(i) is personal and the client. If a client vol ntarily offers to
is not imputed t' members of firms with make a gift to his Ia yer. the lawyer
whom the lawye s are associated. may accept the gift. but before doing so.
Acquisition of terest in Litigation he should urge that the lient secure dis-
Paragraph (j states the traditional interested advice from in independent.
general rule tha lawyers are prohibited competent person who is cognizant of all
from acquiring proprietary interest in the circumstances. Othe than in excep-
litigation. This eneral rule, which has tional circumstances, a t wyer should in-
its basis in com non law champerty and sist that an instrument which his cli-
maintenance, is ;ubject to specific excep- ent desires to name hin beneficially be
tions developed in decisional law and prepared by another lav er selected by
continued in the e Rules. such as the ex- the client."
ception for reaso iable contingent fees set Paragraph (d) is subs ntially similar
forth in Rule 1. and the exception for to DR 5-104(B), but refe to "literary or
certain advances of the costs of litigation media" rights, a more ge erally inclusive
set forth in para raph (e). term than "publication" rights.
This Rule is n t intended to apply to Paragraph (e)(1) is si ilar to DR 5-
customary quali cation and limitations 103(B), but eliminates he requirement
in legal opinions and memoranda. that "the client remains Itimately liable
MODEL CODE (OMPARISON for such expenses."
With regard tparagraph (a). DR Paragraph (e)(2) has m 3 counterpart in
104(A) provided i hat a lawyer "shall not the Model Code.
enter into a busi ess transaction with a Paragraph (f) is subs ntially identi-
client if they hve differing interests cal to DR 5-107(AXI).
therein and if the client expects the law- Paragraph (g) is sub ntially identi-
yer to exercise hi professional judgment cal to DR 5-106.
therein for the 1 rotection of the client. The first clause of ragraph (h) is
unless the client tas consented after full similar to DR 6-102(A There was no
disclosure." EC -3 stated that a lawyer counterpart in the Mode Code to the sec-
"should not seek z persuade his client to ond clause of paragraph (h).
permit him to ir vest in an undertaking Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in
of his client nor make improper use of the Model Code.
his professional i elationship to influence Paragraph (j) is subs antially identi-
his client to inv in an enterprise in cal to DR 5-103(A).
which the lawye is interested." RULE 1.9 Conflict of I terese For-
With regard 0 paragraph (b). DR 4- mer Client
101(B3() providi I that a lawyer should (a) A lawyer'who has formerly rep-
not use 'a confida nce or secret of his cli- resented a client in a matter shall not
ent for the advan tage of himself, or of a thereafter represent another person
third person, un ess the client consents in the same or a substantially related
after full discios re." matter in which that person's inter-
There was no counterpart to para- ests are materially adverse to the in-
graph (c) in the isciplinary Rules of the terests of the former client unless the
Model Code. EC 5 stated that a lawyer former client consents after consulta-
.should not sugg t to his client that a tion.
gift be made to hi self or for his benefit. (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly
If a lawyer accep a gift from his client, represent a person in the same or a
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substantially related matter in which
a firm with which the lawyer former-
ly was associated had previously rep-
resented a client
(1) whose interests are materially
adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material
to the matter;.
unless the former client consents af-
ter consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly rep-
resented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:.
(1) use information relating to the
representation to the disadvantage
of the former client except as Rule
1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or re-
quire with respect to a client, or
when the information has become
generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to
the representation except as Rule
1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or re-
quire with respect to a client.
COMMENT:
After termination of a client-lawyer
relationship, a lawyer may not represent
another client except in conformity with
this Rule. The principles in Rule 1.7 de-
termine whether the interests of the pre-
sent and former client are adverse. Thus,
a lawyer could not properly seek to re-
scind on behalf of a new client a contract
drafted on behalf of the former client. So
also a lawyer who has prosecuted an ac-
cused person could not properly repre-
sent the accused in a subsequent civil ac-
tion against the government concerning
the same transaction.
The scope of a "matter" for purposes
of this Rule may depend on the facts of a
particular situation Gr transaction. The
lawyer's involvement in a matter can al-
so be a question of degree. When a law-
yer has been directly involved in a specif-
ic transaction, subsequent representa-
tion of other clients with materially
adverse interests clearly is prohibited.
On the other hand. a lawyer who recur-
rently handled a type of problem for a
former client is not precluded from later
representing another client in a wholly
distinct problem of that type even
though the subsequent representation in-
volves a position adverse to the prior cli-
ent. Similar considerations can apply to
the reassignment of military lawyers be-
tween defense and prosecution functions
within the same military jurisdiction.
The underlying question is whether the
lawyer was so involved in the matter
that the subsequent representation can
be justly regarded as a changing of sides
in the matter in question.
Lawyers Moving Between Firms
When lawyers have been associated
within a firm but then end their associa-
tion, the question of whether a lawyer
should undertake representation is more
complicated- There are several competing
considerations. First, the client previous-
ly represented by the former firm must
be reasonably assured that the principle
of loyalty to the client is not compro-
mised. Second, the rule should not be so
broadly cast as to preclude other persons
from having reasonable choice of legal
counsel. Third, the rule should not un-
reasonably hamper lawyers from form-
ing new associations and taking on new
clients after having left a previous asso-
ciation. In this connection, it should be
recognized that today many lawyers
practice in firms, that many lawyers to
some degree limit their practice to one
field or another, and that many move
from one association to another several
times in their careers. If the concept of
imputation were applied with unqualified
rigor, the result would be radical curtail-
ment of the opportunity of lawyers to
move from one practice setting to anoth-
er and of the opportunity of clients to
change counsel.
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Reconciliation of these competing
principles in the past has been attempted
under two rubrics. One approach has
been to seek per se rules of disqualifica-
tion. For example, it has been held that a
partner in a law firm is conclusively pre-
sumed to have access to all confidences
concerning all clients of the firm. Under
this analysis, if a lawyer has been a part-
ner in one law firm and then becomes a
partner in another law firm, there may
be a presumption that all confidences
known by the partner in the first firm are
known to all partners in the second firm.
This presumption might properly be ap-
plied in some circumstances, especially
where the client has been extensively
represented, but may be unrealistic
where the client was represented only for
limited purposes. Furthermore, such a
rigid rule exaggerates the difference be-
tween a partner and an associate in mod-
ern law firms.
The other rubric formerly used for
dealing with disqualification is the ap-
pearance of impropriety proscribed in
Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. This rubric has
a two fold problem. First, the appearance
of impropriety can be taken to include
any new client-lawyer relationship that
might make a former client feel anxious.
If that meaning were adopted, disqualifi-
cation would become little more than a
question of subjective judgment by the
former client. Second, since "improprie-
ty" is undefined, the term "appearance of
impropriety" is question-begging. It
therefore has to be recognized that the
problem of disqualification cannot be
properly resolved either by simple analo-
gy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the
very general concept of appearance of
impropriety.
Confidentiality
Preserving confidentiality is a question
of access to information. Access to infor-
mation, in turn, is essentially a question.
of fact in particular circumstances, aided
by inferences, deductions or working pre-
sumptions that reasonably may be made
about the way in which lawyers work to-
gether. A lawyer may have general ac-
cess to files of all clients of a law firm
and may regularly participate in discus-
sions of their affairs; it should be in-
ferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy
to all information about all the firm's
clients. In contrast, another lawyer may
have access to the files of only a limited
number of clients and participate in dis-
cussions of the affairs of no other clients;
in the absence of information to the con-
trary, it should be inferred that such a
lawyer in fact is privy to information
about the clients actually served but not
those of other clients.
Application of paragraph (b) depends
on a situation's particular facts. In such
an inquiry, the burden of proof should
rest upon the firm whose disqualification
is sought.
Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify
the lawyer only when the lawyer in-
volved has actual knowledge of informa-
tion protected by Rules 1.6 and l-9(b).
Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm
acquired no knowledge or information
relating to a particular client of the firm,
and that lawyer later joined another
firm, neither the lawyer individually nor
the second firm is disqualified from rep-
resenting another client in the same or a
related matter even though the interests
of the two clients conflict. See Rule
1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once
a lawyer has terminated association with
the firm.
Independent of thl question of disqual-
ification of a firm, a lawyer changing
professional association has a continuing
duty to preserve confidentiality of infor-
mation about a client formerly repre-
sented. See Rules 1.6 and 1-9.
Adverse Positions
The-second aspect of loyalty to a client
is the lawyer's obligation to decline sub-
sequent representations involving posi-
tions adverse to a former client arising
in substantially related matters. This ob-
ligation requires abstention from ad-
verse representation by the individual
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lawyer involved, but does not properly
entail abstention of other lawyers
through imputed disqualification. Hence.
this aspect of the problem is governed by
Rule 1.9(a). Thus, if a lawyer left one
firm for another, the new affiliation
would not preclude the firms involved
from continuingto represent clients with
adverse interests in the same or related
mafters, so long as the conditions of
paragraphs (b) and (c) concerning confi-
dentiality have been met.
Information acquired by the lawyer in
the course of representing a client may
not subsequently be used or revealed by
the lawyer to the disadvantage of the cli-
ent. However, the fact that a lawyer has
once served a client does not preclude the
lawyer from using generally known in-
formation about that client when later
representing another client.
Disqualification from subsequent rep-
resentation is for the protection of for-
mer clients and can be waived by them.
A waiver is effective only if there is dis-
closure of the circumstances, including
the lawyer's intended role in behalf of
the new client.
With regard to an opposing party's
raising a question of conflict of interest,
see Comment to Rule 1-7. With regard to
disqualification of a firm with which a
lawyer is or was formerly associated, see
Rule 1.10.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule
in the Disciplinary Rules of the Model
Code. Representation adverse to a former
client was sometimes dealt with under
the rubric of Canon 9 of the Model Code,
which provided: "A lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety." Al-
so applicable were EC 4-6 which stated
that the "obligation of a lawyer to pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of his
client continues after the termination of
his employment" and Canon 5 which
12-Z-9G AB A01A La- N
stated that '"a] lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client."
The provision for waiver by the former
client in paragraphs (a) and (b) is simi-
lar to DR 5-105(C).
The exception in the last clause of
paragraph (cXI) permits a lawyer to use
information relating to a former client
that is in the "public domain," a use that
was also not prohibited by the Model
Code, which protected only "confidences
and secrets." Since the scope of
paragraphs (a) and (b) is much broader
than "confidences and secrets," it is nec-
essary to define when a lawyer may make
use of information about a client after
the client-lawyer relationship has termi-
nated.
RULE [.10 Im ted Disqualification:
General Rule
(a) While lav yers are associated in
a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a cli nt when any one of
them practici alone would be pro-
hibited from d ing so by Rules 1.7,
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.
(b) When a L twyer has terminated
an association v ith a firm, the firm is
not prohibited I ram thereafter repre-
senting a perso with interests mate-
rially adverse L those of a client rep-
resented by th, formerly associated,
lawyer and not :urrently represented
by the firm, uni
(1) the mat r is the same or sub-
stantially re ed to that in which
the formerly sociated lawyer rep-
resented the c lent; and
(2) any la r remaining in the
firm has info tion protected by
Rules 1.6 and L 9(c) that is material
to the matter.
(c) A disqualifi ation prescribed by
this rule may be '[aived by the affect-
ed client under t1e conditions stated
in Rule 1.7. it
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lawyer involved, but does not properly
entail abstenti, n of other -lawyers
through imputed isqualification. Hence,
this aspect of the roblem is governed by
Rule 1.9(a). Thus if a lawyer left one
firm for anothe!, the new affiliation
would not preclu 3e the firms involved
from continuing' represent clients with
adverse interests n the same or related
matters, so long as the conditions of
lparagraphs (b) an I (c) concerning confi-
dentiality have be n met.
Information acc aired by the lawyer in
the course of repr enting a client may
not subsequently 4e used or revealed by
the lawyer to the d sadvantage of the cli-
ent. However, the act that a lawyer has
once served a client does not'preclude the
lawyer from using generally known in-
formation about t at client when later
representing anoth r client.
Disqualification om subsequent rep-
resentation is for e protection of for-
mer clients and ca be waived by them.
A waiver is effectiv only if there is dis-
closure of the circ instances, including
the lawyer's intend role in behalf of
the new client-
With regard to
raising a question o
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disqualification of
lawyer is or was for
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There was no -c terpart to this Rule
in the Disciplina Rules of the Model
Code. Representati adverse to a former
client was sometisen dealt with under
the rubric of Cano 9 of the Model Code,
which provided: lawyer should avoid
even the appearan e of impropriety- Al-
so applicable we EC 4-6 which stated
that the "obligati n of a lawyer to pre-
serve the confide and secrets of his
client continues a ter the termination of
his employment' and Canon 5 which
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stated that Ila] wyer should exercise
independent profi sional judgment on
behalf of a client-'
The provision fo waiver by the former
client in paragrap is (a) and (b) is simi-
lar to DR 5-105(C)
The exception i the last clause of
paragraph (cX1) p rmits a lawyer to use
information relati to a former client
that is in the "pub ic domain," a use that
was also not pro ibited by the Model
Code, which prote :ted only "confidences
and secrets." ! ince the scope of
paragraphs (a) an (b) is much broader
than "confidences nd secrets," it is nec-
essary to define wh n alawyer may make
use of information about a client after
the client-lalvyer ationship has termi-
nated-
RULE 1.10 Imputed Disqualification:
General Rule
(a) While lawyers are associated in
a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of
them practicing alone would be pro-
hibited from doing so by Rules 1.7,
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated
an association with a firm, the firm is
not prohibited from thereafter repre-
senting a person with interests mate-
rially adverse to those of a client rep-
resented by the formerly associated
lawyer and not currently represented
by the firm, unless:
(I) the matter is the same or sub-
stantially related to that in which
the formerly associated lawyer rep-
resented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the
firm has information protected by
Rules G and S.(c) that is material
to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by
this rule may be waived by the affect-
ed client under the conditions stated
in Rule t.7.
Mz_%
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COMMENT.
Definition of "Firm"
For purposes of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the term "firm" includes
lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in
the legal department of a corporation or
other organization, or in a legal services
organization. Whether two or more law-
yers constitute a firm within this defini-
tion can depend on the specific facts. For
example, two practitioners who share of-
fice space and occasionally consult or as-
sist each other ordinarily would not be
regarded as constituting a firm. How-
ever, if they present themselves to the
public in a way suggesting that they are
a firm or conduct themselves as a firm,
they should be regarded as a firm for the
purposes of the Rules. The terms of any
formal agreement between associated
lawyers are relevant in determining
whether they are a firm, as is the fact
that they have mutual access to informa-
tion concerning the clients they serve.
Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful
cases to consider the underlying purpose
of the Rule that is involved. A group of
lawyers could be regarded as a firm for
purposes of the rule that the same law-
yer should not represent opposing par-
ties in litigation, while it might not be so
regarded for purposes of the rule that
information acquired by one lawyer is
attributed to the other.
With respect to the law department of
an organization, there is ordinarily no
question that the members of the depart-
ment constitute a firm within the mean-
ing of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
However. there can be uncertainty as to
the identity of the client For example, it
may not be clear whether the law depart-
ment of a corporation represents a sub-
sidiary or an affiliated corporation, as
well as the corporation by which the
members of the department are directly
employed. A similar question-can arise
concerning an unincorporated associa-
tion and its local affiliates.
Similar questions can also arise with
respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers
employed in the same unit of a legal ser-
vice organization constitute a firm, but
not necessarily those employed in sepa-
rate units. As in the case of independent
practitioners, whether the lawyers
should be treated as associated with each
other can depend on the particular rule
that is involved, and on the specific facts
of the situation.
Where a lawyer has joined a private
firm after having represented the gov-
ernment, the situation is governed by
Rule 1.11(a) and (b); where a lawyer rep-
resents the government after having
served private clients, the situation is
governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1). The individ-
ual lawyer involved is bound by the
Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7
and 1.9.
Different provisions are thus made for
movement of a lawyer from one private
firm to another and for movement of a
lawyer between a private firm and the
government- The government is entitled
to protection of its client confidences
and, therefore, to the protections provid-
ed in Rules 1.6, 1.9 and 1.11. However, if
the more extensive disqualification in
Rule 1.10 were applied to former govern-
ment lawyers, the potential effect on the
government would be unduly burden-
some- The government deals with all pri-
vate citizens and organizations and,
thus, has a much wider circle of adverse
legal interests than does any private law
firm. In these circumstances, the govern-
ment's recruitment of lawyers-would be
seriously impaired if Rule 1.10 were ap-
plied to the government. On balance.
therefore, the government is better
served in the long run by the protections
stated in Rule 1.11.
Principles of Imputed Disqualifica-
tion
The-rule of- imputed disqualification
stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the
principle of loyalty to the client as it ap-
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plies to lawyers who practice in a law
firm. Such situations can be considered
from the premise that a firm of lawyers
is essentially one lawyer for purposes of
the rules governing loyalty to the client.
or from the premise that each lawyer is
vicariously bound by the obligation of
loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom
the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a)
operates only among the lawyers cur-
rently associated in a firm. When a law-
yer moves from one firm to another, the
situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and
1.10(b).
Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law
firm, under certain circumstances, to
represent a person with interests directly
adverse to those of a client represented
by a lawyer who formerly was associated
with the firm. The Rule applies regard-
less of when the formerly associated law-
yer represented the client. However, the
law firm may not represent a person with
interests adverse to those of a present
client of the firm, which would violate
Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not rep-
resent the person where the matter is the
same or substantially related to that in
which the formerly associated lawyer
represented the client and any other law-
yer currently in the firm has material
information protected by Rules 1.6 and
1.9(c).
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-I05(D) provided that "(ijf a law-
yer is required to decline or to withdraw
from employment under a Disciplinary
Rule, no partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, may accept or continue such em-
ployment."
RULE 1.11 Succesive Government
and Private Emt loyment
(a) Except as 1a4 may otherwise ex-
pressly permit, a Iwyer shall not rep-
resent a private client in connection\
with a matter in
participated perso
tially as a public c
unless the approl
agency consents i
No lawyer in a fir
lawyer is associat
undertake or cont
in such a matter
(1) the disq4
screened from
the matter and
part of the fee tl
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en to the approl
agency to enab]
compliance with
this Rule.
(b) Except as law
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could be used to tl
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(c) Except as law
pressly permit, a I
public officer or en(1) participat,
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obligation to under the representa-
tion competently (see Rule 1.1); the obli-
gation to avoid dis alifying conflicts.
and to secure client esent after consul-forthse cot be
tation for tho c which can be
agreed to (see Rule .7); and the obliga-
tion to protect inf mation relating to
the representation ( ee Rules 1.6 and 1.9).
If approval of th substitution of the
purchasing attorne - for the selling at-
torney is required y the rules of any
tribunal in which matter is pending,
such approval mu be obtained before
the matter can be included in the sale
(see Rule 1.16).
Applicability of t e Rule
This Rule applie to the sale of a law
practice by represei tatives of a deceased,
disabled or disapp eared lawyer. Thus,
the seller may be r presented by a non-
lawyer represents ;ive not subject to
these Rules. Since, however, no lawyer
may participate in a sale of a law prac-
tice which does no conform to the re-
quirements of this ule, the representa-
tives of the selleri- well as the purchas-
ing lawyer can be pected to see to it
that they are met.
Admission to or etirement from a law
partnership or pr essional association,
retirement plans nd similar arrange-
ments, and a sale f tangible assets of a
law practice, do n constitute a sale or
purchase governed y this Rule.
This Rule does t apply to the trans-
fers of legal rep tation between law-
yers when such t fers are unrelated
to the sale of a pr tice.
MODEL CODE MPARISON
There was no unterpart to this Rule
in the Model Cod.
COUNSELOR
RULE L. Advisor
In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent profes-
sional Judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice,. alawyer-
may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, econom-
TANDARDS No. 89
ic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situa-
tion.
COMMENT:
Scope of Advice
A client is entitled to straightforward
advice expressing the lawyer's honest as-
sessment. Legal advice often involves un-
pleasant facts and alternatives that a cli-
ent may be disinclined to confront. In
presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to
sustain the client's morale and may put
advice in as acceptable a form as honesty
permits. However, a lawyer should not be
deterred from giving candid advice by
the prospect that the advice will be un-
palatable to the client.
Advice couched in narrowly legal
terms may be of little value to a client,
especially where practical considera-
tions, such as cost or effects on other peo-
ple, are predominant. Purely technical le-
gal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical con-
siderations in giving advice- Although a
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such,
moral and ethical considerations im-
pinge upon most legal questions and may
decisively influence how the law will be
applied.
A client may expressly or impliedly
ask the lawyer for purely technical ad-
vice. When such a request is made by a
client experienced in legal matters, the
lawyer may accept it at face value. When
such a request is made by a client inexpe-
rienced in legal matters, however, the
lawyer's responsibility ai advisor may
include indicating that more may be in-
volved than strictly legal considerations.
Matters that go beyond strictly legal
questions may also be in the domain of
another profession. Family matters can
involve problems within the professional
competence of psychiatry, clinical psy-
chology or social work; business matters
can involve problems within the compe-
tence of the-accounting profession or of
financial specialists. Where consultation
with a professional in another field is it-
ABA/SNA La-yre" Meatal eo Praf.atoa.Il Cduct
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self something a competent lawyer would
recommend, the lawyer should make
such a recommendation. At the same
time, a lawyer's advice at its best often
consists of recommending a course of ac-
tion in the face of conflicting recommen-
dations of experts.
Offering Advice
In general, a lawyer is not expected to
give advice until asked by the client.
However, when a lawyer knows that a
client proposes a course of action that is
likely to result in substantial adverse le-
gal consequences to the client, duty to
the client under Rule 1.4 may require
that the lawyer act if the client's course
of action is related to the representation.
A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to ini-
tiate investigation of a client's affairs or
to give advice that the client has indicat-
ed is unwanted, but a lawyer may ini-
tiate advice to a client when doing so ap-
pears to be in the client's interest.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to
this Rule in the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. DR 5-107(B) provided that a
lawyer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays him to
render legal services for another to direct
or regulate his professional judgment in
rendering such legal services." EC 7-8
stated that '"a]dvice of a lawyer to his
client need not be confined to purely legal
considerations.... In assisting his client
to reach a proper decision, it is often de-
sirable for a lawyer to point out those
factors which may lead to a decision that
is morally just as well as legally permis-
sible- In the final analysis, however,..
the decision whether to forego legally
available objectives or methods because
of non-legal factors is ultimately for the
client.-."
RULE 2.2 Inter ediary
(a) A lawyer : ay act as intermedi-
ary between cli, ts if:
(L) the law r consults with each
client concer4 ing the implications
of the comm representation, in-
cluding thA advantages and risks in-
volved, an the effect on the attor-
ney-client privileges, and obtains
each client consent to the common
representa on;
(2) the la yer reasonably believes
that the in tter can be resolved on
terms com atible with the clients'
best interes, that each client will
be able to make adequately in-
formed dec sions in the matter and
that there s little risk of material
prejudice t the interests of any of
the clients i 'the contemplated reso-
lution is u uccessful; and
(3) the Is yer reasonably believes
that the co mon representation can
be under ken impartially and
without i proper effect on other
responsibi ities the lawyer has to
any of the lients.
(b) While acting as intermediary,
the lawyer s all consult with each cli-
ent concern ng the decisions to be
made and th. considerations relevant
in making t iem, so that each client
can make a equately informed deci-
sions.
(c) A la r shall withdraw as in-
termediary i any of the clients so re-
quests, or if ny of the conditions stat-
ed in paragr ph (a) is no longer satis-
fied. Upon ithdrawal, the lawyer
shall not con inue to represent any of
the clients it
subject of th
COMMENT.
the matter that was the
intermediation.
A lawyer cts as intermediary under
this Rule whea the lawyer represents two
or more parties with potentially conflict-
ing interests. A, key factor in defining the
.relationship i; whether the parties share
responsibili for the lawyer's fee, but
the common presentation may be in-
ferred from ther circumstances. Be-
cause confusi n can arise as to the law-
yer's role wh e each party is not sepa-
-rately represe ted. it is important that
the lawyer ma e clear the relationship.
The Rule d not apply to a lawyer
acting as arbit ator or mediator between
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self something a corn tent lawyer would
recommend, the la yer should make
such a recommenda ion. At the same
time, a lawyer's adv at its best often
consists of recomme ding a course of ac-
tion in the face of c flicting recommen-
dations of experts.
Offering Advice
In general, a Is. er is not expected to
give advice until sked by the client.
However, when a wyer knows that a
client proposes a rse of action that is
likely to result in s bstantial adverse le-
gal consequences the client, duty to
the client under ule 1.4 may require
that the lawyer ac if the client's course
of action is related the representation.
A lawyer ordinari has no duty to ini-
tiate investigation f a client's affairs or
to give advice that he client has indicat-
ed is unwanted, b t a lawyer may ini-
tiate advice to a el nt when doing so ap-
pears to be in the lient's interest.
MODEL CODE C( MPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to
this Rule in the Di ciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. DR 5-07(B) provided that a
lawyer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, emp oys, or pays him to
render legal servia s for another to direct
or regulate his prc fessional judgment in
rendering such le al services." EC 7-8
stated that "la~dvie of a lawyer to his
client need not be nfined to purely legal
considerations.. I assisting his client
to reach proper ecision, it is often de-
sirable for a la r to point out those
factors which ma lead to a decision that
is morally just as ,ell as legally permis-
sible. In the fin analysis, however_
the decision wh her to forego legally
available objecti+s or methods because
of non-legal facto is ultimately for the
client-.."
RULE 2.2 Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as intermedi-
ary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each
client concerning the implications
of the common representation. in-
ROFESSIONAL .CONDUCT 01:143
cluding the advantages and risks in-
volved, and the effect on the attor-
ney-client privileges, and obtains
each client's consent to the common
representation:
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes
that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the clients'
best interests, that each client will
be able to make adequately in-
formed decisions in the matter and
that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of
the clients if the contemplated reso-
lution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes
that the common representation can
be undertaken impartially and
without improper effect on other
responsibilities the lawyer has to
any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary,
the lawyer shall consult with each cli-
ent concerning the decisions to be
made and the considerations relevant
in making them, so that each client
can make adequately informed deci-
sions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as in-
termediary if any of the clients so re-
quests, or if any of the conditions stat-
ed in paragraph (a) is no longer satis-
fied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer
shall not continue to represent any of
the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation.
COMMENT:
A lawyer acts as intermediary under
this Rule when the lawyer represents two
or more parties with potentially conflict-
ing interests. A key factor in defining the
relationship is whether the parties share
responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but
the common representation may be in-
ferred from other circumstances. Be-
cause confusion can arise as to the law-
yer's role where each party is not sepa-
rately represented, it is important that
the lawyer make clear the relationship.
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer
acting as arbitrator or mediator between
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or among parties who are not clients of
the lawyer, even where the lawyer has
been appointed with the concurrence of
the parties. In performing such a role the
lawyer may be subject to applicable
codes of ethics, such as the Code of Eth-
ics for Arbitration in Commercial Dis-
putes prepared by a joint Committee of
the American Bar Association and the
American Arbitration Association.
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seek-
ing to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mu-
tually advantageous basis; for example,
in helping to organize a business in
which two or more clients are entrepre-
neurs, working out the financial reorga-
nization of an enterprise in which two or
more clients have an interest, arranging
a property distribution in settlement of
an estate or mediating a dispute between
clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve po-
tentially conflicting interests by develop-
ing the parties' mutual interests. The al-
ternative can be that each party may
have to obtain separate representation,
with the possibility in some situations of
incurring additional cost, complication
or even litigation. Given these and other
relevant factors, all the clients may pre-
fer that the lawyer act as intermediary.
In considering whether to act as inter-
mediary between clients, a lawyer should
be mindful that if the intermediation
fails the result can be additional cost.
embarrassment and recrimination. In
some situations the risk of failure is so
great that intermediation is plainly im-
possible. For example, a lawyer cannot
undertake common representation of cli-
ents between whom contentious litiga-
tion is imminent or who contemplate
contentious negotiations. More generally.
if the relationship between the parties
has already assumed definite antago-
nism, the possibility that the clients' in-
terests can be adjusted by intermedia-
tion ordinarily is not very good.
The appropriateness of intermediation
can depend on its form. Forms of inter-
mediation range from informal arbitra-
tion, where each client's case is presented
by the respective client'and the lawyer
decides the outcome, to mediation, to
common representation where the cli-
ents' interests are substantially though
not entirely compatible. One form may
be appropriate in circumstances where
another would. not. Other relevant fac-
tors are whether the lawyer subsequent-
ly will represent both parties on a con-
tinuing basis and whether the situation
involves creating a relationship between
the parties or terminating one.
Confidentiality and Privilege
A particularly important factor in de-
termining the appropriateness of inter-
mediation is the effect on client-lawyer
confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege. In a common representation,
the lawyer is still required both to keep
each client adequately informed and to
maintain confidentiality of information
relating to the representation. See Rules
1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both require-
ments while acting as intermediary re-
quires a delicate balance. If the balance
cannot be maintained, the common rep-
resentation is improper. With regard to
the attorney-client privilege, the prevail-
ing rule is that as between commonly
represented clients the privilege does not
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if
litigation eventuates between the clients,
the privilege will not protect any such
communications, and the clients should
be so advised.
Since the lawyer is required to be im-
partial between commonly represented
clients, intermediation is improper when
that impartiality cannot be maintained.
For example, a lawyer who has repre-
sented one of the clients for a long period
and in a variety of matters might have
difficulty being impartial between that
client and one to whom the lawyer has
only recently been introduced.
Consultation
In acting as intermediary between cli-
ents, the lawyer is required to consult
with the clients on the implications of
doing so, and proceed only upon consent
AD/JBNA L&-.,yn Meutuul on Prufeomal C..det
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based on such a consultation. The consul-
tation should make clear that the law-
yer's role is not that of partisanship nor-
mally expected in other circumstances.
Paragraph (b) is an application of the
principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where
the lawyer is intermediary, the clients
ordinarily must assume greater respon-
sibility for decisions than when each cli-
ent is independently represented.
Withdrawal
Common representation does not di-
minish the rights of each client in the
client-lawyer relationship. Each has the
right to loyal and diligent representa-
tion, the right to discharge the lawyer as
stated in Rule 1.16, and the protection of
Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a for-
mer client.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to
this Rule in the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. EC 6-20 stated that a "law-
yer is often asked to serve as an impar-
tial arbitrator or mediator in matters
which involve present or former clients.
He may serve in either capacity if he first
discloses such present or former rela-
tionships." DR 6-105(B) provided that a
lawyer "shall not continue multiple em-
ployment if the exercise of his indepen-
dent judgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by
his representation of another client, or if
it would be likely to involve him in repre-
sentation of differing interests, except to
the extent permitted 'under DR 5-
105(C)." DR 6-105(C) provided that "a
lawyer may represent multiple clients if
it is obvious that he can adequately rep-
resent the interests of each and if each
consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment on be-
half of each."
RULE 23 EvaluajIon for Use by
Third Persons
(a) A lawyer may undertake an
evaluation of a to tter affecting a cli-
PROFESSION L CONDUCT 01:145
ant for the e of someone other than
the client If
(1) the I wyer reasonably believer
that makig the evaluation is com-
patible w th other aspects of the
lawyer's telationship with the cli-
ent; and
(2) the 4 lient consents after con-
sultation.
(b) Except as disclosure is required
in connectioz with a report of an eval-
uation. info fration relating to the
. n&. I* *j#if aS* #%.ULV I
Rule 1.6.
COMMENT.
Definition
An evaluati n may be performed at
the client's dir ction but for the primary
purpose of est blishing information for
the benefit of ird parties; for example,
an opinion conerning the title of proper-
ty rendered at he behest of a vendor for
the informati n of a prospective pur-
chaser, or at t e behest of a borrower for
the informati n of a prospective lender.
In some situa ons, the evaluation may
be required b a government agency; for
example, an 4 pinion concerning the le-
gality of the s curities registered for sale
under the sec ,rities laws. In other in-
stances, the e aluation may be required
by a third per on. such as a purchaser of
a business.
Lawyers fo the government may be
called upon to give a formal opinion on
the legality of contemplated government
agency action. In making such an evalua-
tion, the govea nment lawyer acts at the
behest of the government as the client
but for the p rpoe of establishing the
limits of the I ency's authorized activi-
ty. Such an op ion is to be distinguished
from confide tial legal advice given
agency official. The critical question is
whether the o .nion is to be made public.
A legal eva uation should be distin-
guished from n investigation of a per-
son with who the lawyer does not have
a client-lawyei relationship. For exam-
ple. a lawyer tained by a purchaser to
analyze a vend r's title to property does
Publiehd by the Amertoa Set Aeodo bA.tt 66on4 T k* Ser"' et Vf k tn Aftr.. sec. 19S-26-90
No. 157 ABA Mt DEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
tractors, act for the I yer in rendition even though the plan
of the lawyer's profe sional services. A whole or in part on a pr
lawyer should give ch assistants ap- arrangement.
propriate instructio and supervision (b) A lawyer shall not f
concerning the ethi I aspects of their nership with a nonlawyer
employment, partic arly regarding the activities of the partnersh
obligation not to dis lose information re- the practice of law.
lating to representa on of the client, and (c) A lawyer shall not p
should be responstble for their work son who recommends, e
product. The meas res employed in su- pays the lawyer to rende
pervising nonlawy4 rs should take ac- vices for another to direct
count of the fact t at they do not have the lawyer's professional j
legal training and a e not subject to pro- rendering such legal servi
fessional discipline- (d) A lawyer shall not pi
MODEL CODE CO PARISON or in the form of a professi
ration or association aul
There was no di t counterpart to practice law for a profit, iL
this Rule in the M I Code. DR 4-101(D) (1) a nonlawyer owns a
provided that a Ia er "shall exercise therein, except that a fid
reasonable care to p vent his employees, resentative of the estate
associates, and othe whose services are may hold the stock or int
utilized by him fro disclosing or using lawyer for a reasonable t
confidences or seer of a clienL..." DR administration;
7-107(J) provided t at ' a] lawyer shall (2) a nonlawyer is a co
exercise reasonable care to prevent his rector or officer thereof;
employees and assciates from making (3) a nonlawyer has ti
an extrajudicial staement that he would direct or control the p
be prohibited from making under DR 7- judgment of a lawyer.
107."
RULE 5.4 Professional Independence
of a Lawyer
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, ex-
cept that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with
the lawyer's firm, partner, or asso-
ciate may provide for the payment
of money, over a reasonable period
of time after the lawyer's death, to
the lawyer's estate or to one or more
specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the
practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may. pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 1.17. pay to
the estate or other representative of
that lawyer the agreed-upon pur-
chase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may in-
clude nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan,
01:163
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COMMENT:
The provisions of this Rule express
traditional limitations on sharing fees.
These limitations are to protect the law-
yer's professional independence of judg-
ment. Where someone other than the cli-
ent pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or
recommends employment of the lawyer,
that arrangement does not modify the
lawyer's obligation to the client. As stat-
ed in paragraph (c), such arrangements
should not interfere with the lawyer's
professional judgment.
MODEL CODE COMP4RISON
Paragraph (a) is substantially identi-
cal to DR 3-102(A).
Paragraph (b) is substantially identi-
cal to DR 3-103(A).
Paragraph (c) is substantially identi-
cal to DR 5-107(B).
Paragraph (d)- is substantially identi-
cal to DR 5-107(C).
a-23-91 Publbhed by the America Bar AUeltioa ad The Bureu of Natil Afalrn. Ioc.
IDEL S
RULE 5-5 Unaut orized Practice of
Law
A lawyer shall ot:
(a) practice Ia in a jurisdiction
where doing so via ates the regulation
of the legal prof sion in that juris-
diction; or
(b) assist a pe son who is not a
member of the bar in the performance
of activity that co titutes the unau-
thorized practice f law.
COMMENT.
The definition of t e practice of law is
established by law nd varies from one
jurisdiction to ano er. Whatever the
definition, limiting e practice of law to
members of the bar rotects the public
against rendition of services by un-
qualified persons. Pa ph (b) does not
prohibit a lawyer f im employing the
services of paraprof ionals and dele-
gating functions to t em, so long as the
lawyer supervises t e delegated work
and retains responsib lity for their work-
See Rule 5.3. Like * it does not prohib-
it lawyers from pro, ding professional
advice and instructi n to nonlawyers
whose employment uires knowledge
of law;, for example, aims adjusters,
employees of financial r commercial, in-
stitutions, social work rs, ac countants
and persons employ in government
agencies. In addition, a awyer may coun-
sel nonlawyers who wi h to proceed pro
se.
MODEL CODE COMP RISON
With regard to pa raph (a), DR 3-
101(B) of the Model e provided that
'Ta] lawyer shall not ctice law in a
jurisdiction where to d so would be in
violation of regulations f the profession
in that jurisdiction-"
With regard top aph (b), DR 3-
101(A) of the Model Cod provided that
"al lawyer shall not aid non-lawyer in
the unauthorized practi of law."
RULE 5.6 Restrictions n Right to
Practice
.A lawyer shall not psi
fering or making:
S-ZI-95 AS
ticipate in of-
(a) a partnership aI employment
agreement that restric the right of a
lawyer to practice aft r termination
of the relationship, eicept an agree-
ment concerning benifits upon retire-
ment; or
(b) an agreement i which a restric-
tion on the lawyer' right to practice
is part of the setthlment of a contro-
versy between priv te parties.e
COMMENT. [
An agreement retricting the right of
partners or associ: tes to practice after
leaving a firm not ,nly limits their pro-
fessional autonom but also limits the
freedom of client to choose a lawyer.
Paragraph (a) pro. 'ibits such agreements
except for restrit ns incident to provi-
sions concerning .tirement benefits for
service with the fir
Paragraph (b) p ohibits a lawyer from
agreeing not to re )resent other persons
in connection wit] settling a claim on
behalf of a client.
This Rule does aot apply to prohibit
restrictions that n y be included in the
terms of the sale o£ a law practice pursu-
ant to Rule 1.17.
MODEL CODE MXbPARISON
This Rule is sul stantially similar to
DR 2-108.
RULE 5.7 Responsibilities Regarding
Law-Related Services
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to the provision of law-related
services, as defined in paragraph (b),
if the law-related services are provid-
ede
"(I) by the lawyer in circum-
sitances that are not distinct from
the lawyer's provision of legal'ser-
vices to clients; or
(2) by a separate entity controlled
by the lawyer individually or with
/DNA L.-yefw Mansal on Pretinat Ceduct
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others if the lawyer fails to take
reasonable measures to assure that
a person obtaining the law-related
services knows that the services of
the separate entity are not legal
services and that the protections of
the client-lawyer relationship do
not exist-
(b) The term "law-related services"
denotes services that might reason-
ably be performed in conjunction
with and in substance are related to
the provision of legal services, and
that are not prohibited as unautho-
rized practice of law when provided
by a nonlawyer.
COMMENT
When a lawyer performs law-related
services or controls an organization that
does so, there exists the potential for eth-
ical problems. Principal among these is
the possibility that the person for whom
the law-related services are performed
fails to understand that the services may
not carry with them the protections nor-
mally afforded as part of the client-law-
yer relationship. The recipient of the
law-related services may expect, for ex-
ample, that the protection of client confi-
dences, prohibitions against representa-
tion of persons with conflicting interests,
and obligations of a lawyer to maintain
professional independence apply to the
provision of law-related services when
that may not be the case.
Rule 5.7 applies to the provision of
law-related services by a lawyer even
when the lawyer does not provide any
legal services to the person for whom the
law-related services are performed. The
Rule identifies the circumstances in
which all of the Rules of Professional
Conduct apply to the provision of law-
related services. Even when those cir-
cumstances do not exist, however, the
conduct of a lawyer involved -in-the pro-
vision of law-related services is subject
to those Rules that apply generally to
lawyer conduct, regardless of whether
the conduct involves the provision of le-
gal services. See, eg. Rule 8A.
When law-related services are provid-
ed by a lawyer under circumstances that
are not distinct from the lawyer's provi-
sion of legal services to clients, the law-
yer in providing the law-related services
must adhere to the requirements of the
Rules of Professional Conduct as provid-
ed in Rule 5.7(a)(1).
Law-related services also may be pro-
vided through an entity that is distinct
from that through which the lawyer pro-
vides legal services. If the lawyer individ-
ually or with others has control of such
an entity's operations, the Rule requires
the lawyer to take reasonable measures
to assure that each person using the ser-
vices of the entity knows that the ser-
vices provided by the entity are not legal
services and that the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct that relate to the client-
lawyer relationship do not apply. A law-
yer's control of an entity extends to the
ability to direct its operation. Whether a
lawyer has such control will depend upon
the circumstances of the particular case.
When a client-lawyer relationship ex-
ists with a person who is referred by a
lawyer to a separate law-related service
entity controlled by the lawyer, individu-
ally or with others, the lawyer must
comply with Rule L8(a).
In taking the reasonable measures re-
ferred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure
that a person using law-related services
understands the practical effect or sig-
nificance of the inapplicability of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the law-
yer should communicate to the person re-
ceiving the law-related serices, in a
manner sufficient to assure that the per-
son understands the significance of the
fact, that the relationship of the person
to the business entity will not be a client-
lawyer relationship. The communication
should be made before entering into an
agreement for provision of or providing
law-related services, and preferably
should be in writing.
The burden is upon the lawyer to show
that the lawyer has taken reasonable
measures under the circumstances to
communicate the desired understanding.
For instance, a sophisticated user of law-
IZ-25-M romisubd by th A,we'jma be Assoctio sad The Bureau of Natwesal Afraisi. ic.
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related services, such as a publicly held
corporation, may require a lesser expla-
nation than someone unaccustomed to
making distinctions between legal ser-
vices and law-related services, such as an
individual seeking tax advice from a law-
yer-accountant or investigative services
in connection with a lawsuit.
Regardless of the sophistication of po-
tential recipients of law-related services,
a lawyer should take special care to keep
'separate the provision of law-related and
legal services in order to minimize the
risk that the recipient will assume that
the law-related services are legal ser-
vices. The risk of such confusion is espe-
cially acute when the lawyer renders
both types of services with respect to the
same matter. Under some circumstances
the legal and law-related services may be
so closely entwined that they cannot be
distinguished from each other, and the
requirement of disclosure and consulta-
tion imposed by paragraph (aX2) of the
Rule cannot be met. In such a case a law-
yer will be responsible for assuring that
both the lawyer's conduct and, to the ex-
tent required by Rule 5.3, that of nonlaw-
yer employees in the distinct entity
which the lawyer controls complies in all
respects with the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
A broad range of economic and other
interests of clients may be served by law-
yers' engaging in the delivery of law-re-
lated services. Examples of law-related
services include providing title insur-
ance, financial planning, accounting,
trust services, real estate counseling, leg-
islative lobbying, economic analysis so-
cial work, psychological counseling, tax
return preparation, and patent, medical
or environmental consulting.
When a lawyer is obliged -to accord the
recipients of -such services the protec-
tions of those Rules that apply to -the
client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer
must take special care to heed the pro-
scriptions of the Rules addressing con-
flict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11,
especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a), (b) and
(f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 relating to dis-
closure, of confidential information. The
promotion of the law-related services
must also in all respects comply with
Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with ad-
vertising and solicitation. In that regard.
lawyers should take special care to iden-
tify the obligations that may be imposed
as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional
law.
When the full protections of all of the
Rules of Professional Conduct do not ap-
ply to the provision of law-related ser-
vices, principles of law external to the
Rules, for example, the law of principal
and agent, govern the legal duties owed
to those receiving the services. Those
other legal principles may establish a
different degree of protection for the re-
cipient with respect to confidentiality of
information, conflicts of interest and
permissible business relationships with
clients. See also Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule
in the Model Code
PUBLIC SE VICE
RULE 6.1 Voluntary ro Bone Pub-
lico Service
A lawyer should pire to render at
least (50) hours of ro bono publico
legal services per y r. In fulfilling
this responsibility, e lawyer shotd&
(a) provide a subs atial majority of
the (50) hours of I I services with-
out fee or expectatio of fee to:
(1) persons of Ii ited means or
(2) charitable, eligious, civic,
community, gover ental and edu-
cational organizat ons in matters
-which are desigued imarily to ad-
dress the needs of rmns of limited
means; and
(b) provide any ad itional services
through:
(1) delivery of leg Iservices at no
fee or substantially reduced fee to
individuals, groups r organizations
ADA/nNA LA-Ye"" 14"arl oa Prwn;. &t Cuedet
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create "unjusti ed expectations" would (b) A copy or recording
ordinarily pr clude advertisements tisement or communicati
about results a tained on behalf of a cli- kept for two years after
ent, such as t e amount of a damage semination along with i
award or the lawyer's record in ob- when and where it was us
taining favora le verdicts, and advertise- (c) A lawyer shall not gi
ments contai ng client endorsements. of value to a person for rec
Such informat on may create the unjus- the lawyer's services ex
tifled expecta [on that similar results lawyer may
can be obtaine for others without refer- (I) pay the reasonable
ence to the s cific factual and legal cir- vertisements or coma
cumstances. permitted by this Rule;
(2) pay the usual cha
MODEL COD COMPARISON for-profit lawyer referra
DR 2-101 rovided that '"a lawyer legal service organizatio
shall not - tse - any form of public (3) pay for a law pra
communicat n containing a false. cordance with Rule 1.17.
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self- (d) Any communication
laudatory or u nfair statement or claim." suant to this rule shall i
DR 2-101(B) provided that a lawyer name of at least one lawye
"may publish )r broadcast - the follow- ble for its content.
ing informati .-. in the geographic area COMMENT.
or areas in wl ich the lawyer resides or To assist the public in obt
maintains offi .es or in which a signifi- services, lawyers should be
cant part of .he lawyer's clientele re- make known their service
sides, provide that the information -_ through reputation but also
complies with DR 2-101(A). and is prm- ganized information campai
sented in a d gnified manner-" DR 2- form of advertising. Advertisi
101(B) then s cified twenty-five catego- an active quest for clients, 4
ries of inform tion that may be dissemai- the tradition that a lawyer
nated. DR 2-1 1(C) provided that 'Ja]ny seek clientele. However, the p
person desiri to expand the informa- to know about legal services
tion authori for disclosure in DR 2- filled in part through advert
101(B), or to rovide for its dissemina- need is particularly acute in
tion through her forums may apply to persons of moderate means w
(the agency aving jurisdiction under made extensive use of legal se
state law._ he relief granted in re- interest in expanding public iL
sponse to an such application shall be about legal services ought to p
promulgated an amendment to DR 2- considerations of tradition. N
101(B), uni ily applicable to all law- advertising by lawyers entails
yers. practices that are misleadin
RULE 7.2 Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of
Rules 7.1 and 7.3. a lawyer may adver-
tise services through public media,
such as a telephone directory, legal
directory, newspaper or other period-
ical, outdoor advertising, radio or
television, or through written or re-
corded communication
reaching.
This Rule permits public
tion of information concerni
yer's name or firm name, a(
telephone number, the kinds
the lawyer- will undertake; th
which the lawyer's fees are d
including prices for specific s(
payment and credit arrang
lawyer's foreign language abil
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of references and, with their consent,
names of clients regularly represented;
and other information that might invite
the attention of those seeking legal as-
sistance.
Questions of effectiveness and taste in
advertising are matters of speculation
and subjective judgment. Some jurisdic"
tions have had extensive prohibitions
against television advertising, against
advertising going beyond specified facts
about a lawyer, or against "undignified"
advertising. Television is now one of the
most powerful .media for getting infor-
mation to the public, particularly per-
sons of low and moderate income;
prohibiting television advertising, there-
fore, would impede the flow of informa-
tion about legal services to many sectors
of the public. Limiting the information
that may be advertised has a similar ef-
fect and assumes that the bar can accu-
rately forecast the kind of information
that the public would regard as relevant.
Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohib-
its communications authorized by law,
such as notice to members of a class in
class action litigation.
Record of Advertising
Paragraph (b) requires that a record
of the content and use of advertising be
kept in order to facilitate enforcement of
this Rule- It does not require that adver-
tising be subject to review prior to dis-
semination. Such a requirement would be
burdensome and expensive relative to its
possible benefits, and may be of doubtful
constitutionality.
Paying Others to Recommend a Law-
yer
A lawyer is allowed to pay for adver-
tising permitted by this Rule and for the
purchase of a law practice in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 1.17, but oth-
erwise is not permitted to pay another
person for channeling-professional work.
This restriction does not prevent an or-
ganization or person other than the law-
yer from advertising or recommending
the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid
1/ABABNI& ".~ew' mass&
agency or prepaid legal services plan
may pay to advertise legal services pro-
vided under its auspices. Likewise, a law-
yer may participate in not-for-profit law-
yer referral programs and pay the usual
fees charged by such programs. Para-
graph (c) does not prohibit paying regu-
lar compensation to an assistant, such as
a secretary, to prepare communications
permitted by this Rule-
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a). DR 2-
101(B) provided that a lawyer "may pub-
lish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103,
in print media _. or television or radio-"
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2-
101(D) provided that if the advertise-
ment is "communiiated to the public
over television or radio.- a recording of
the actual transmission shall be retained
by the lawyer."
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2-
103(B) provided that a lawyer "shall not
compensate or give anything of value to
a person or organization to recommend
or secure his employment - except that
he may pay the usual and reasonable fees
or dues charged by any of the organiza-
tions listed in DR 2-103(D)." (DR 2-
103(D) referred to legal aid and other le-
gal services organizations.) DR 2-101(1)
provided that a lawyer "shall not com-
pensate or give anything of value to rep-
resentatives of the press, radio, televi-
sion, or other communication medium in
anticipation of or in return for profes-
sional publicity in a news item."
There was no counterpart to para-
graph (d) in the Model Code.
RULE 7.3 Dir t Contact with Pro-
spective Cli ts
(a)-,A Ia shall not by in-person
or live teleph e contact solicit pro-
fessional empi eut from a prospec-
tive client.wi whom the lawyer has
no family or p ior professional rela-
tionship when a ignificant motive for
the lawyer's do so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.
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1. Consolidated Integrated Services, Inc. ("CIS"), a large closely-held
corporation, is about to enter into an initial public offering in order to raise funds to expand its
capital facilities and product lines so as to enter additional markets. It has retained M,D & P to
counsel it with respect to the transaction, a multi-disciplinary firm providing accounting, legal,
trust, valuation, insurance and financial services. CIS has been represented by M,D &P since
CIS was founded by Pat Patriarch, a highly respected businessman who continues to be the eyes
and ears of CIS and a very effective spokesperson for the company. In addition to providing
accounting and legal services to the company, M, D & P has represented Pat with his personal
accounting, legal, financial and estate planning affairs for many years. M, D & P is engaged in
negotiations with the underwriters on behalfofCIS. At the same time, M, D & P's accounting
arm has prepared the financial statements for the company. Recently, Pat has been working with
M, D & P's estate planners to revise and update his estate plan in an effort to move a portion of
his stock to his children or trusts for them prior to the IPO. M, D & P's valuation unit will be
preparing the appraisal to be attached to the gift tax return. As part of the estate plan, it has been
suggested that a joint and survivor insurance policy be placed by M, D & P's insurance unit on
Pat's and his wife's life. The policy is to be purchased by an irrevocable trust. The medical
information obtained for the application has revealed that Pat's blood tests show he is in the early
stages of an ultimately debilitating disease which progresses at an unpredictable rate. In some
patients, the disease lies dormant for as many 20 years; in other patients it progresses rapidly.
2. A small multi-disciplinary firm, EPI, Inc., has recently acquired a very
sophisticated insurance group, headed by J.P. Jones, who is well known nationally in insurance
circles, to augment its life underwriting capabilities. One of the clients of the group is Pam
Coniver, a U.S. citizen and high net worth individual who has invested in commercial real estate
projects across the U.S. and overseas. Coniver's estate will be highly illiquid and fully subject to
U.S. estate taxes except to the extent reduced by a credit for foreign death taxes. Because of the
overseas connections here, EPI's insurance group believes that there are considerable advantages
to using a sophisticated and highly specialized insurance product involving an offshore insurer.
The policy or policies would be owned by a Bermuda trust. EPI's legal group, which is quite
competent to handle estate matters for local clients, but has no experience in offshore insurance
or foreign trust work, will be handling the estate planning documentation. Pam has no
preference as to choosing an attorney for the work and is willing to accept the recommendations
of JP as to who should handle the legal work. Pam does like EPI's proposed fee arrangement,
which folds the cost of the insurance and the legal work into a single package.
3. Mary Flowers, who founded the Tulip Law Firm, a 6 lawyer shop, has
represented Dr. and Mrs. Smith with their legal affairs for many years. This has included
assisting them with the-purchase of their primary and vacation homes, estate planning and
counseling their daughter with her divorce and their son with his DUI problems. She
incorporated Dr. Tulip's medical practice as a professional corporation, negotiated the
shareholders agreement with his partners as the practice grew and negotiated the lease for the
building where the medical practice operates. Recently, the Tulip Law Firm was acquired by
Multi-Services, Inc., a huge international MDP providing financial, accounting, trust, legal and
other services. Dr. Smith is about to retire and sell his practice to his current partners. He has
asked Mary to negotiate the buy-out agreement. A major question is whether the buy-out should
be for a lump sum cash payment, a note, a profits interest in the practice going forward or a
combination of the above. He has called Mary to arrange a meeting to discuss the sale, his
retirement and estate planning and the tax advantages of changing domicile. Mary explained that
through Multi-Services' financial planning arm, she could help the Smiths as well with decisions
relating to the investment of the funds received in the buy-out. The head of Multi-Services
insurance and financial services group has asked Mary to identify clients that would be good
prospects for the purchase of a line of new mutual funds and insurance products that have a high
commission potential for the firm. Mary understands that under the firm's fee sharing
arrangement, she will receive as originating partner a bonus on the sale of these products as well
as a portion of any continuing income stream to the firm resulting from the sale.
Dr. Smith was recently brought into a lawsuit on a cross claim arising from prescribing a
drug for.sexual dysfunction which has been shown to cause heart failure in some patients.
Harvey Heman, a local businessman owning a chain of exercise centers and a patient of Dr.
Smith, sued the pharmaceutical manufacturer after taking the drug for 2 years, and now the
manufacturer claims that Dr. Smith over-prescribed the drug in numerous inappropriate
situations to patients. Unfortunately, Dr. Smith is woefully under-insured for malpractice, and he
has sought advice from Mary about his personal liability, as well as asset protection techniques.
It turns out that the drug company uses Multi-Services' accounting arm to prepare its annual
financial statements, but it has never provided legal services to the company.
STATEMENT OF STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 2000-2
(draft of 9/13/00)
1. Introduction. The objective of this statement is to articulate the standards of
acceptable practice in the preparation and distribution of written legal opinions relating to Federal
tax issues. The impetus for this statement is a growing perception that some tax practitioners.
including some attorneys practicing law in traditional law firms or functioning within non-law
firm professional organizations. are preparing opinions relating to tax issues which are calculated
to assist their recipients or others to "game" the system. However. the guidance set forth in this
statement is intended to apply to tax opinions generally and is not limited to any specific situation
as to which more explicit standards of conduct may apply.
2. Definition of "Tax Opinion" and Scope of this Statement. For the purposes of
this statement, a "Tax Opinion" is a written communication to a client or third person which
addresses specific factual circumstances and which states the author's opinion as to the
application of legal authorities, or the modification, reversal or extension of such authorities, to
such factual circumstances. Tax Opinions, as so defined, are subject to the standards set forth in
this statement. However, these standards are not intended to apply to an attorney's explanation of
the law in the abstract or to opinions which a reasonable person would consider to be only
tentative or preliminary. Nor do they specifically apply to oral opinions unless memorialized in
written form and communicated in writing to the client or others. I To the extent that the purpose
or contemplated use of a Tax Opinion presupposes that the preparation or scope of the opinions
set forth in the Tax Opinion will conform to specific statutory, regulatory, ethical or other
authoritative requirements, the standards set forth in this statement are supplemental to and not in
lieu of such other requirements. which are incorporated herein by reference. Thus, for example, a
Tax Opinion which also constitutes a "tax shelter opinion" for purposes of Section 10.33 of
Circular 230, 31 C.F.R.. Subtitle A, Part 10 ("Circular 230"), or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346
should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of those authorities in order to comply with the
standards articulated in this statement. Similarly, a Tax Opinion stating that a client may properly
take a certain position on its tax return should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.
Section 6694 and Treas. Regs. Section 1.6694-2. Section 10.34 of Circular 230, and A.B.A.
Formal Opinion 85-352.
3. Competency of Practitioner to Render Tax Opinion. A practitioner who
accepts an engagement to provide a Tax Opinion assumes an obligation to be knowledgeable, as
of the time that the Tax Opinion is rendered, in the relevant aspects of Federal tax law. To the
extent that any opinion set forth in a Tax Opinion is based upon any other person's opinion or
conclusions regarding any aspect of Federal tax law or any aspect of state or Federal non-tax law,
the author of the Tax Opinion should identify such other person and should explicitly describe the
opinion or conclusions of such other person being relied upon. Additionally, if necessary or
advisable in order to avoid misunderstanding, the author of a Tax Opinion should summarize the
substance of the analysis of such other person in reaching his or her opinion or conclusions or
should provide a copy of such analysis as an attachment to the Tax Opinion.
1 Although not subject to the specific standards applicable to written Tax Opinions, oral opinions
regarding the tax consequences of specific factual circumstances are equally subject to the
requirements of competency, thoroughness. and all other applicable ethical standards. See also
Treas. Regs. Sections i.6 664-4(cX2) and 1.6 69 4-2(cX3).
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4. Statement of the Intended Purpose of the Tax Opinion. Underlying the
standards set forth in this statement is a recognition that Tax Opinions may be prepared to serve a
variety of needs or purposes and that. therefore, those standards should be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate those different needs or purposes. However. if necessary or advisable in order to
eliminate any risk of misunderstanding. a Tax Opinion should explicitly state the purpose or
purposes for which it has been prepared: whether or not the author contemplates that any person
other than the client for whom the Tax Opinion was prepared may rely upon it: and, if warranted
under the circumstances, any purpose for which reliance upon the Tax Opinion by the client or
any other person was not contemplated and/or would be inappropriate. In addition, if specific
statutory, regulatory, or other authoritative standards govern the manner in which opinions should
be prepared for a particular purpose, such as, for example. establishing a basis for the client's
"'reasonable belief" under Treas. Regs. Section 1.6662-4(g)(4) or for "reasonable cause" under
Treas. Regs. Section 1.6664-4(c), a Tax Opinion should not be issued for such a purpose unless
the author has complied in good faith with those standards and includes in the Tax Opinion a
specific representation to that effect. These various disclosure requirements are not intended to
limit an attorney's flexibility in providing written advice, but to ensure that the flexibility
contemplated by this statement is not inadvertently exceeded or purposefully abused.
5. Factual Circumstances; Duty of Inquiry. Unless otherwise self-evident from
the context in which it is prepared, a Tax Opinion should clearly identify the material factual
circumstances upon which the author's conclusions are based. In any case in which the Tax
Opinion may be presented to or relied upon any person other than the client, the Tax Opinion
should describe the extent of any due diligence conducted by the author or others to verify the
accuracy of the material facts underlying the opinion and the reasonableness of any material
assumptions. In such a case as well, the Tax Opinion should specifically describe and identify the
source of any material representations as to future activities, such as financial projections. For
example, the Tax Opinion may state that the material facts or representations as to future
activities have been established by a written certificate from the client or others, by an opinion of
an expert, or by the author's own investigation. This standard does not require an attorney to
"audit" the facts as presented by his or her client. However, the attorney must make further
inquiry if any asserted facts, assumptions, or representations as to future activities are materiallyincomplete, inconsistent with other circumstances, or otherwise implausible or suspect. See
A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. which discusses an attorney's duty to make factual inquiries in the
context of a tax shelter opinion: A.B.A. Formal Opinion 335. which establishes guidelines for
opinions regarding the sale of unregistered securities: and Section 10.34 of Circular 230. It isimproper to issue a Tax Opinion on the basis of stated facts or representations as to future
activities which the author of the Tax Opinion knows to be false. At least in cases in which theTax Opinion will be presented to or relied upon by any person other than the client, it is also
improper to issue a Tax Opinion which ignores or assumes away factual circumstances of which
the author of the Tax Opinion is aware and which, if properly considered, would materially alter
the author's analysis or conclusions.
6. Relating the Law to the Facts. A Tax Opinion should relate the applicable
legal authorities, or the modification. extension, or reversal thereof, to the relevant factual
circumstances. If. under the applicable legal standards, the resolution of a material legal issue
depends upon how-a related-factual issue isdecided. the Tax Opinion should so state, identifying
the factual issue to be decided and. if appropriate. stating how, in the author's opinion, the factual
issue is likely to be resolved. Alternatively, if the Tax Opinion resolves the material legal issueby making an assumption regarding the outcome of the related factual issue, the author should so
state. In an appropriate case, a Tax Opinion should also explain how the material legal issue
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would likely be resolved if the related factual issue was decided contrary to the predicted or
assumed outcome.
7. Identify All Material Tax Issues. In certain situations. the governing standards
require the author of a Tax Opinion to address and opine upon all material tax issues. See Section
10.33(a)(3) of Circular 230 or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. In other cases, based upon the
intended purpose of the Tax Opinion, an attorney may restrict the scope of a Tax Opinion to
specific issues. However. whenever reasonably necessary in order to avoid any
misunderstanding, the author of a Tax Opinion should identify all material tax issues and should
specifically designate those material tax issues as to which no opinion or prediction is being
rendered.
8. Legal Analysis. A Tax Opinion should express the author's degree of
confidence in a stated opinion and, if appropriate, discuss whether the pertinent legal authorities
and factual circumstances constitute "substantial authority" for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty established by I.R.C. Section 6662. These requirements are especially
important when a stated purpose of the Tax Opinion is to insulate the client against penalties with
respect to a specific position by setting forth counsel's opinion that there exists the stated degree
of probability that the position in question would be sustained if litigated and decided on the
merits. In such a case, the author of the Tax Opinion should analyze the position in question in
light of the required level of probability. Only if the author concludes unequivocally and in good
faith that the required level of probability existed as of the relevant date may the Tax Opinion be
given for the stated purpose of penalty protection.
9. Discussion of Penalties. Whenever an attorney advises a client that. under the
existing facts and applicable law, the client may properly take a return position which, if
disallowed, may expose the client to penalties, the attorney should advise the client concerning
the existence of those penalties and how the client may avoid their imposition by disclosure, by
the timely filing of a qualified amended return, or otherwise. See A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85-
352. A failure to give such advice, even though the circumstances so warrant violates the
standards of acceptable practice contemplated by this statement. See Treas. Regs. Section
1.6694-2(cX3)(ii); Circular 230, Sec. 10.34(aX2).
10. Duty to Prevent Misuse of Tax Opinion. Lastly, the committee believes that.
after issuing a Tax Opinion, the attorney and his or her firm should not ignore any inadvertent or
deliberate misuse of that Tax Opinion of which they become aware. For example, if an attorney
or the firm learns that, without prior approval, the client is using the Tax Opinion for a purpose
for which it was not intended, the attorney or the firm should take affirmative steps to correct the
situation. Obviously, those steps will depend upon the circumstances. However, even an
attorney's ethical obligation to protect the confidences and secrets of the client may be limited
under some circumstances if the client or another person is deliberately misusing the attorney's
work product to defraud or to mislead others. See generally A.B.A. Formal Opinion 92-366
concerning the misuse of an opinion on non-tax issues.
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STATEMENT OF STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 2000-2
(draft of 4L,,4) 9/13/00)
1. Introduction. The objective of this statement is to articulate the standards of
acceptible practice in the preparation and distribution of written legal opinions relating to Federal
tax issues. The impetus for this statement is a growing perception that some tax practitioners,
including some attorneys practicing law in traditional law firms or functioning within non-law
firm professional organizations, are preparing opinions relating to tax issues which are calculated
to assist their recipients or others to "game" the system. However, the guidance set forth in this
statement is intended to apply to tax opinions generally and is not limited to any specific situation
as to which more explicit standards of conduct may apply.
2. Definition of "Tax Opinion" and Scope of this Statement. For the purposes of
this statement, a "Tax Opinion" is a written communication to a client or third-p.a person
which addresses specific factual circumstances and which states the author's opinion asto the
application of legal authorities, or the modification, reversal or extension of such authorities, to
such factual circumstances. Tax Opinions, as so defined, are subject to the standards set forth in
this statement. However, these standards are not intended to apply to an attorney's explanation of
the law in the abstract or to opinions which a reasonable person would consider to be only
tentative or preliminary. Nor do they specitically apply to oral opinions unless memorialzed in
written torm and communicated in writing to the client or others. ] To the extent that the purpose
or contemplated use of a Tax Opinion presupposes that the preparation or scope of the opinions
set forth in the Tax Opinion will conform to specific statutory, regulatory, ethical or other
authoritative requirements, the standards set forth in this statement are supplemental to and not in
lieu of such other requirements. which are incorporated herein by reference. Thus, for example, a
Tax Opinion which also constitutes a -tax shelter opinion" for purposes of Section 10.33 of
Circular 230, 31 C.F.R.. Subtitle A, Part 10 ("Circular 230"), or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346
should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements ot those authorities in order to comply with the
standards articulated in this statement. Similarly, a Tax Opinion stating that a client may properly
take a certain position on its tax return should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.
Section 6694 and Treas. Regs. Section 1.6694-2 as,-vie , Section 10.34 of Circular 230, and
A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85-352.
3. Competency of Practitioner to Render Tax Opinion. A practitioner who
accepts an engagement to provide a Tax Opinion assumes an obligation to be knowledgeable, as
of the time that the Tax Opinion is rendered, in the relevant aspects of Federal tax law. To the
extent that any opinion set forth in a Tax Opinion is based upon any other person's.aaa io,,.o(
opinion or conclusions regarding any aspect of Federal tax law or 4" any aspect of state or
-ederal non-tax law. the author ot the Tax Opinion should identify such other person and should
explicitly describe the opinion or conclusions of such other person being relied upon.
Additionally, if necessary or advisable in order to avoid misunderstanding, the author of a
Tax Opinion should summarize the substance ot the analysis i "i'l.'05" -1 such other person
in reaching his or her opinion or conclusions or should provide a copy of such analysis as an
attachment to the Tax Opinion.
I Although not subject to the specific standards applicable to written Tax Opinions. oral opinions
regarding the tax consequences of specific factual circumstances are equally subject to the
requirements of competency, thoroughness, and all other applicable ethical standards. See also
Treas. Regs. Sections 1.6664-4(cX2) and 1.6 69 4-2(cX3).
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4. Statement of the Intended Purpose of the Tax Opinion. Underlying the
standards set forth in this statement is a recognition that Tax Opinions may be prepared to serve a
variety of needs or purposes and that. therefore. those standards should be sufficiently flexible to
accomnodate those different needs or purposes. However. if necessary or advisable in order to
eliminate any risk of misunderstanding, a Tax Opinion should explicitly state the purpose or
purposes for which it has been prepared, whether or not the author contemplates that any person
other than the client for whom the Tax Opinion was prepared may rely upon it: and. if warranted
under the circumstances, any purpose for which reliance upon the Tax Opinion by the client or
any other person was not contemplated and/or would be inappropriate. In addition. if specific
statutory, regulatory, or other authoritative standards govern the manner in which opinions should
be prepared for a particular purpose. such as, for example, establishing a basis for the client's
"reasonable belief' under Treas. Regs. Section 1.6662-4(gX4) or for "reasonable cause" under
Treas. Regs. Section 1.6664-4(c)(2), a Tax Opinion should not be issued for such a purpose
unless the author has complied in good faith with those standards and includes in the Tax Opinion
a specific representation to that effect. These various disclosure requirements are not intended to
limit an attorney's flexibility in providing written advice, but to ensure that the flexibility
contemplated by this statement is not inadvertently exceeded or purposefully abused.
5. Factual Circumstances; Duty of Inquiry. Unless otherwise self-evident from
the context in which it is prepared. a Tax Opinion should clearly identify.u the material factual
circumstances upon which the author's conclusions are based. In any case inw'which the Tax
Opinion may be presented to or relied upon any person other than the client, the Tax Opinion
should describe the extent of any due diligence emplay.d conducted by the author or others to
verify the accuracy ot the material facts underlying the opinion and the reasonableness of any
material assumptions. In such a case as well, the Tax Opinion should specifically describe and
identify the source of any material representations as to future activities, such as financial
projections. For example, the Tax Opinion may state that the material facts or representations as
to future activities have been established by a written certificate from the client or others, by an
opinion of an expert, or by the author's own investigation. This standard does not require an
attorney to "audit" the facts as presented by his or her client. However, the attorney must make
further inquiry if any asserted facts, assumptions, or representations as to future activities are
materially incomplete, inconsistent with other circumstances, or otherwise implausible or suspect.
See A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. which discusses an attorney's duty to make factual inquiries in
the context of a tax shelter opinion: aW A.B.A. Formal Opinion 335, which establishes guidelines
for opinions regarding the sale of unregistered securities; and Section 10.34 of Circular 230. It
is improper to issue a Tax Opinion on the basis of stated tacts or representations as to tuture
activities which the author of the Tax Opinion knows to be false. At least in cases in which the
Tax Opinion will be presented to or relied upon by any person other than the client, it is also
improper to issue a Tax Opinion which ignores or assumes away factual circumstances of which
the author of the Tax Opinion is aware and which, if properly considered, would materially alter
the author's analysis or conclusions.
6. Relating the Law to the Facts. A Tax Opinion should relate the applicable
legal authorities, or the modification, extension, or reversal thereof, to the relevant factual
circumstances. If, under the-applicable legal- standards, the resolution of a material legal issue
depends upon how a related factual issue is decided, the Tax Opinion should so state, identifying
the factual issue to be decided and, if appropriate, stating how, in the author's opinion, the factual
issue is likely to be resolved. Alternatively, if the Tax Opinion resolves the material legal issue
by making an assumption regarding the outcome of the related factual issue. the author should so
state. In an appropriate case, a Tax Opinion should also explain how the material legal issue
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would likely be resolved if the related factual issue was decided contrary to the predicted or
assumed outcome.
7. Identify All Material Tax Issues. In certain situations, the governing standards
requiri the author of a Tax Opinion to address and opine upon all material tax issues. See Section
10.33(aX3) of Circular 230,wpa, or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. In other cases, based upon the
intended purpose of the Tax Opinion, an attorney may restrict the scope of a Tax Opinion to
specific issues. However, whenever reasonably necessary in order to avoid any
misunderstanding, the author of a Tax Opinion should identify all material tax issues and should
specifically designate those material tax issues as to which no opinion or prediction is being
rendered.
8. Legal Analysis. A Tax Opinion should express the author's degree of
confidence in a stated opinion and, if appropriate. discuss whether the pertinent legal authorities
and factual circumstances constitute "substantial authority" for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty established by I.R.C. Section 6662. These requirements are especially
important when a stated purpose of the Tax Opinion is to insulate the client against penalties with
respect to a specific position by setting forth counsel's opinion that there exists the stated degree
of probability that the position in question would be sustained if litigated and decided on the
merits. In such a case, the author of the Tax Opinion should analyze the position in question in
light of the required level of probability. Only if the author concludes unequivocally and in good
faith that the required level of probability existed as of the relevant date may the Tax Opinion be
given for the stated purpose of penalty protection.
9. Discussion of Penalties. Whenever an attorney advises a client that. under the
existing facts and applicable law, the client may properly take a return position which, if
disallowed. may expose the client to penalties. the attorney should advise the client concerning
the existence of those penalties and how the client may avoid their imposition by disclosure, by
the timely filing of a qualified amended return, or otherwise. See A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85-
352. A Ta. G-i.i-... "hich f i s - :-I...j failure to give such advice, even though the
circumstances so warrant, .aik to -..p 6,h violates the standards of acceptable practice
contemplated by this statement. See Treas. Re.-p:S~ion 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii); Circular 230, Sc
I 0.34(a)(2).
10. Duty to Prevent Misuse of Tax Opinion. Lastly, the committee believes that,
after issuing a Tax Opinion. the attorney and his or her firm should not ignore any inadvertent or
deliberate misuse of that Tax Opinion of which they become aware. For example, if an attorney
or the firm learns that. without prior approval, the client is using the Tax Opinion for a purpose
for which it was not intended, the attorney or the firm should take affirmative steps to correct the
situation. Obviously, those steps will depend upon the circumstances. However, even an
attorney's ethical obligation to protect the confidences and secrets of the client may be limited
under some circumstances if the client or another person is deliberately misusing the attorney's
work product to defraud or to mislead others. See generally A.B.A. Formal Opinion 92-366
concerning the misuse of an opinion on non-tax issues.
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COMMENTS ON ETHICS 2000 PROPOSED RULES AND COMMENTS
(March 6, 2000)
These comments were drafted by a Task Force consisting of Donald P. Lan, Jr., Michael
B. Lang (serving as chair of the Task Force), Denise D. J. Roy, Ira B. Shepard, Sylvan Siegler
(serving as liaison to the Ethics 2000 Commission), and Bryan Skarlatos. The Task Force has
also considered comments received from James P. Holden. The Task Force was appointed by
Linda Galler, Chair of the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section of Taxation.
Proposed Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.15, 1.18, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and the proposed
deletion of Rule 2.2 are discussed in these comments.
The contact person is: Michael B. Lang
University of Maine School of Law
246 Deering Avenue
Portland, Maine 04102
(207) 780-4366
Fax: (207) 780-4239
E-mail: mlanuci-Dusm.maine.edu
General Comment - Lawyers in Multidisciplinary Practice
The proposed Rules and Comments do not address situations where lawyers are
performing work that clearly constitutes the practice of law in a multidisciplinary practice firm
(MDP). The Task Force understands that the Ethics 2000 proposals to date have not undertaken
to address such issues.
Proposed Rule 1.4
Proposed Rule 1.4 provides a definition of the "informed consent" standard used
elsewhere in the proposed rules. It is apparent that this standard was not intended to be
substantively different from the consent "after consultation" standard found in the current rules,
such as Model Rules 1.6 and 1.9. However, deletion of the "consultation" requirement seems to
suggest that the proposed rule embodies a lower requirement for two-way communication than
does the current rule. This implication may be partly offset by the inclusion of the "informed"
concept in the new standard. Nonetheless, it would be preferable to retain the "after consultation"
requirement as part of proposed Rule 1.4(c)'s definition of informed consent. In addition, the
definition of "informed consent" should be modified to add a reference to the "advantages" as well
as the material risks of the proposed course of conduct, following the language of present Model
Rule 2.2.
Proposed Rule 1.7(b) requires that informed consent in the context of waiving a conflict of
interest be in writing. There is no apparent reason to limit the writing requirement to this
situation. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to add the requirement that informed consent be
in writing to the definition of informed consent in proposed Rule 1.4 and make conforming
changes in the other proposed rules and comments.
Either Rule 1.4 or the Comments should cross-reference all rules in which informed
consent is required for any action. Furthermore, if the lawyer's duties to another client or to a
former client, or the lawyer's own interests or duties to a third person will materially limit the
communication with a client required by Rule 1.4, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7, relating
to conflicts of interest. This point should be mentioned in the Comments to Rule 1.4.
Although the proposed placement of the informed consent standard in Rule 1.4 has some
merit in that the rule deals with communication, it might be more appropriate to place the
definition in the terminology section of the Rules, with a cross-reference in Rule 1.4 instead. In
the alternative, the terminology section should include a cross-reference to Rule 1.4 to assist
readers who look in the terminology section for a definition of the term "informed consent."
Proposed Rule 1.5
Proposed Rule 1.5, like the other proposed rules, does not refer directly or by cross-
reference to other rules of conduct imposed upon specific segments of the legal community.
While Comment [2] notes that "applicable law "may impose limitations on contingent fees," the
Comments should also state that applicable law may provide more general limitations on fees.
For example, lawyers authorized to appear before the Internal Revenue Service are subject to
Treasury Department Circular 230 (Circular 230), § 10.28(a) of which prohibits a "practitioner"
from charging "an unconscionable fee for representing a client in a matter before the Internal
Revenue Service." It is unclear whether this standard is different from the standard in proposed
Rule 1.5.
Comment [2] should emphasize that Rule 1.5(d) is not an exhaustive list of situations in
which a contingent fee is prohibited. For example, §10.28(b) of Circular 230 does not permit a
practitioner to charge a contingent fee for preparing an original tax return and limits the
circumstances in which a contingent fee may be charged for preparing an amended return or a
claim for refund.
Circular 230 may also affect the subject of proposed Rule 1.5(e), relating to the division of
a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Section 10.30 of Circular 230 restricts the
associations of an attorney with any persons or entities who, to the knowledge of the lawyer,
obtain clients or otherwise practice in a manner forbidden under that section. While this is a much
broader restriction than.Rule 1.5:s restriction on fee-sharing,.it suggests the possibility of adding
to the Comments a statement that other provisions of applicable law may impose additional
restrictions, covering more than just fee-sharing, on a lawyer's professional associations.
Proposed Rule 1.6
In applying the confidentiality obligation, uncertainty may arise as to when a lawyer is
representing a client, thus causing the confidentiality obligation to arise. This uncertainty may
arise in many contexts, including situations where lawyers are employed by MDPs. For example,
"information relating to representation of a client" may or may not include information relating to
services other than legal services, such as return preparation, that a lawyer may provide along
with legal services. In this context, one might ask whether an activity that is not itself a "legal
service" can be the sole basis for "representation of a client." The Comments to Rule 1.6 should
address this issue and refer to Rule 5.7 and the Comments to Rule 5.7 on the lawyer's
responsibilities when providing law-related services. While these issues will be important in the
MDP context, they also arise outside the MDP context; the Comments should attempt to address
the non-MDP context.
The Comments should also clarify that the term "another" in proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) and
(3) includes a governmental entity and that these provisions permit disclosure of client
information, for example, in the case of paragraph (b)(2), to prevent the client from committing
tax fraud that is likely to result in substantial injury to the taxing jurisdiction's financial interests
(loss of revenue) in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services.
Unfortunately, the expanded permissive disclosure rules of proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) may
also present opportunities for extortion-like behavior. For example, assume a lawyer represents a
client in a transaction that is arguably fraudulent, but unbeknownst to the lawyer. The lawyer is
not paid for his services. Subsequently, the transaction is questioned and the client is represented
by another lawyer. The proposed Rule may permit the original lawyer to threaten (perhaps in a
way that does not constitute extortion) to reveal client confidences unless the lawyer is paid. The
fact that a lawyer could disclose client confidences to some extent if in a suit to collect the fee the
client counters with a claim of inadequate representation may lead some lawyers to believe they
can engage in the kind of extortion-like behavior described earlier. Serious consideration should
be given to whether proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) would permit such behavior by the lawyer, if so,
whether that result is appropriate, and, if not, whether the proposed Rule should be modified.
New Comment [151 requires a lawyer called as a witness or otherwise ordered to reveal
information relating to the client's representation to assert on behalf of the client "all non-
frivolous claims that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege or other applicable law." As written, it is unclear whether this requirement applies if a
statute or regulation mandates disclosure of information relating to the client as, for example,
might be the case under IRC section 60501, requiring persons engaged in a trade or business
(including lawyers) to report certain information about transactions in which they receive more
than $10,000. While new Comment [15] might be.read broadly to require the lawyer to assert on
behalf of the client all non-frivolous claims of privilege when faced with a provision such as
section 60501, the Comment's application to this kind of situation should be clarified by adding
the words "or is mandated by statute or regulation" to the second sentence of the Comment after
the word "ordered."
Proposed Rule 1.7
A. Caption
It is not clear why the word "Concurrent" was added to the caption. The Reporter's
Explanation states that the word was added to distinguish "concurrent" conflicts from other
conflicts. However, since the proposed Rule applies to conflicts with current clients, former
clients and third parties as well as conflicts with the lawyer's own interests, it is unclear what
"'other" conflicts are. An introductory comment distinguishing "concurrent" conflicts from other
conflicts may be appropriate.
B. Subsections (a) and (b) and Written Informed Consent
The reorganization of this rule, as proposed, is very helpful without affecting the
substance of the prior rule. The new requirement of written informed consent is generally a good
idea because it will focus attention on the client's interests and possible conflicts and will eliminate
any confusion over the existence of a waiver. The requirement of informed consent in writing
should be extended to all Model Rule informed consent requirements.
It should be noted that a Task Force of the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice that
reviewed Circular 230 last year did not recommend requiring that informed consent under §10.29
of Circular 230 (relating to conflicts of interest) be in writing. However, the Task Force noted
that imposing such a requirement in the absence of a similar requirement under the ABA Model
Rules would lead to significant inadvertent noncompliance. Parallel written informed consent
requirements in all ethical rules and other applicable law would help facilitate compliance by
affected lawyers.
C. New Comment [31 - Conflicts That Arise After Representation Begins
New Comment [3] should include a discussion of how an attorney determines which client
he or she may continue to represent when such continued representation is appropriate. This idea
is briefly addressed in new Comment [20], which states:
Ordinarily, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation of
the client who will be least harmed by the lawyer's withdrawal. The
lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to
minimize harm to the clients.
However, it is difficult to imagine a conflict situation in which it would be appropriate to drop one
client and continue representing another client whose interests are adverse without obtaining
written informed consent from both clients. Accordingly, if a conflict arises between two existing
clients, the lawyer should be required to withdraw from representing both clients unless the
lawyer receives written informed consent from both clients to continue representing one of the
clients. In the process of obtaining written informed consent, the lawyer should disclose
(probably in writing) to both clients the risks, benefits and burdens that will result from the
lawyer's withdrawal from representing one or both clients.
One special category of situations in which this problem may arise is the joint
representation gone sour. For example, in a situation in which a lawyer represents a husband and
wife with respect to a joint tax liability and a conflict arises after the representation has begun
over an issue such as collection or innocent spouse relief, the lawyer should be required to
withdraw from representing both clients unless he receives written informed consent from both
clients. In the context of obtaining written informed consent, the lawyer should disclose
(probably in writing) the potentially adverse interests of the two clients, the difficulties in terms of
cost and familiarity with the facts in changing lawyers for either or both clients, and the benefit, if
any, of one of the clients continuing to be represented by the lawyer. While joint representation is
dealt with in Comments [28] to [3 1], those comments do not address how the lawyer should act
when a conflict arises after the joint representation has begun, except to generally note that
"ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the joint
representation fails." While it may be more appropriate to address conflicts arising after a joint
representation has begun in the comments about joint representation rather than in Comment [3],
the principles outlined above should apply in such situations.
D. New Comment [41 - Renresentation of Competing Interests in Unrelated Litigation
New Comment [4] states that "representation of competing economic enterprises in
unrelated litigation does not constitute a conflict of interest." The sentence should be rewritten to
state that such representation "does not necessarily constitute a conflict of interest." In addition,
this Comment should include a cross-reference to Comment [23] and Comment [23] should
include a cross-reference to this Comment.
E. New Comment [51 - Actual vs. Potential Conflicts
New Comment [5] includes a brief discussion of the possibility of subsequent harm to a
client if a conflict of interest arises in the future. The idea of potential conflicts of interest is an
important concept that should be expanded and discussed in its own separate comment. it is
important for lawyers to understand the difference between actual conflicts of interest that
currently exist and potential conflicts of interest that may arise in the future. Many client
engagements do not give rise to an actual conflict of interest, but the attorney must be able to
identify and evaluate potential conflicts of interest and, under certain circumstances, should be
required to discuss potential conflicts with the clients. Joint representations are the most common
source of potential conflicts. For example, representation of a married couple in connection with
a joint income tax return does not ordinarily involve an actual conflict of interest, although there is
always a potential conflict. However, when at some point in representing the couple with respect
to a tax deficiency the possibility of an innocent spouse defense arises, the potential conflict
becomes an actual conflict. While Comments [28] to [31] address such joint representation
situations at some length, potential conflicts in other contexts should also be addressed by a
comment.
F. New Comment [91 - Conflicts Between Clients in the Same Litigation
New Comment [9] states that conflicts between clients represented by the same lawyer in
the same litigation are non-consentable because of the need for the lawyer to vigorously develop
each client's position. The Comment should clarify that such a conflict is non-consentable
because of the requirement of loyalty to each client, including the responsibility to vigorously
develop each client's position. The Comment should cross-reference the relevant rules regarding
this duty.
G. New Comment [131 - Waivers of Future Conflicts
New Comment [13] discusses current waivers of future conflicts. This Comment should
cross-reference the proposed new Comment [5] discussing actual versus potential conflicts.
H. New Comment [181 - Third Party Payment of Legal Fees
New Comment [18] deals with conflicts between a client and another person who is
paying for the client's legal fees. The Comment does not make any reference to written informed
consent. The Comment should clarify that, if a conflict exists, the lawyer must - after determining
that the conflict is consentable - obtain written informed consent of the client to the arrangement.
I. New Comment [201 - Conflicts Arising During Representation
New Comment [20] should be expanded as discussed above under, and subsumed under,
new Comment [3].
J. New Comment [231 - Issue Conflicts
New Comment [23] should not be limited to inconsistent legal positions taken in tribunals.
The same conflicts can and do arise in non-litigation contexts, including representing clients
before administrative agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service or the Environmental
Protection Agency, before legislative bodies or in private negotiations. ABA Formal Opinion 314
(1965) concluded that the Internal Revenue Service was not a tribunal. Either new Comment [23]
should be generalized to cover a broader range of situations than representation before tribunals
or a similar comment should be added to the group of comments dealing with non-litigation
conflicts.
K. New Comment r281 - Joint Representation
New Comment [28] discusses special considerations in joint representations and states
that, "ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the
joint representation fails." The Comment should contain more information about how and when a
lawyer can choose between two or more jointly-represented clients who have a conflict, as
discussed in comments to new Comment [3] above. There should be a cross-reference to new
Comment [3] which discusses these ideas.
Proposed Rule 1.8
As in the case of proposed Rule 1.7, it is not clear why the word "Concurrent" was added
to the caption for proposed Rule 1.8.
Many of the paragraphs in proposed Rule 1.8 allow a client to waive a conflict provided
the client gives informed consent in writing. However, it is not clear that the drafters intended to
imply that every situation in which written informed consent is permitted automatically involves a
consentable conflict. To the contrary, it is likely that the drafters intended for lawyers to engage
in the same analysis regarding consentability on a case by case basis that is required under
proposed Rule 1.7. If this is so, then new Comments [1] through [3] should incorporate (either
by reference or by repeating the steps here) the same four-step analysis set forth in new Comment
[1] under proposed Rule 1.7. This four-step analysis requires a determination of consentability in
each case.
Proposed Rule 1.9
Proposed Rule 1.9 changes the standard for obtaining a former client's consent to a
conflict of interest. The idea of having one "informed consent" standard for all rules where client
consent may be required is a good idea. See comments above on proposed Rule 1.4 regarding the
"informed consent" standard.
Model Rule 1.9(c)(2) (which prevents a lawyer from revealing confidential information
gained in a former client relationship) is proposed to be moved from this Rule to proposed Rule
1.6(a), but retained in its entirety. This change makes sense.
Proposed Rule 1.10
The changes reflected in proposed Rule 1. 10 seem appropriate. In particular, the
expansion of imputed disqualification to include all paragraphs of Rule 1.8 seems appropriate and
may have the incidental effect of protecting the profession from the appearance of impropriety in
that application of the proposed Rule 1.10 will call to clients' attention the profession's rigorous
conflict of interests rules. Proposed Rule 1. 10(a)'s coverage of situations where the lawyer
"reasonably should know" of the conflict should have the salutary effect of causing firms without
conflicts review procedures to adopt them.
Proposed Rule 1.15
New Comment [2]'s statement that the disputed portion of funds "must" (as opposed to
"'should" in the current Comment) be kept in a trust account is a salutary change making the
lawyer's obligation clear.
More generally, however, although proposed Rule 1.15(c) is intended to prevent lawyers
from remitting disputed property to clients when the lawyer is obligated to retain the property and
to require distribution of property which is not in dispute, the operative language of the Rule does
not seem to depend on the apparent merit or bona fides of claims to the property. That is, the
Rule calls for retention of disputed property regardless of the basis for the dispute. While this
approach may help keep the lawyer out of the middle of the dispute, it may also result in hardship
for the lawyer and the client where a claim to the property is frivolous. Proposed Comment [3]
limits the requirement to disputes involving "lawful claims" and the lawyer's "duty under
applicable law to protect [lawful] third party claims against wrongful interference by the client."
If this is the standard intended by the drafters, it should be incorporated into the language of the
Rule itself, rather than relegated to a Comment. However, a "lawful" standard is perhaps vaguer
than necessary or even desirable. A more readily applied standard might be something akin to the
formulation in Section 57 of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, March 29, 1996). That section includes an exception to the obligation to deliver
property to the person entitled to receive it where "there are substantial grounds for dispute as to
the person entitled to the property." (Emphasis added.)
Proposed Rule 1.18
Proposed Rule 1.18 represents an attempt to codify the duties that a lawyer owes to a
prospective client. Although the existence of such a duty has been well-settled for some time,
this attempt to clarify and codify the nature of this duty is an excellent idea. Nonetheless, the
proposed Rule 1.18(c) test of "significantly harmful" information will be difficult to implement. Of
particular significance is the fact that the. prospective client attempting to show that the lawyer
received information that could be "significantly harmful" to the prospective client within the
meaning of the Rule may need to disclose the very information sought to be protected.
Suppose the lawyer is not aware of any such information, but the client fears that
apparently innocuous information conveyed during the consultation may prove harmful in light of
later developments. For example, information initially disclosed may later raise a possible statute
of limitations defense to the prospective client's claim. Another, and perhaps more usual, example
would be a change of story between the time of the initial consultation and the then more-
educated prospective client's retainer of another lawyer.
There is also the possible problem of initial consultations for the purpose of disqualifying
the lawyer. This is often difficult to demonstrate, particularly if the prospective client is
disingenuously indiscrete during the consultation. Whether the Rule or Comments should
address this problem may depend on how common this problem is perceived to be.
The exceptions to disqualification in proposed Rule 1. 18(d) (as interpreted in proposed
Comments [3] through [7]) go some way to resolving some of the above difficulties, but these
exceptions give rise to problems of their own. The exception in Proposed Rule 1.1 8(d)(1) permits
post-consultation waivers with "informed consent." Such informed consent may be difficult to
secure after the fact, particularly in the case of a prospective client; a prospective client would
have no incentive to provide consent.
Proposed Comment [4] goes even further than proposed Rule 1.1 8(d)(1) in permitting the
lawyer to secure the prospective client's advance waiver of both the prohibition on representation
and the prohibition on use of any information conveyed during the consultation. The waiver, of
one or both of the prohibitions, requires the prospective client's informed consent and is an
approach previously approved in ABA Formal Opinion 90-358, but it is not clear whether this
approach will really provide a viable option for dealing with most prospective clients. In any
event, such informed consent is likely to be difficult to demonstrate after the fact, unless (as
suggested above in connection with proposed Rule 1.4) the informed consent is required to be in
writing.
Proposed Rule 1.1 8(d)(2) permits adverse representation by the consulted lawyer's firm
provided that the consulted lawyer took care to limit the information received during the initial
consultation and the lawyer is "screened." The first requirement is desirable, but it is subject to the
"changed story" and the "disingenuously indiscreet" problems. Expansion of the screening
remedy to situations involving prospective clients sounds appealing inasmuch as prospective
clients are entitled to less protection than actual clients. However, the lesser protection already
afforded the prospective client, when coupled with the concerns of observers about whether there
are leaks in the screens, argues against extending the screening remedy to this situation.
The application of proposed Rule I. 18 in an MDP context may prove particularly difficult
since it may be unclear in such circumstances whether a person consulting a lawyer about the
possibility of hiring the lawyer is thinking of entering into a client-lawyer relationship. While the
MDP problem is not yet ripe for addressing, a similar problem currently exists in situations where
one lawyer engages in both law practice and in the provision of law-related services. The
relationship between proposed Rule 1.18 and Rule 5.7 should be explained in the Comments,
perhaps clarifying when the duties under proposed Rule 1.18 do not arise because the client is
only seeking law-related services.
Proposed Deletion of Rule 2.2
Model Rule 2.2 merits deletion. It is difficult to distinguish from Model Rule 1.7. It really
adds nothing to the latter rule.
Proposed Rule 4.4
Proposed Rule 4.4(b) puts the burden of avoiding inquiries as to privileged information on
the lawyer who seeks information from a third person if the lawyer "knows or reasonably should
know" that the information is privileged. Placing this burden on the lawyer may be unwise.
Proposed Comment [2] indicates this proposal is designed, at least in part, to protect material in
the hands of an organization's present or former employees which is protected by a privilege of
the organization itself. Nonetheless, precluding the lawyer's seeking of such information before
the organization's privilege has been established seems undesirable and may, in some cases,
facilitate improper cover-ups. An alternative approach might be to require the lawyer to advise
the person from whom the information is sought that some other person may have a legal right to
prevent the disclosure of the information, leaving the decision on whether to disclose to the
person from whom the information is sought.
Proposed Rule 4.4(c) attempts to solve the longstanding question of what a lawyer is
to do upon receiving an inadvertently sent document. The Rule simply requires that the sender be
notified promptly, but does not resolve the question of whether the receiving lawyer may read the
document and/or will be presumed to have read the document. This is a crucial question and
should be addressed. It seems too important an issue to leave entirely to the lawyer's unguided
discretion. Proposed Comment [3]'s statement that other aspects of this problem are matters of
law "beyond the scope of these Rules" is of no help, particularly where there is no clear rule of
law.
Proposed Rule 5.1
Paragraphs (a) and (b) should apply to lawyers with supervisory authority over the
professional work of a legal department in a nonprofit organization, such as a charity, church or
university. Comment [ 1] should clarify thispoint, perhaps by substituting "organization" for
"enterprise" in the first sentence thereof and adding "nonprofit organization" after "enterprise" in
the second sentence thereof.
Paragraph (b) of Rule 5.1 should apply to a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority
over professional work of another lawyer in an MDP to the extent that the work of the other
lawyer constitutes the practice of law, regardless of how other issues involving MDPs are
resolved. A sentence to this effect should be added to Comment [3]. The application of
paragraph (a) to MDPs is problematic and not appropriate for commentary at this time.
Proposed Rule 5.2
Proposed Comment [2] should be clarified to indicate that paragraph (b) only applies if the
lawyer acts in accordance with a "supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable
question of professional duty" as a lawyer. The ethical standards of any other professions of
which one or both of the lawyers is a member are not relevant and may not be relied upon to
resolve the question.
Proposed Rule 5.3
A comment should be added on this rule paralleling proposed Comment [ 1 ] to Rule 5. 1,
indicating that the Rule refers to lawyers who have supervisory authority over non-lawyer
assistants in a firm or a legal department of an organization, enterprise or government agency.
COMMENTS ON ETHICS 2000 PROPOSED RULES AND COMMENTS - Report 2
(June 23, 2000)
These comments were drafted by a Task Force consisting of Linda Galler, Donald P. Lan,
Jr., Michael B. Lang (serving as chair of the Task Force), Joel Newman, Sylvan Siegler (serving
as liaison to the Ethics 2000 Commission), and Bryan Skarlatos. The Task Force has also
considered comments received from James P. Holden. The Task Force was appointed by Linda
Gafler, Chair of the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section of Taxation.
Proposed Rules 1.2, 1.11, 1.12, 1.16, 1.17, 4.2, 4.3, 5.5, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 are discussed in these
comments. These comments represent the views of the members of the Task Force. The report
has not been approved by the Council of the Section of Taxation or the Section of Taxation.
The contact person is: Michael B. Lang
University of Maine School of Law
246 Deering Avenue
Portland, Maine 04102
(207) 780-4366
Fax: (207) 780-4239
E-mail: mlang(Ausm.maine.edu
General Comment - Lawyers in Multidisciplinary Practice
As the Task Force noted in its first report (dated March 15, 2000), the proposed Rules
and Comments do not address situations where lawyers are performing work that clearly
constitutes the practice of law in a multidisciplinary practice firm (MDP). The Task Force
understands that the Ethics 2000 Commission to date has not undertaken to address MDP issues.
Proposed Rule 1.2
Under Proposed Rule 1.2(c), a lawyer is permitted to limit the scope of representation "if
the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent."
According to Proposed Comment [5]:
A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited
objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation
is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to
accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the
client thinks are too costly....
Proposed Comment [6] states that any limitation 'must be reasonable under the circumstances."
As an example, the Proposed Comment explains that if the client is merely attempting to secure
general information about the law the client needs "in order to handle a common and typically
uncomplicated legal problem," the lawyer and client may agree to limit the lawyer's services to a
telephone consultation. Such limitations do not exempt the lawyer from the duty of competence,
but the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining whether competent representation
is afforded.
The Task Force strongly endorses Proposed Rule 1.2(c), explained in the Comments as
permitting a client and an attorney who is asked to render legal advice to agree to limit the extent
of the work performed. In tax practice, clients often wish to limit the extent of work performed
on matters that involve a relatively small amount (and the clients seek correspondingly minimal
fees), or where time constraints preclude extensive consideration. If the client understands the
implications of the limitations on the quality of the representation and on the advice sought from a
lawyer, the lawyer should be permitted to undertake representation on the client's terms. Thus,
the lawyer and the client should be able to agree that the lawyer will spend more or less time or
energy on a particular matter. A lawyer, however, may not agree to provide advice that is so
limited in scope as to violate the duty of competence.
The Task Force also agrees that the duty of competence is not an absolute standard
requiring that the lawyer go to all lengths in all representations, but rather that the extent of the
lawyer's duty in any particular representation depends on its own facts. Thus, it is appropriate to
take into account financial or time pressures in measuring the extent of the work to be done by a
lawyer in fulfilling the duty of competence. The duty to provide competent representation must
include a scope of representation that is sufficient to render useful service to the client within the
constraints of time and financial resources.
Proposed Comment [6] should address the lawyer's obligation to undertake adequate
research to make an informed and intelligent judgment. Where the lawyer is able to consult
relevant texts, treatises and articles, and draw upon relevant experience, it may be appropriate to
do so and to forego additional research into primary authorities. This may be so even if
exhaustive research might change the lawyer's advice as to the course of conduct. The Comment
should emphasize that it is incumbent upon the lawyer to decide when enough research has been
performed to conclude that, under the circumstances, the lawyer's judgment is adequately
informed.
Either the Rule or a comment should require the lawyer to indicate the extent to which the
client reasonably can rely upon the lawyer's advice. Thus, the lawyer normally should advise
whether the client reasonably could proceed to plan a transaction or take other contemplated
action based upon the level of advice provided. In the case of a tax lawyer, fbr example, the
lawyer should be required to advise whether the advice provides sufficient basis to take a position
in a tax return without running the risk of a penalty under I.RC..§ 6662, or whether the advice
reflects little more than the lawyer's "gut reaction."
The Comments should also expressly state that limiting the scope of representation is
improper in three contexts. First, limiting the scope of representation is not appropriate where the
lawyer can reasonably anticipate that legal advice rendered to a client may also be relied upon by
third parties, for example, courts or other third party non-clients. Thus, a client should not be
able to limit the work performed by an attorney in preparing a brief or other court document
involving a complex issue that cannot adequately be addressed given such a limitation. The court
is owed duties, including the duty of candor, that the client cannot waive nor the client
engagement mitigate.
Secondly, the Comments should state that a client may not limit an attorney's work in
preparing a tax or other legal opinion that will be referenced in promotional materials provided to
prospective investors, who are entitled to rely upon the advice of the attorney. Ordinarily, it
would be impossible both to explain adequately to third parties the effects of a limitation on the
agreed scope of the work and to ascertain whether the third parties sufficiently appreciate the
risks of relying on advice based on such a limited scope representation. Moreover, a tax attorney
has an obligation to the tax system not to give casual advice on substantial issues that are likely to
be relied upon for tax reporting, particularly where a number of third parties may be involved.
Third, the Comments should state that limiting the scope of representation is not
appropriate whenever the lawyer's duties under other statutes, rules, or laws might thereby be
compromised. Thus, a lawyer must always observe the rules of a court or an administrative
agency before which the lawyer practices. Similarly, tax lawyers should not agree to limit the
scope of representation in a manner that could expose the lawyer to penalties under the Internal
Revenue Code (e.g., I.R.C. § 6694 return preparer penalty).
As a final comment, the Task Force notes the importance of Proposed Rule 1.2(c) to pro
bono practice. In the tax area, for example, volunteer attorneys often enter appearances before
the United States Tax Court on behalf of otherwise pro se litigants merely for purposes of settling
cases with IRS. Appeals Officers on the same day as an appearance. (Whether it is ethically
proper to represent a client in these negotiations with little opportunity for preparation depends
primarily on whether such representation satisfies the lawyer's duty of competence, which in turn
depends on the facts and circumstances.) If the pro bono attorney is unable to reach a settlement
with the Appeals Officer, it is unclear under the current rules whether the attorney may decline
further representation. Some believe that this uncertainty has deterred otherwise willing attorneys
from taking on these cases. The Proposed Rule would clarify that an attorney and client could
agree to the limited representation. This subject is addressed in Proposed Comment [2] to New
Rule 6.5, which crossreferences Proposed Rule 1.2(c). A mention of this situation in the
Comments to Proposed Rule 1.2(c), with a crossreference to New Rule 6.5 would be appropriate.
Proposed Rule 1.11
Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) provides that a lawyer who formerly served as a public officer or
employee of the government is (1) subject to Rule 1.9 and (2) "except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, shall not represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially" in his former role without the informed consent of the
appropriate government agency. Proposed Rule 1.1 (b) states that when a lawyer is disqualified
from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in the firm with which the lawyer is associated
who knows or reasonably should know of the lawyer's disqualification may undertake or continue
representation in the matter unless prescribed screening and notice procedures are followed.
Proposed Rule 1.11 (c) states that, except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having
information known to be confidential government information about a person acquired when the
lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a client whose interests are adverse to
that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person. The term "confidential government information" is newly defined and replaces the
definition found in paragraph (e) of the current Rule. Proposed Rule 1.1 1(d).is a counterpart of
paragraph (a) and addresses the case of a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee.
Such a lawyer, like one who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the
government, is expressly made subject to Rule 1.9.
Proposed Comments [2] and [3] indicate that Rule 1.10 is not intended to apply to impute
disqualification to the other lawyers in the disqualified lawyer's firm or government agency when
Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) or (d) applies to an individual lawyer. This latter point is not clear from
the Proposed Rule and is very important; it should be expressly spelled out in the Rule, perhaps by
adding the parenthetical "(but is not subject to Rule 1.10)" after the reference to "Rule 1.9" in
Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) and (d). See Proposed Preamble and Scope [21].
The comments below focus primarily on Proposed Rule 1.11 (a)(1) and its application of
Proposed Rule 1.9 to former government employees or officers. Proposed Rule 1.9 addresses
conflicts of interest and states that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are substantially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. The latest version of
Proposed Comment [1] to Proposed Rule 1.9 states that current and former government lawyers
must also comply with Rule 1.11 (deleting the earlier version of the Proposed Comment to the
effect that in the case of these lawyers Rule 1.11, and not Rule 1.9, applies). Until now, then,
Rule 1.11 has been regarded as the exclusive source of guidance concerning disqualification by
reason of prior government service and Rule 1.9 has been considered irrelevant. The distinction
between the two Rules was also honored in prior drafts of Proposed Rule 1.11.
Under the current Proposed Rule 1.11 (a), a former government official who in any
nmatter" takes a position adverse to the government is disqualified under Rule 1.9 if the "matter"
is substantially related to work done while in government service. While the term "matter" is
defined in Proposed Rule, 1. 1 to. require specific proceedings and parties, thereby excluding such
activities as rulemaking, Proposed Rule 1.9 contains no similar restrictive definition of the term,
and the term "matter" is likely to be construed more broadly in Rule 1.9 than it is in Rule 1.11.
This conclusion follows from an examination of section 213 (analogous to Rule 1.9) and section
214 (analogous to Rule 1.11) of the new Restatement, where Comment d. to section 214 states
that the "definition is narrower than that governing former client conflicts of interest under section
213." The difference is also apparent when the definition of "matter" in Proposed Comment [2] to
Proposed Rule 1.9 is compared with the definition of "matter" in Proposed Rule 1.11. Thus,
although both 18 USC §207(a)(1) and Circular 230 (31 C.F.R. § 10.26), the latter governing those
admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, define amatter" in a way that excludes
rulemaking, the broad definition of matter for purposes of Rule 1.9 (as applied by Proposed Rule
1.11) seems to cover rulemaking.
Assuming Rule 1.9's definition of "matter" does include "rulemaking," Proposed Rule
1.11 (a)'s application of Rule 1.9 to former government lawyers would represent a major
departure from existing conflict of interest rules, rules that have worked well in the context of tax
practice without generating problems that warrant fundamental change. For example, while
section 10.26 of Circular 230 permits a former government lawyer who participated in rulemaking
to represent a private party with regard to the rulemaking so long as the lawyer does not use
confidential government information or challenge the validity of the rule, Rule 1.9 (as applied by
Proposed Rule 1.11) would bar the former government lawyer from such representations. The
Proposed Rule, as so interpreted, would effectively preclude a former government lawyer who
was involved in drafting regulations from ever representing a client who wanted to take a position
adverse to the government with respect to such regulations. This would severely limit the job
mobility of government lawyers and make it increasingly difficult for the government to attract
talented lawyers for certain kinds of positions. While Proposed Comment [2] makes it clear that
Proposed Rule 1.1 1(b)'s special imputation rule, allowing the screening of the disqualified lawyer,
will apply with respect to former government lawyers rather than the total firm disqualification
rule of Rule 1.10, this is unlikely to offer much solace to the former government lawyer whose
regulatory drafting experience is extensive, thus disqualifying her from representing numerous
clients who may want to take a position adverse to the government.
While the Task Force recognizes the concern of the Commission about the perception of a
"revolving door," where former government lawyers are perceived to sell the expertise acquired
during their government service, the Proposed Rule, as so interpreted, would be truly draconian.
Furthermore, if adopted by any State Bar, the proposal would apparently apply to former
government lawyers who left government service for private practice years before the Rule's
adoption. Indeed, this interpretation would be very reasonable in light of the Proposed Rule's
lack of a time limitation on the disqualification period and the fact that any other interpretation
would confer an enormous competitive advantage on those lawyers who left government service
before any stated effective date for the Proposed Rule.
Furthermore, the restrictive nature of the Proposed Rule would be likely, at least in the tax
field, to encourage former government lawyers to accept positions with accounting firms, which
generally take the view that they are not engaged in the practice of law. This avenue would be
particularly attractive to the former government lawyer who is also a certified public accountant.
In the alternative, a tax lawyer might argue that he is permitted to represent a client, at least
before the Internal Revenue Service, despite the prohibition that the Proposed Rule would impose
because he is only subject to the more liberal conflict of interest rule of Circular 230. Since a
lawyer's right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service depends on his membership in good
standing of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth or the District of Columbia Bar, if the
lawyer were admitted to the Bar of a State in which the Proposed Rule had not been adopted, the
lawyer's right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service would probably be unaffected by
adoption of the Proposed Rule by the Bar of another State in which the lawyer's client resides.
For all of these reasons, the Task Force urges that Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) not subject
former government lawyers to Rule 1.9. In the alternative, if the Commission does not intend
Proposed Rule 1.1 1(a)(1) to apply Rule 1.9 to "matters" defined broadly to include rulemaking,
this intention should be made clear by expressly stating that in applying Rule 1.9 to former
government lawyers under Rule 1.11, the definition of "matter" in Rule 1. 11 is controlling. At an
absolute minimum, application of Rule 1.9 to former government lawyers should be limited to a
reasonable time period after the lawyer leaves public service, such as the one-year time period of
section 10.26(b)(4) of Circular 230.
Proposed Rule 1.12
Rule 1.12 deals with conflicts of former judges and arbitrators who may represent clients
that previously appeared before them in their capacity as judge or arbitrator. The Proposed Rule
expands Rule 1.12 to include mediators and other third-party neutrals. By doing so, the Proposed
Rule provides different rules for (i) a former judge or other adjudicative officer and (ii) an
arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral who participates in either court-ordered or private
dispute resolution.
Proposed Rule 1.12(a), as amended, only applies to a former judge or other adjudicative
officer. It provides that a lawyer may not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which
he/she participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer unless the
client gives "informed consent," as opposed to the current Rule's "consent after consultation."
Subparagraph (a) also provides (as it did in prior subparagraph (c)) that no other lawyer in a firm
in which a disqualified former judge or adjudicative officer is associated who knows of that
lawyer's disqualification may undertake or continue representation unless the disqualified lawyer
is screened from the matter, is partitioned no part of the fee therefrom and written notice is
promptly given to the prior tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with provisions of the
Rule. The Proposed Rule 1.12(a) broadens the requirement of a Chinese wall to situations where
the firm knows or "reasonably should know" of the lawyer's disqualification. The Task Force
questions the workability of the requirement that a screened former judge not be apportioned any
part of the fee from the representation, particularly in the case of a large firm.
'The Task Force commented on both this generic change in the Proposed Rules and on the
"informed consent" standard in its earlier report, dated March 15, 2000.
New Rule 1.12(c) provides that an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral may
not represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interest of any former party to the proceeding in which the
lawyer served as an arbitrator, mediator or a third-party neutral unless the former party gives.
informed consent, again without consultation. This disqualification rule differs from the rule
applicable to a former judge in two significant respects.
First, the former judge must have participated personally and substantially in the matter.
The rule for arbitrators and neutrals only requires that the prospective client not be involved in the
same or a substantialy related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to any
party to the proceeding. There is no definition of "substantially related matter" in either the
Proposed Rule or the Proposed Comments. The Proposed Rule might be read as barring an
arbitrator, mediator or a third-party neutral from taking a legal position for a client that is adverse
to a legal position taken by a party in the proceeding in which the lawyer served as a mediator,
arbitrator or a third-party neutral. Applying the Proposed Rule to such "issues conflicts,"
however, seems too harsh. The Comments should reject this construction and provide additional
guidance about the meaning of the phrase "materially adverse."
Secondly, Proposed Rule 1.12(c) imputes disqualification of the lawyer to all lawyers in
the lawyer's firm who know or reasonably should know of the disqualification (parallel language
to subsection (a)) absent informed consent. There is no provision here, like that for former
judges, for allowing the firm to continue representation without informed consent if it builds a
Chinese wall and apportions no part of the fee to the neutral. Although Proposed Comment [2]
justifies the absence of such a screening option on the theory that the neutral may have
confidential information, the same is true of former government lawyers for whom a screening
option is provided in Proposed Rule 1.11 (c). The Task Force urges the Commission to consider a
similar option for the firm of a disqualified neutral.
Arbitrators were removed from the rules governing former judges because the
Commission believes that former judges do not typically have confidential information or share
confidentiality obligations with respect to the parties as do arbitrators, mediators and other third-
party neutrals. This distinction makes sense, but not where the arbitrator or mediator is merely
arguing a legal position for a client in a different matter that may be adverse to a party to the
proceeding. Proposed Comment [2] suggests that the "substantially related matter" aspect of the
Proposed Rule may only be intended to apply where the former neutral is likely to have
confidential information, and thus may not be intended to cover an issues conflict. The Task
Force considers this the correct approach and believes, as stated above, that the Comments should
clarify that the Proposed Rule does not apply to issues conflicts.
Finally, it is unclear what rule applies to a lawyer who as a former government employee
served as an adjudicative officer, arbitrator or mediator, such as an IRS Appeals Officer. Is that
lawyer governed by Proposed Rule 1.12(a) or (c), as appropriate, or is the lawyer governed by
Proposed Rule 1.11, which deals with representation of clients by a former government
employee? The Rules should clarify which rule is to control in such a situation.
Proposed Rule 1.16
Current Rule 1. 16(b)(3) allows permissive withdrawal if the client insists upon "pursuing
an objective" that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent. Proposed Rule 1. 16(b)(4) would
change this to allow permissive withdrawal if the client insists upon taking action (instead of
"pursuing an objective") that the lawyer considers repugnant or "with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement." By making the trigger that can prompt withdrawal an "action," rather
than focusing on the client's objectives, the Proposed Rule applies a more objective standard. The
Task Force endorses this change.
The Proposed Rule also deletes the word 'imprudent." The Commission removed the
word "imprudent" because it permitted a lawyer to threaten withdrawal in order to prevail in
almost any dispute with the client. The Commission feels this change will prevent lawyers from
undermining their clients' ability to direct the course of the representation, a goal the Task Force
supports.
Proposed Comment [7] provides no examples of situations where the lawyer has a
"fundamental disagreement" with action that the client insists on taking. Thus, it appears that a
lawyer could withdraw under the Proposed Rule if he/she had a moral or religious objection to the
action the client wanted to take. The Task Force believes withdrawal should be permitted in such
a situation only if the lawyer could not reasonably have foreseen that the client might insist on
taking the objectionable action at the time the lawyer accepted the representation. Proposed
Comment [7] should elaborate on the meaning of the phrase "fundamental disagreement" with
respect to this and other situations.
Rule 1.16(b)(5) provides that a lawyer may withdraw if the representation will result in an
unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer. Proposed Rule 1.16(b)(6) modifies the rule to allow
withdrawal only if the representation would result in an unforeseeable and unreasonable financial
burden. The Commission believes that lawyers should not be permitted to withdraw when the
financial burden of the representation was foreseeable at the outset since lawyers are in a better
position than clients to assess the situation and avoid the financial burden. Consequently, if the
likelihood of the financial burden is apparent at the outset, the lawyer should decline
representation at that time. The Task Force supports this change and also believes that the
Commission should add a foreseeability element to Proposed Rule 1. 16(b)(4) as well, as stated
above.
While Proposed Rule 1. 16(c) maintains the current requirement that a lawyer must
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for termination when ordered to do so by a
tribunal, the Proposed Rule also requires that the lawyer comply with applicable law requiring
notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. Thus, if a court requires
that a lawyer notify the court of withdrawal or move for leave to withdraw, the Proposed Rule
requires the lawyer to do so. This probably just states the obvious.
Proposed Rule 1.17
Proposed Rule 1.17(b) modifies the current requirement that a law practice be sold as an
entirety to another lawyer or law firm to permit the entire practice to be sold to one or more
lawyers or law firms. The Task Force supports this change, which is designed to allow a lawyer,
for example, to sell his family law practice to family lawyers and his bankruptcy law practice to
bankruptcy lawyers, thus ensuring that the most competent practitioners are obtaining the cases.
Proposed Rule 1.17(c) deletes the current requirement that written notice of the terms of
the proposed change in the fee arrangement be given to each of the seller's clients. Proposed Rule
1.17(d) deletes the second sentence of current subparagraph (d), which allows the purchaser to
refuse to undertake the representation of any acquired client if the client refuses to pay increased
fees to the purchaser, provided such fees do not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for
rendering substantially similar services. This change, effectively requiring the purchaser to
continue to charge the same fee that the client contracted for with the seller, justifies no longer
requiring written notice of a change in the fee arrangement. The Task Force supports these
changes. As the Commission notes, since the seller could not withdraw if the client refused to pay
increased fees (thus forcing an amendment to the fee. contract), the purchaser of the law practice
should not be able to do so either.
Proposed Rule 4.2
Proposed Rule 4.2 makes only a minor change to Rule 4.2 to expressly provide that a
lawyer may communicate with a person represented by counsel if he is authorized to do so by a
court order. This salutary change was made to alert lawyers to the availability of'judicial relief in
rare situations in which it is needed. The majority of the proposed changes affect only the
commentary.
A. Rule - Indirect Communications by a Lawyer's Agent or Representative
Rule 4.2 states that a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of representation
with another person who is represented by another lawyer. However, the Rule does not mention
anything about indirect communications by a lawyer through the lawyer's agent or representative.
Thus, there is no prohibition against a lawyer counseling a client or an agent to communicate
with a represented person in a specific way that the lawyer could not do directly. The Rule should
contain language preventing communications with a represented person, directly or indirectly.
For an example of such a rule, see N.Y. CODE PROF. RESPONSIBLITY § 1200.35. Alternatively,
the Rule could expand the prohibition to cover agents or others acting on the lawyer's behalf
2. Proposed Comment [2 - Communication Between Parties
Proposed Comment [2] provides that "parties to a matter may communicate directly with
each other...." Consistent with the change to the Rule suggested above, this Proposed Comment
should clarify that a party may not communicate with another represented party if he is doing so
at the request of or on behalf of the first party's lawyer.
1. Proposed Comment [31 - Investigative Activities of Government Lawyers
Despite prosecutors' concerns, the Commission has decided not to recommend special
rules governing communications with represented persons by government lawyers who are
conducting an investigation. Instead, the Commission refers the issue to current law. Proposed
Comment [3] states that communications by government lawyers prior to the commencement of
criminal or enforcement activities may be authorized by law: However, the Proposed Comment
further provides that a communication is not necessarily authorized by law simply because the
communication does not violate a constitutional right. The Proposed Comment is intentionally
ambiguous about when a communication may be unauthorized despite the fact that it does not
violate a constitutional right. It would be helpful to have some additional explanation or examples
to highlight the types of other laws that could be implicated. For example, the Comment could
refer to other ethical rules, such as the attorney-client privilege, that could be implicated by
prosecutorial communications with represented persons.
2. Comment [6] - Communications with
Agents or Employees of Represented Organizations
Proposed Comment [6] discusses the circumstances under which a lawyer may contact
employees or agents of a represented organization. Current Comment [4] prohibits
communications with any employee or agent having managerial responsibility within the
organization and any employee or agent whose statement may constitute an admission on the part
of the organization. This rule effectively creates a bright line test in most cases, distinguishing
between people currently employed by the corporation who, therefore, generally can make
admissions for the organization and people not currently employed by the organization who,
therefore, cannot generally make admissions for the organization. Proposed Comment [6]
effectively narrows the protections offered to the organization by eliminating the language
regarding managerial responsibility and the language regarding people who may make admissions.
Instead, the Proposed Comment prohibits contact with employees or agents who supervise,
direct, or regularly consult with the organization's lawyers regarding the subject matter, or any
person who has authority to obligate the organization with respect to- the matter. There may be
more certainty and reliability in the rule of the current Comment which, as stated, essentially
created a bright line test between current and former employees. The Task Force hopes that the
benefit of the narrowed protection for organizations justifies the less clearly applied rule of
Proposed Comment [6].
Proposed Rule 4.3
Proposed Rule 4.3 emphasizes the prohibition on giving legal advice to unrepresented
persons by incorporating the text of the prohibition found in Comment [I] under the current Rule.
The Proposed Rule also adds a new limitation to the prohibition by providing that it only applies
to situations in which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person's interests "are or have a reasonable possibility of being" in conflict with the client's
interests. Finally, the Proposed Comments add a paragraph defining what generally constitutes
the giving of impermissible advice.
A. The Rule - Prohibition on Giving Legal Advice to Unrepresented Persons
It is appropriate to limit the prohibition to circumstances in which the unrepresented
person's interests are in conflict with the client's interests. However, the language of the Proposed
Rule creates some ambiguity because it provides that the prohibition applies when the lawyer
"reasonably should know" that the interests of the unrepresented person have a "reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client." While it may be appropriate to
include such broad language, there will be issues regarding when a lawyer reasonably should
know of a conflict and when there may be a reasonable possibility of a conflict, as opposed to an
actual conflict. Some explanation in the commentary would help to reduce this uncertainty.
B. Proposed Comment [2] - What Constitutes Impernissible Advice
Proposed Comment [2] attempts to define what constitutes impermissible advice when
there is or may be a conflict of interest. The examples state that it is permissible for a lawyer to
explain his own view of the meaning of a document. This permits a lawyer to explain the meaning
or legal effect of a document to an unrepresented person. Such an explanation essentially
constitutes the giving of legal advice. Thus, it would be appropriate to require a lawyer to advise
the unrepresented person of the need to consult independent counsel in any circumstance where
the lawyer finds himself explaining the meaning of a document to the unrepresented person if the
lawyer believes or has reason to believe the interests of the unrepresented person are in conflict
with the interests of the lawyer's client.
Proposed Rule 5.5
The Task Force supports Proposed Rule 5.5(b) to the extent that it codifies the
widespread view that the listed safe harbor activities do not constitute unauthorized practice of
law. The Task Force, however, believes the safe harbor list should be expanded. While the Task
Force's reasons for supporting such expansion focus on the practice of federal tax law, these
reasons also apply to any law practice that focuses principally on federal law.
Paragraph 8 of the Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Model Rule 5.5 (the
"Explanation") notes that the Commission considered a proposal to broaden the Proposed Rule
5.5(b)(2) safe harbor to allow occasional interstate practice by an out-of-state lawyer in
connection with the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed (the
"Proposal"). The interstate practice "need not involve a specific matter of a client in the lawyer's
home jurisdiction, but rather may involve a client who contacted the out-of-state lawyer because
of that lawyer's national reputation." According to the Explanation, the Commission is not yet
persuaded that it should adopt the Proposal. However, the Commission invites comments on the
matter. The Task Force urges the Commission to adopt the Proposal.
The Proposal is particularly relevant to tax lawyers. Many tax lawyers have national
reputations, based upon their expertise in federal tax law. It is not uncommon for clients all over
the country (or the world) to solicit tax advice from such renowned experts.
Paragraph 7 of the Explanation refers to Section 3 of the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers as a model for the safe harbor in Proposed Rule
5.5(b)(2)(ii). Section 3(3) of the Restatement provides:
A lawyer properly admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may provide legal services
to clients in a matter:
(3) in a tribunal or administrative agency of the federal government
in compliance with requirements for admission to that tribunal or
agency. (Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Preliminary
Draft No. 13, Aug. 11, 1997)
Under this formulation, a lawyer admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service under
Circular 230 (31 C.F. R. Part 10) should be allowed to give federal tax advice to clients in any
state, whether the lawyer is admitted to practice in that state or not. Indeed, while a lawyer's
right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service derives from the lawyer's good standing as a
member of the Bar of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth or the District of
Columbia, there are no geographical limits on where the clients so represented may reside or have
their domicile or principal place of business. (See Circular 230, §§ 10.2 and 10.3.) At the very
least, the Commission should expand the Proposed Rule 5.5(b) safe harbors to recognize that this
type of multijurisdictional practice is allowed.
Even if the lawyer is not fbrmally admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service, occasional interstate practice for the purpose of giving federal tax advice should be
expressly permitted. -As Paragraph I of the Reporter's Explanation notes, in view of "the
increasingly interstate and international nature of some clients' legal matters, the Commission
believes that some latitude should be accorded an out-of-state lawyer." Consistent with this view,
Proposed Comment [2], in explaining the rationale for the safe harbors, provides in part:
There are occasions in which lawyers admitted to practice in another jurisdiction,
but not in this jurisdiction, will engage in conduct in this jurisdiction under
circumstances that do not create significant risk to the interests of their clients, the
courts, or the public.
Surely, the practice of federal tax law is one of those occasions. The ability to interpret federal
tax law is not restricted to lawyers situated in any particular jurisdiction. Thus, a Wyoming
lawyer may interpret the Internal Revenue Code as well as a New York lawyer. The out-of-state
federal tax lawyer is the kind of lawyer meriting the "latitude" referred to by the Reporter's
Explanation.
There is a possibility that the federal tax advice would turn on the peculiarities of state and
local law, matters in which the federal tax lawyer might have no expertise. This possibility,
however, is uncommon outside a few specialized areas of tax-related practice, such as estate
planning. Moreover, Rule 1.1 obligates the lawyer to provide competent representation. If state
or local law issues arise, the tax lawyer has an obligation to assure competent representation,
whether by associating a local lawyer or otherwise. Comments on a safe harbor for occasional
interstate practice should emphasize this point and crossreference Rule 1.1. Subject to the
lawyer's obligation to provide competent representation, the risks inherent in allowing federal tax
lawyers to practice interstate are slight, and are far outweighed by the benefits to be derived from
allowing clients access to tax advice from the very best federal tax lawyers, no matter where they
may be.
As suggested above, those who specialize in federal tax law (and other areas of federal
law) often do not limit their practice or their client base to the jurisdiction in which their Bar
admission and office are located. Although it has been reported that some State Bars have sought
to preclude such out-of-state lawyers from representing clients within their jurisdictions, this
effort is unlikely to be fruitful in the long run. The principal effect of current restrictions in this
area may be that an occasional out-of-state lawyer whose client refuses to pay a fee may find the
local court unwilling to assist with collection of the fee on the theory that the lawyer was engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law. The Task Force doubts that such cases benefit either the
public or the profession.
Proposed Rule 7.1
In general, the transformation of Rule 7.1 into Proposed Rule 7. 1's simple ban on "false or
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services" makes sense. The Proposed
Comments demonstrate that the concerns reflected in the existing Rule are best addressed as
examples of false or misleading communication rather than by the overly broad prohibitions of the
existing Rule. The first sentence of Proposed Comment [2], however, adds a materiality standard
to the Rule's application that is unclear. The Proposed Comment implies that a truthful statement
is prohibited only if the statement is "materially misleading," but that a false statement is
prohibited regardless of whether it is misleading. This seems like a reasonable interpretation of
the Rule since there would seem to be no reason to prohibit a truthful statement that is not
materially misleading. If this is the intended interpretation, the materiality standard should be
included in the language of the Rule rather than added in a comment.
Proposed Rule 7.2
The Task Force applauds the changes in both Proposed Rule 7.2 and Comment [3] to the
Rule recognizing the legitimacy of electronic communication as a medium for advertising legal
services.
Proposed Rule 7.3
Given the simplification of Proposed Rule 7.1, Proposed Rule 7.3(a)'s continued ban ondirect solicitation of prospective clients, now extended to include real-time electronic contact as
well as in-person or telephone contact, seems a vestige of another era. While the Task Force
recognizes as salutary the addition of an exception for solicitation of a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has a "close personal" relationship, the Commission's rationale that it added this
exception because it was "difficult to justify prohibiting a lawyer from calling a close friend"
suggests both the difficulty of applying the "close personal" relationship exception as a practical
matter and the unnecessarily restrictive nature of the general rule.
Since the Proposed Rule, if adopted, will only be invoked by an unhappy client, the client
will then presumably be arguing that the lawyer had no close personal relationship with the client
before the solicitation of the client's business. The lawyer will presumably be arguing the
existence of a prior close personal relationship with the client. Assuming this dispute takes placein an environment where the solicitation itself was neither false nor misleading (otherwise Rule 7.1
would apply and Rule 7.3(a) would be superfluous), it seems likely that the dispute over the
application of the Rule will be even more unseemly than the disputed solicitation. To put the
matter in a different context, would the Proposed Rule permit a soccer parent lawyer to explain
her firm's practice capabilities to another soccer parent sitting near her at a game if their
relationship is founded upon conversations at soccer games and an occasional school board
meeting? If not, would that be a good result? And how much more would be required for the
existence of a "close personal" relationship?
Indeed, the Task Force believes this discussion indicates that any ban on solicitations isproperly limited to solicitations which are either false or misleading, which are already prohibited
by Rule 7.1 (and would continue to be prohibited by Proposed Rule 7.1), or to the situations
covered by Proposed Rule 7.3(b), those involving prospective clients who have made known to
the lawyer a desire not be solicited and solicitations involving coercion, duress or harassment.
The words "undue influence," "intimidation," and "over-reaching" could be added to Proposed
Rule 7.3(b). The Task Force doubts that solicitations by lawyers are generally, or even
frequently, "fraught with the possibility" of such behavior and does not think this possibility in a
small fraction of cases is justification for Proposed Rule 7.3(a) as suggested in Comment [I],
particularly in view of Proposed Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b). Nor is the availability of advertising and
other forms of nondirect communication a good reason for banning direct solicitation.
The Task Force recognizes that the Commission is not addressing issues involving
multidisciplinary practice firms. Nonetheless, there is an aspect of Proposed Rule 7.3(a) that is
particularly relevant to the ongoing competition between accountants and lawyers, particularly in
the tax field. In Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), the Supreme Court invalidated
Florida's ban on direct, in-person solicitation of employment by certified public accountants,
distinguishing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 U. S. 447 (1978), which upheld a ban on in-
person solicitation by lawyers. The two cases can be distinguished on a variety of grounds other
than the professions of the litigants: Ohralik approached an accident victim at a time of high stress
and vulnerability, while Edenfield proposed to telephone supposedly more sophisticated business
executives of small and medium-sized businesses. Ohralik's solicitation could be characterized as
an invasion of privacy, while what Edenfield proposed would not have been so characterized.
Nonetheless, if a lawyer solicited business in the way Edenfield proposed to do, the solicitation
would be prohibited by Proposed Rule 7.3(a).
The Task Force, however, believes there is considerable doubt following the Edenfield
decision that application of Rule or Proposed Rule 7.3(a) to a tax lawyer who followed
Edenfield's solicitation practices would pass constitutional muster. The Task Force also doubts
most State Bars would seek to enforce the Rule on such facts. Adoption of a rule that is either
unlikely to be enforced or not enforceable in most instances breeds disrespect for the law. The
Task Force believes Rule 7.3(a) is such a rule and that it has long outlived its usefulness.
Furthermore, however a court might respond to an attempt to enforce Rule 7.3(a) in the
case of an in-person or phone solicitation by a tax lawyer, Edenfield leaves little room for
restricting such nondeceptive solicitation by certified public accountants. However, the activities
of lawyers and certified public accountants in the tax field overlap considerably. Lawyers should
be free to compete on an equal basis in this respect with certified public accountants. For this
reason, the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section of Taxation overwhelmingly
approved a 1998 recommendation of a Task Force that Circular 230 (31 C.F.R. §10.30), which
governs those admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, be amended to permit
direct solicitations of prospective clients that do not involve false, fraudulent, unduly influencing,
coercive, unfair, misleading or deceptive statements or claims. (These recommendations were
forwarded to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in 1999.) The current Task
Force believes this is the correct-approach to regulating solicitation by all lawyers, not just tax
lawyers, and urges the Commission to consider it carefully.
The Task Force also notes that Circular 230 (§§ 10.2 and 10.3) permits an attorney in
good standing of the bar of the highest court of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth.
or the District of Columbia to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. This authority is
widely viewed as allowing the attorney to represent clients before the Internal Revenue Service,
regardless of where the attorney is admitted to practice or where the client resides, is domiciled or
has its principal place of business. For this reason, if Circular 230 is amended to permit direct
nondeceptive solicitation of prospective clients for representation before the Internal Revenue
Service, a lawyer admitted to practice in State A may be able to engage in direct solicitation of
such clients in State B without concern about State B's Rule 7.3(a) ban on direct solicitation, the
lawyer's limited authority to represent such clients in State B deriving from Circular 230 and the
lawyer's bar membership in State A. Assuming State A either has a lenient rule regarding direct
solicitation of business by lawyers or is not interested in regulating the lawyer's activities in State
B, the State A lawyer will have a competitive advantage over lawyers admitted in State B in being
able to directly solicit prospective clients in State B. Elimination of the general ban on direct
solicitation of prospective clients from State B's Rule 7.3(a) would correct this disparity by
placing the lawyers in State B on an equal footing with those from outside the state.
The Task Force does not believe that Proposed Rule 7.3(c) (or the existing version of the
Rule) serves any valuable purpose. The Task Force wonders if the Rule is actually enforced in
any jurisdiction in which it has been adopted. The Task Force suspects that the required
"advertising material" label causes many recipients to discard written communications unopened
and to ignore recorded or electronic communications, and wonders if this was not part of the
original motivation for the Rule. In the absence of a demonstrated showing of a need for such a
requirement, the Task Force suggests that the Commission should consider deletion of Rule
7.3(c).
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L. THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S DUTY OF COMPETENCE
American lawyers advising on law outside the of the United States must do so competently.
Model Rule 1.1. Thus, lawyers have a duty to inform themselves about foreign law if they
render legal services involving or requiring knowledge of foreign law. See In re Roel, 3
N.Y.2d 224, 232 (1957) ("When counsel who are admitted to the Bar of this State are
retained in a matter involving foreign law, they are responsible to the client for the proper
conduct of the matter, and may not claim that they are not required to know the law of the
foreign State."); see also Hart v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster & Cuiffo, 211 A.D.2d 617, 619
(2d Dept. 1995) (principle applied in legal malpractice action).
"In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular
matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter,
the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question,
the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to
refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the
field in question." Comments to Model Rule 1.1. The level of competence required by
Model Rule 1.1 must take into account the inherent complexity of international transactions
created not only by two or more sets of legal rules, but also by multijurisdictional and/or
multicultural business practices and customs as well as time and distance constraints.
Care should be taken, of course, not to practice law in a jurisdiction in which one is not
licensed. See generally, infra, VI.
II. "REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS": THE TAX LAWYER'S BASIC
ETHICAL STANDARD
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 (1985) defines the basic ethical standard governing lawyers
engaged in federal tax practice. The opinion states (in pertinent part):
"[A] lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the preparation of the
client's tax return, may advise the statement of positions most favorable to the
client if the lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are warranted
in existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer can have a good faith belief
in this context even if the lawyer believes the client's position probably will
not prevail. However, good faith requires that there be some realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated."
The opinion does not address a lawyer's ethical responsibilities in rendering tax advice.
Distinguished commentators, however, have asserted that the standards stated in Opinion 85-
352 should apply with respect to tax planning, particularly where return positions ultimately
will be involved. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS,
STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 204.2.1 (5h ed. 1999); Report of the Special Task Force on
Formal Opinion 85-352,39 TAXLAW. 635,636 (1986); Gersham Goldstemi & Christopher
K. Heuer, Ethical Disclosure Requirements in Corporate Tax Representation, in ETHICAL
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN CORPORATE TAX REPRESENTATION, at 767,812-13 (PLI Tax
Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 434, 1998). Even if Formal Opinion
85-352 does not apply to tax planning, a lawyer may never counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Model Rule 1.2(d).
See, infra, III.
Does the realistic possibility of success standard apply to advice with respect to positions
taken under foreign laws? Although Opinion 85-352 literally applies only to tax advice in the
context of U.S. tax return positions, the principles applied are: (1) the generic litigation
standard applicable whenever lawyers act as advocates (Model Rule 3.1), and (2) the
prohibition against lawyers advising criminal or fraudulent behavior (Model Rule 1.2(d)). Just
as a U.S. attorney admitted to practice in one state must respect the substantive law of other
U.S. states in rendering legal advice, so too should a U.S. attorney respect the laws of foreign
nations.' Cf. South Carolina Ethics Advisory Opinion 79-05 (1979) ) (South Carolina lawyer
may not advise clients that a foreign divorce decree will withstand a direct attack in South
Carolina if the decree violates the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction).
'Moreover, an American attorney advising with respect to foreign laws might be engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction. See, infra, VI.
IUL ADVISING THE CLIENT IN ILLEGAL OR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT: ETHICAL
STANDARDS
The same ethical standards apply where a client's conduct is, or may be, illegal or fraudulent.
A. Conduct the Lawyer Knows is Illegal or Fraudulent
According to Model Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer may neither counsel a client to engage in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent nor assist a client in engaging
in such conduct. Thus, if a client is prohibited under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction
from engaging in certain acts, a U.S. lawyer may not counsel or assist the client as to
such acts. The lawyer may present an analysis of legal aspects of questionable
conduct but may not recommend the means by which a crime or fraud might be
committed with impunity. Comments to Model Rule 1.2.
If a client's course of action has already begun (and is continuing) when the lawyer
discovers the criminal or fraudulent nature of the acts, the lawyer may not continue
to assist the client with respect to the matter. Withdrawal from representation may
be required. Id.
A. Conduct the Lawyer Believes to be Illegal or Fraudulent
A lawyer has discretion in dealing with conduct that she believes, but does not know,
may be intended to further an illegal or fraudulent act or scheme. According to
Model Rule 1.16(b), a lawyer may, but need not, withdraw from representation if,
inter ala:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that
the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent,
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud,
or
(3) the client insists on pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent.
A lawyer may withdraw under these circumstances only if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests.
B. Lawyer's Duty of Inquiry
What is the lawyer's duty of inquiry when a client requests assistance or advice as to
otherwise legal conduct under circumstances that give rise to suspicion that the
conduct may be used to further an illegal or fraudulent act? A lawyer should not
undertake representation without first making inquiry if the facts presented by a
prospective client suggest that the representation might aid the client in perpetrating
a fraud or otherwise committing a crime.
In ABA Informal Opinion 1470 (1981), a prospective client requested a lawyer's
advice as to lawful means of bringing funds into the United States in a manner that
avoided or minimized tax liability. The client had received the funds, which were
substantial, while employed abroad from sources other than his employer. The client
had not disclosed the payments to anyone else and had not reported them in his U.S.
income tax returns. The client had not revealed facts sufficient to enable the lawyer
to determine the legality of the transactions surrounding the payments, but the lawyer
suspected that the payments might have been unlawful bribes or kickbacks and that
in taking the payments the client might have breached duties to his employer. The
Opinion concludes that the lawyer has a duty to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding receipt of the funds by the client in order to assure the lawyer that the
client is no longer engaging in illegal or fraudulent conduct and that the requested
services would not be predicated upon the client's past fraud or other criminal
conduct. Cf. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof and Jud. Ethics,
Formal Opinion 1999-02 (1999) (a lawyer may assist a fugitive client in otherwise
legal conduct where the lawyer does not know or believe, after inquiry, that the
conduct is unlawful or will contribute to commission of an illegal or fraudulent act).
ABA Formal Opinion 246 (1982) indicates that a lawyer violates ethical standards in
rendering a tax shelter opinion if she accepts as true "facts" told to her by a promoter,
when the lawyer should know that further inquiry would disclose that such "facts" are
untrue. Opinion 246 therefore prescribes a duty of inquiry as to relevant facts and
circumstances. "Recklessly and consciously disregarding information strongly
indicating that material facts expressed in the tax shelter opinion are false or
misleading involves dishonesty." Id; cf Circular 230 § 10.33(a)(1) (prohibiting a
practitioner, in rendering a tax shelter opinion, from relying on a client's statements
of fact if she has reason to believe that any relevant facts are untrue).
D. The Lawyer as Advisor
According to Model Rule 2.1, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other relevant
considerations, e.g., moral, economic, social and political factors, in rendering advice
to a client. The Comments to Model Rule 2.1 suggest that advice couched in purely
legal terms may be of little value to a client and, therefore, that it is proper for a
lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical consideration. These suggestions may
be particularly relevant in international law practice where the lawyer often plays a
role in educating clients on social, cultural, and/or moral aspects of doing business in
foreign countries.
IV. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. The Act
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended ("FCPA"), prohibits persons
from making offers or payments to foreign government officials or foreign political
party representatives in order to obtain or retain business. Specifically, the FCPA
authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to bring criminal charges and the Securities
and Exchange Commission to impose fines and injunctions against companies,
officers, and directors who fail to take the steps necessary to avoid prohibited
payments.
The scope of the FCPA was broadened earlier this year to conform with the terms of
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
I. The amendments substantially expand the definition of prohibited
conduct to include not only offers or payments made for the purpose
of "influencing any act or decision" of a foreign official or political
party representative or for "inducing such foreign official to do or not
to do any act," but also offers or payments made for the purpose of
"securing any improper advantage." The amendments do not
eliminate the exception for expediting or facilitating payments.
2. The amendments broaden the scope of persons and entities subject to
the FCPA. Prior to the amendments, the FCPA applied only to issuers
of securities registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
"domestic concerns," and U.S. citizens. The FCPA's coverage now
include all foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a
foreign bribe while in the United States.
3. The amendments extend the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA to acts
committed by U.S. businesses and nationals entirely outside of the
territorial boundaries of the United States.
"While aggressive enforcement of an expanded FCPA poses risks for U.S. companies
operating abroad, U.S. companies competing in the international marketplace
formerly at a competitive disadvantage should find themselves closer to an equal
footing with a greater number of foreign corporations. In theory at least, the adoption
of the OECD Convention empowers U.S. firms to present evidence of competitor
bribery directly to the authorities in the relevant countries rather than the pointless
diplomatic and media protests of the past. But businesses and individuals not
previously subject to FCPA provisions may now find themselves vulnerable to FCPA
liability. As a result, U.S. companies with employees or agents operating outside of
the United States would be well advised to re-evaluate their compliance policies an
procedures to ensure full compliance with the recent FCPA amendments." Joseph F
.Savage, Jr., Charles F. Willson, & Jennifer Martin, New Amendments to the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct Broaden Its Scope as Enforcement Increases, WmTE-CoLLAR
CRIME REP., July-Aug. 1999, at 1.
B. The Lawyer's Role Where the Client Violates the FCPA
I. The principles and considerations addressed, supra, at m, would apply.
2. If a lawyer who represents a corporation knows or strongly believes that a
corporate executive is engaged in a violation of the FCPA, the question arises
whether the lawyer has a duty to report this to higher corporate levels.
According to Model Rule 1.13(b), the duty to take action is premised on both
a violation of the law and a risk of substantial injury to the corporation. The
Model Rules do not, however, prescribe a particular course of action, but
rather suggest a number of possibilities, including referring the matter to
higher authority within the corporation. For a general (but somewhat dated)
discussion of this question and related issues, see Roger J. Goebel,
Professional Responsibility Issues in International Law Practice, 29 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 1.34-43 (1981).
V. OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
A. The Convention
Earlier this year, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions ("OECD Anti-Bribery Convention") entered into
force. Signed by all twenty-nine member countries of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation (OECD) and five non-member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, and the Slovak Republic),2 the Convention provides generally for the
criminalization of bribery through domestic law and reform and the cooperation
2To date, the Convention has been ratified by eighteen of the thirty-four signatories. The
United States has ratified the Convention.
among the signatories in battling corruption.3 The OECD Anti-Briberv Convention
represents the culmination of U.S. efforts to encourage its trading partners to enact
legislation similar to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires each government to "establish that it
is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or
give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order
that the official act or refrain from action in relation to the performance of official
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the
conduct of international business." Article 1(1). "[C]omplicity in, including
incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign
public official," as well as attempt or conspiracy, and criminalized by the Convention,
as well. Article 1(2).
To some (perhaps limited) degree, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention levels the
playing field for American companies, who have complained that they lose overseas
contracts to foreign competitors, which can or do pay bribes.
3See also Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, signed April 1996 by twenty-
one members of the Organization of American States. This Convention requires signatories to
criminalize domestic and foreign bribery and to take measures to combat the illicit enrichment of
government officials. Signatories also agree to provide mutual assistance in criminal matters and
extradition with respect to covered offenses. Several signatories of this Convention, including the
United States, are also parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
11
B. The Lawyer's Role Where the Client Violates the Convention
See, supra, IV(B).
VL UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Advising clients on foreign law may be considered the practice of law by a foreign
jurisdiction, subjecting the U.S. lawyer to claims of unauthorized practice of law. Engaging
in unauthorized practice violates the ethical standards of the jurisdiction in which the attorney
is licensed, Model Rule 5.5, and also may be actionable under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction. "As a practical matter, it is normally the lawyer's home jurisdiction that is most
likely to bring a disciplinary action against the member lawyer. Nevertheless, given the reach
of some long-arm jurisdictional statutes as well as the extraterritorial reach of some lawyer
regulation codes, legal services in one country that somehow relate to a transaction in another
may subject a lawyer to the courts and laws of a foreign country." Robert E. Lutz, Ethics
and International Practice: A Guide to the Professional Responsibilities of Practitioners,
16 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 53, 60-61 (1992/1993).
jsu/ LI.GA T * WtEll OF JUIY f. 1999
Question at Heart of New Tax Adviser Privilege
When Is Tax Practice 'Legal'?
BY CHRISTOPHER S. RZK
he recent report of the
American Bar Association's
Commission on Multidisci-
plinary Practice stresses the need to
maintain client confidentiality. While
lawyers may believe they need not be
reminded of the sanctity of secrets, the
comuission understood that client confi.
dences may be underrmned when firms
include lawyers and non-lawyer pro!cs-
sionals working side by side. The prob-
lem is simply this: A client's communi-
cations to his or her accountant. auditor,
or other nonlawyer professional ordinan-
ly are not covered by the atomey-client
privilege.
Tax practice. in which lawyers and
non-lawyers frequently work together to
advise and represent clients, presents
perhaps the most visible example of the
challenges of maintaining client confi-
dences in a multidisciplinary setting.
Last year. Congress addressed some of
Christopher S. Rtaek is a parmer at
D.C.'s Caplin & Drvsdale. From 1995 to
1998. Rizek served as attorney-adviser
and then associate tax legislative coun-
sel in the Treasury Departmeni' Office
of Tax Legislative Counsel. While at
Treasur: he was the deparments main
negotiator on the taxpayer rights provi-
sions of the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998.
these challenges in the IRS Resrcturing
and Reform Act of 1998, enacting a new
evidentary privilege for ceraim commu-
nications between taxpayers and their
advisers.
Issues relating to the scope of. and
exceptions to. this new privilege are sure
to be litigated in coming years. but com-
mentary from the courts has already
begun. In dicta in United States v.
Frederick. 83 AFTR2d 99-1870 (7h Cir.
1999). Judge Richard Posner highlighted
the conceptual issue at the heart of the
new privilege: that it applies to accoun-
ts or other nonlawyers only when they
are rendering legal advice-in other
words. practicing law. This core problem
is likely to focus attention on a broader
issue in the tax field, namely the extent
to which Congress has overridden the
authority of stases to regulate practice
of law.
COMMON LAW GAP
Common law recognizes no privilege
for communic pons made between indi-
viduals and their accountants. Since
there is no common law accountant-
client privilege, federal courts do not rec-
ognize such a privilege under Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Likewise, the U.S. Tax Court does not
recognize an accountant-client or tax
adviser-client privilege, even though it
allows accountants and others to epre-
sent taxpayers before it. IRC §17452.
7453; Tax. CL Rule 200.
In the 1998 law. however. Congress
creased a federal statutory privilege nal-
ogous to the statutory accountant-client
privilege is many states. New §7525 of
the Internal Revenue Code provides:
With respect to tax advice, te same
common law protections of confiden-
tiality which apply to a communica-
inon between a taxpayer and an ator-
ney shall also apply to
a communication be-
tween a taxpayer and
any federally autho-
rized tax pracuoner to
the extent the commu-
nicanon would be con-
sidered a privileged
communication if it
were between a taxpay.
er and an anorney.
The statute defines a
"federally authorized tax
pracuuoner" (FATP) as an
individual authorized to .
practice before the IRS
pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§330. "Tax advice" is'
defined as "advice given
by an individual with resct to a m-ner
which is within the scope of the individ-
ual's authority to practice."
The statute identifies various excep-
tions to the new privilege. It does not,
apply to criminal tax maters. nor can it
be asserted in any proceeding other than
a federal civil tax maner (e.g.. in nontax
litigation or an investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commiassion).
Like the attorney-client privilege, the
statutory privilege is wavable, so com-
munications disclosed in nontax pro-
ceedings will presumably be nonprivi-
leged in subsequent tax proceedings.
Finally. the new privilege does not apply
to certain communicatons related to car-
poraste tax shelters.
In order for communications -with
respect to tax advice" to be privileged
under this provision, they must be the
sort of communications that would be
protected if made between a lawyer and
a Client. Of Course, it is hoMbook law
that communications between a lawyer
and a client are privileged only to the
exient they are made in conneeton with
legal advice.
Although defining the exact bound-
aries of "legal advice" has been the
source of much controversy over the
yeas, the general principle is well-euab-
lished that communications with an
atoney that are not for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice (e.g.. manageal
consultations, investment or economic
analysts, or preparation of a tax renum)
are not privileged. A fornor such com-
muications with a nonlawyer FATP can-
not be privileged under 17525. Indeed.
the legislative history of the new privi-
lege says exactly this. H. Conf. Rep. No.
105-599 at page 268.
Conversely, if a communication is
privileged only to the extent the "tax
advice" would be "legal advice" if given
by a lawyer, then such tax advice must
necessarily be a subset of legal advice.
True, some kinds of tax advice may be
otaide the scope of legal advice. But a
communication for the purpoe of get-
ing such tax advice would then be out-
auk the scope of th anorneyiat priv-
ilege even if made with a lawyer, and so
it would man noalmvielid m the
new same
This analysis was apparently discerned
by Judge Pouner in Frederit and under-
lies his comment about the new privi-
I lege. Richard Frederick. who is an asor-
ney and an accountant, rendered both
legal and tax return preparation services
to his chens. The court held that ne was
acting primarily as an accountantL not as
a lawyer, and thus that the communica-
uons at issue were not privileged. The
court correctly held that the new sunito-
ry privilege was inapplicable because the
communicatuons occurred
before its effective date.
- But Judge Posner never-
theless observed that the
new privilege can be
invoked only if the sub)ect
mustser of the communica-
uons is legal and. noting
that the IRS allows non-
lawyers to practice before
it. said. "Nothing in the
new statute. . suggests
that these non-lawyerS practitioners are entued
to privilege when they aredoing other than lawyvers"
work.'
Sothe question is not
whether privileged tax
advice constiutes legal advice. It does-
tudeed it must. or there will be no privi-
lege. The only question is whether an
FATP can offer such advice without
-engaging in the unathorzed pracuce of
-law. This is a -uch trckir issue. paruc.
-ulary i view of the accounting pmfes-
sion's.long-standing claim that an
accountnt is not prscticing law when be
or she offers tax advice or other tax-
related sm'viceL
PACTICE PUZZLER
The statutory provision cross-refer.
enced in the definition of an FATP autho.
rizes the secretary of the Treasury to
"regulate the practice of representatives
of persons" before Treasury, to impose
certain requirements for admission to
such practice, and to suspend or disbar
such persons. 31 U.S.C. *330. The
authority to admit and regulate practice
is subject to 5 U.S.C. 1500. which in turn
provides. with certain limitations, that a
member in good standing of the bar of a
state may practice before any federal
agency and that a duly qualified certified
public accountant may represent a person
before the IRS.
Pursuant to these provisions. Treasury
regulations state that attorneys, CPAs,
enrolled agents, and (in limited cases)
enrolled actuaries may practice before
the IRS. 31 C.F.R. §10.3 (Treasury
Department Circular 230). Circular 230
states that "practice" before the IRS
comprehends all matters connected with
a presentation" to the IRS "relating to a
client's rights, privileges, or liabilities"
under federal tax laws, including "pre-
paring and filing necessary documents.
corresponding and communicating with
the Internal Revenue Service, and repre-
senting a client a conferences. hearings,
and meetings." 31 C.F.R. §10.2(e).
On the other hand, Circular 230
expressly states that "nothing in the regu-
lations in this part shall be construed as
authorizing persons not members of the
bar to practice law."
Although the boundaries of the prac-
tice of law are notoriously difficult to
delineate, the ABA Commission on
Mulidisciplinary Practice has proposed
to define item by presumptively includ-
ing in legal practice "Preparing any legal
SEE PVg.IE0, PAGE S26
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docurrnL'" "prepang or expressing any
legal opinion." and -preparing any
claims, demands or pleadings of any
kind. or any written documents contain-
ing legal argument or interpretation of
law. for filing in any court. adminisa-
live agency or other mbunal." The MDP
Commission also suggests defining
'legal services- as "'services which. if
provided by a lawyer engaged in the
practice of law would be regarded as
part of such pracuce of law" for purposes
of the disciplinary rule..
Arguably. theretore. Circular 230 is
self-contradictory. At the same ume it
disclaims that it authorizes nonlawvers to
engage in the practice of law, it identifies
as part of 'pracuce before the IRS" many
activities that would undoubtedly consi-
cute the pracuce of law if pertormed by a
lawyer. Acts that would constitute the
practice of law if done by a lawyer in a
legal setting cannot logically cease to be
the practice of law simply because they
are done by nonlawyers in different set-
tings.
In a similar situation, the Supreme
Court found that federal authorizaon to
practice before the Patent Office permut-
ted acuvities by nonlawyer patent agents
that certainly consuituted the practice of
law in Florida. Sperry v. Florida. 373
U.S. 379 (1963). Among the specific
activities the Court found to be perosuned
were "rendering legal opinions." "prepar-
ing, drafting, and construng legal docu-
ments." and "otherwise engaging in the
practice of law." At the same ume. the
Court somewhat confusingly found that
registration with the Patent Office did not
authorize "the general practice of patent
law." but only those services that were
reasonably necessary and incident to
preparing and prosecuting patent appli-
caUiOns.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Should the disclaimer regarding the
practice of law in Circular 230 be given
effect? If so. it could be argued that the
new statutory privilege applies to no
communications whatsoever. for it would
then apply only to a nonlawyer's com-
munications related to legal advice, i.e.,
advice rendered in the practice of law.
which Circular 230 does not authorize.
This might be what Judge Posner was
hinting at in Frederick- Of course, this
interpretation would leave Congress'
effort to create a tax adviser privilege an
empty set. devoid of legal effecL Given
Congress' penchant for symbolic acts.
that may well be accurae, but it is not an
interpretation likely to be favored by the
courts.
It seems more likely that controversies
over the scope of the new statutoy privi-
lege will force the conclusion that tax
advisory services by FATh do constitute
the practice of law if they would other-
wise be the practice of law when per.
formed by a lawyer. This may even be
the better interpretaion. Notwithstanding
Circular 230's disclaimer, it and the
statutory provisions it interprets clearly
authorize some activities by FATPs that
would constitute "legal services" or the
practice of law under the MDP
Commission's proposed definition. At
the very least, they authorize activities
such as appearing before the IRS to seek
a private letter ruling for a client,
responding to an IRS summons or exam-
ination request. and appealing a pro-
posed adjustment.
Under the Sperry analysis. legal opin.
ions and advice concerning tax issues.
research and preparation for such items,
and perhaps even the stuucturing of trans-
actions, may be considered to be parts of
the practice of law that are now federally
authortized for nonlawyem. Communica-
tions may therefore be privileged to the
extent they relate to such manes.
As long as its own disclaimer is
ignored, Circular 230 can be rad to sup-
oort this interuretation. For instance.
even though one need not be an autho-
rized "practitioner' to prepare tax
returns. Circular J0 eStablishes ethical
standards governing the positions that
authorized practitioners can take on a
return or advise a client to take.
Likewise. Circular 230 provides stan-
dards for opiioss on certain kinds of tax
shelter transactions. From these facts. it
may be argued that FATPs are authorized
to offer legal advice as to return positions
and opinions on iansaciton: otherwise.
how could Treasury regulate such activi-
ties?
Taking the position even furthe. onr
might even argue that "tax advice" is
broader than advice directly related to an
actual presentation to the IRS. on the
grounds that "tax advice" is defined as
-advice given by an individual with
respect to a matter which is within the
scope of the individual's authority to
practice." Thus. if a matter eventually
ends up before the IRS. any communica-
tions relatng to the matwr may arguably
be considered within the scope of pnvi-
eged tax advice.
Courts are likely to come out some-
where between these extremes. Circular
230 can probably best be harmonized
with the prohibition against unauthorized
practice of law simply by adopting a nar-
row interpretation of the scope of the
federal authority to practice before the
IRS. A restictive interpretation of such
Tax advisers
may be forced
to admit that
they practice
law, albeit
with federal
authority.
authorized tax practice in the privilege
context would also be consistent with the
habit of courts to constle privileges nar-
rowly, since they are impediments to the
determination of the truth. One ironic
consequence, however, may be that. in an
effort to keep the playing field between
lawyers and accountants level, the courts
will begin adopting a narrow view of
what constitutes legal services provided
to taxpayers by lawyers. The end result
may be a loss of taxpayer confidentiality.
not a gain.
Multidisciplinary practices in the tax
area have so far dodged accusations that
they are engaged in the practice of law.
The new privilege provision may focus
this controversy and force such practi-
tioners to acknowledge that they are
practicing law. albeit with federal author-
ity. Otherwise. the definitional problem
highlighted by Judge Posner in Frederick
could lead to the conclusion that tax
practitioners do not enjoy any privilege.
It may come as a surprise to some
state bar associations to letrn that non-
lawyers claim federal authority to per-
form broad categories of work that are
squly within the traditional definition
of legal services, and that Congress has
implicitly endorsed these practices. At
least in the practice of taxation, that day
appears to be upon us. 5
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LEGAL AFFAIRS
Should law firms be taking equity stakes in their clients?
EVERYONE wants a piece ofthe Internet pie. Silicon Val-ley landlords are demanding
stock from high-tech startups
that want to lease office space.
And if there are equal bids on a home in
the Bay Area, some sellers want to know
if the prospective owners have stock they
can throw in to sweeten the deaL
No surprise, then, that the San Fran-
cisco legal newspaper The Recorder re-
ports that 1999 was a very good year for
technology-focused Silicon Valley law
firms. Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, for example, held stock in 34
newly public clients worth a total of
sz3o million by year-end. If the firm dis-
tributed that sum among its 12o partners,
it would come to si.9 million apiece.
Wilson Sonsini has been a longtime in-
vestor in its client companies, going
back to Rolm and Activision in the mid-
'8os. More recent investments include
Bamboo.com, Brocade Communications,
E-Loan, Juniper Networks, and VA
Linux Systems; Wilson Sonsini holds
more than ioo,ooo shares in each, as well
as more than 2 million shares in Webvan.
Cooley Godward is another law
firm that has a history of investing in
clients, starting with the io8,ooo shares it
held in Amgen before the biotech super-
star went public in z986 (Nasdaq:
[ANAmKERSt'
La w firms are rakine~it in
Wilson Sonsini Cioodrich & Rosati
..Venture Law Group
.Cooley Godward
LGuhder;s Dettmer Stough
ViI.Ieneuve.Franklin & Hachigian
6rbelC l.er &'Harrison.
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AMGN). More recently, Cooley took shares per company. An American Bat
stakes of more than z8,ooo shares in Association analysis of Securities Ex-
Caliper Technologies and over 13,000 in change Commission records showed
Tularik. Other top Silicon Valley law that one in three of the lawyers repre-
firms haven't done too senting more than 500
badly either (see "Rain- 'Nobody has companies that went
makers," below). public in 1999 held stock
According to The a problem as in those clients at the
Recorder, Silicon Valley long as everyone time of the offering.
firms had 173 clients go And those figures don't
public in z999 and held makes a profit.' even include the stakes
shares or stock options that law firms may have
in 99 of them. A venture capitalist told in clients that have been acquired or in-
Red Herring that one firm refused to do vestments in nonclient companies and
legal work for his startups unless it was venture capital funds.
granted an equity stake of at least ioo,ooo The Venture Law Group, a combi-
nation law firm, consultancy, and venture
- ". capital fund, has purposely structured its
business model to earn more in invest-
from equity stakes. ment returns than in fee revenues; it ac-
tively encourages partners to take a per-
. -~s . ..........j sonal stake in client companies. VLG's
1 S q ea9$M clients include HealthCentral, Preview
34 230 Systems, eToys, Chemdex, and Yahoo.
16 62 All of the attorneys participate in the
17 45 fruits of the firm's investment program
and divide it equally; like most top em-
11 31 ployees in Silicon Valley, the bulk of their
.12 ... 22 compensation comes in equity, not salary.
::4 . . . 8 While no hard-line rule prohibits
lawyers from taking equity investment
in clients, in the minds of some longtime
SOURCE: TIHE RECORDER
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law practitioners, the situation in-
evitably creates potential conflicts of in-
terest. "Nobody has a problem as long as
everyone makes a profit," Ronald
Mallen, a San Francisco lawyer who
counsels law firms on ethics and mal-
practice issues, told the ABA Journal.
"It's when the market turns down that
the problems arise. That is where the ex-
posure is. You not only have the oppor-
tunity to become a multimillionaire, you
can get sued."
One possible area for conflict is a
law firm's handling of an IPO registra-
tion statement, which requires adequate
investigation of a company in which the
firm may have an equity stake. The firm
might be insufficiently thorough in its
due diligenre if it is also a direct investor
in the company. Another scenario: sup-
pose companies A and B, both clients of
the same firm, come into conflict, but the
firm has an equity stake only in A. In this
case, a plaintiff might question the firm's
objectivity about a company in which it
holds stock.
Big accounting firms have recently
been called to account for a similar issue:
taking equity stakes in companies they
audit. The SEC released a report in Jan-
uary saying that more than 5o percent of
partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers had
violated rules prohibiting them from
holding personal investments in compa-
nies audited by the firm. The concern is
that service professionals are ceasing to be
independent analysts and becoming ad-
vocates of their own equity investments.
Most big law firms have enacted
mechanisms to insulate themselves from
liability and potential lawsuits. Wilson
Sonsini, Cooley Godward, and VLG all
use outside investment groups to man-
age their investments. The hope is that
by having a third party handle the de-
tails, the attorneys appear to have their
fingers less directly in the pie. Sullivan &
Cromwell, a New York-based law firm
second only to Wilson Sonsini in the
amount of IPO money it handled last
year, does not invest in its clients at all.
Other law firms simply try to limit their
investments. "Most of our equity invest-
ments in clients are limited to $30,000,"
says Craig Johnson, chairman of VLG.
"Admittedly, that can be worth millions
72 RED HERRING - MAY 2000
of dollars post-IPO in today's market."
This is certainly enough to impress a
jury in a conflict-of-interest case. VLG
also brings in other counsel to work on
the IPO prospectuses of companies in
which it has a stake. The truth is, there
have not been many lawsuits over poten-
tial equity-conflict situations and, as a re-
sult, most firms aren't concerned that
such suits will crop up in the future.
"We have no choice but to
make this part of our business
model," says Mr. Johnson.
"The volume of business is
just getting higher. There arc entrepre-
neurs camping out in our lobby all the time
hoping we'll take them on, yet I personally
can only take on five new deals a year. I feel
as if I'm on my porch hanging on for dear
life in the midst of a hurricane."
The hurricane is unlikely to blow
over anytime soon. And if law firms aren't
careful, a conflict-of-interest storm might
be hard on its heels. -Michael Perkins
NETWORKING
Female entrepreneurs get a leg up.
DESPITE news-makingevents like Carly Fiorina'sappointment as Hewlett-Packard's CEO, the pro-portion of men to women
on Silicon Valley startup boards still re-
sembles Amazon.com's price/earnings
ratio. But that may be changing. Accord-
ing to the National Foundation for
Women Business Owners, women cur-
rently own or lead 5o percent of all U.S.
businesses, and in the top 5o U.S. metro-
politan areas, women-owned businesses
are growing faster than the overall econ-
omy. However, last year only 5 percent of
the $30 billion's worth of venture capital
went to women-headed startups. To
speed their access to capital and informal
resources like mentoring, job oppor-
tunities, and networking, several organi-
zations catering to women entrepreneurs
have emerged.
"Women aren't exposed to the right
network of people," says Kay Koplovitz,
who chairs the National Women's Busi-
ness Council. In late January, together
with the Forum for Women Entrepre-
neurs, the council sponsored a venture
capital fotum for women entrepreneurs,
Springboard zooo. "The roots of the net-
working process in Silicon Valley came
out of the semiconductor business. Al-
though there have been women engi-
neers, they weren't in managerial roles
and were left out of the cycle."
Mary Choy, the point woman for
the San Francisco chapter of Women on
the Web (WOW), agrees that a de facto
old boys' network still exists. "Women
haven't had the same opportunity as
men to create a network over the years,"
she says. WOW's z,ooo-member com-
munity offers workshops on all facets of
technology, from programming and site
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ETHICS
The Ethical Question
Behind Referral Fees
LAWYERS HOLD A UNIQUE POSITION of trust, and
our clients instinctively rely on our objectivity when
we assist them with their estate
ay 2 lawyer planning and help them select the the representation.'{ ' accept a corn- estate planning team. That unique The Commentariesmission or re- attribute of objectivity provides further provide thatferral fee from a additional ,alue to our legal skill, 'The receipt bynon-lawyer, such as helps build a loyal client base the lawyer of sucha life insurance agent, and sets us apart from the sales a payment involvesin connection with people. This article discusses the a conflict of in-the representation of decision making process of referral terest with respect toa client? fees - right or wrong? the client. It is im-The American Bar proper for a lawyer,Association's Model Rules of to obtain if he or she were ever who is subject to the strictProfessional Conduct do not to consider accepting and retain- obligations of a fiduciary,
specifically prohibit the lawyer's ing such payments. to benefit personally from suchacceptance of rebates, discounts, Although not within the scope a representation."
referral fees and commissions of this column, the lawyer should The American Bar Associationfrom non-lawyers. However, also be certain the sharing of the agrees. In its Formal Opiniona lawyer's acceptance of such compensation by the non-lawyer 93-379 (1993), the ABA Ethicspayments, when combined with is lawful. Committee opined that thethe fee received from a client, The Commentaries on the benefit of any discount accordedcould result in a fee deemed Model Rules of Professional Con- to a lawyer by a third-partyto be unreasonable pursuant duct, developed by The American - provider must be passed along toto Rule 1.5. It is also probable College of Trust and Estate the client.that the lawyer's objectivity Counsel, make it clear that No opinions directly onwhile representing the client ACTEC believes Rules 1.5 and 1.7 point have been issued bywould be materially affected prohibit a lawyer from accepting any state ethics committees, butby the prospect of receiving a rebate, discount, commission ethics opinions recently issuedsuch payments thus giving rise or referral fee from a non-lawyer. in Pennsylvania and New Yorkto a conflict of interest im- The ACTEC Commentaries say provide guidance. The Pennsylva-plicating Rule 1.7(b). Finally, 'even with full disclosure to nia Bar Association's Committeethe lawyer may be deemed and consent by the client, such on Legal Ethics and Pro-to have a pecuniary interest an arrangement involves too fessional Responsibility has issuedadverse to the client or to have great a risk of over-reaching two pertinent written opinions.received compensation from by the lawyer and the potential In Opinions' 98-12 and 95-78,a person other than the client for actual or apparent abuse, the Committee representativesthat interferes with the lawyer's The client is generally entitled advised that a lawyer's receipt ofindependence of professional to the benefit of any eco- a portion of an investment advi-judgment implicating Rules nomies that are achieved by sor's annual management fee and1.8(a) and 1.8(0. These concerns the lawyer in connection with a real estate broker's commission,
would exist even if the might be permissible. The
client were to consent By Paul C. Heintz opinions caution that theto the financial arrange- ObermayerRebmannMaxveg&Hppel LLP lawyer first must concludement which consent the Pbiladpbhiz PA that his orlawyer would be required her loyalty and judgment
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would not be compromised, oth-
erwise implicating Rule 1.7(b),
and that the client must also con-
sent to the arrangement after con-
sultation. Indeed, it is difficult
to conceive of a 'kick back"
arrangement -that would not
compromise a lawyer's loyalty
and judgment.
The issue of referral fees is
not new to Pennsylvania lawyers.
For many years it was the
practice of title insurance
companies to pay a 'commission'
to lawyers or realtors who
referred such business to the tide
company. The lawyers' general
practice in those days, however,
was to remit the commission to
the client either in the form of a
credit on the lawyer's statement
or on the real estate settlement
sheet. Thus the long term profes-
sional practice in Pennsylvania
seems to comport with what
the Rules suggest should be
the lawyer's course of action
when he or she has an opportu-
nity to accept commissions
from non-lawyers.
Opinion 711 issued earlier
this year by the New York State
Bar Association's Committee on
Professional Ethics, is also
instructive. It relates to a lawyers'
actual sale of long term care
insurance policy to a client.
The Committee opined' 'A
lawyer may not sell long term
care insurance to the lawyer's
own clients if the representation
relates to estate planning or other
matters or areas of practice that
might reasonably cause the
lawyer's professional judgment
on behalf of the client to be af-
fected by the lawyer's own finan-
cial or business interests.'
The Committee went on to
say that where the lawyer is
in a position to receive personal
gain by recommending a service
or product where that service or
product is central to the estate
planning service, and not tangen-
tial to it, the lawyer is 'categori-
cally forbidden' from receiving
the benefits of the sale of such
services or products to those
whom the lawyer represents
in the course of estate plan-
ning and 'this conflict cannot
A lawyer may notsell long term
care insurance to the
lawyer's own clients
if the representation
relates to estate
planning or other
matters or areas of
practice that might
reasonably cause the
lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf
of the client to be
affected by the lawyer's
own financial or
business interests.
0>
be cured by disclosure and
client consent.'
Refraining from accepting
inducements from those on
the estate planning team assures
us that we will remain objective
while helping our clients assem-
ble that team and that we will
continue to serve as the actual
quarterback of that team. it seems
highly inappropriate both to
serve up to the sales people sur-
rounding us those who repose so
much trust in us and to sacrifice
our ability to properly select the
estate planning team and the abil-
ity to quarterback it.
Most significant of all, we
should do nothing to imperil the
bedrock on which our profession
is based - total loyalty to the
client and independence of pro-
fessional judgment while repre-
senting that client.
We estate planning lawyers
have been blessedly re-
moved from the debate currently
raging within the accounting
profession between those who
wish to remain traditional fee-
only accountants and those who
wish to "sell product, or at least
participate in commissions. That
battleground is not pretty. +
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Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm)
HOUSE OF LORDS
(1999] 1 All ER 517, [1999] 2 WLR 215
HEARING-DATES: 9, 10, 11, 12, 18 November, 18 December 1998
18 December 1998
CATCHWORDS:
Accountant - Duty - Conflict of interest - Duty of confidentiality to client
- Former client - Accountant providing litigation support services - Accountants
instructed to act on behalf of client in investigation adverse to former client
- Accountants possessing confidential information relating to former client -
Information relevant to investigation - Accountants erecting Chinese walls
around inVestigation - Former client seeking injunction to prevent accountants
from acting in investigation - Whether injunction should be granted - Principles
to be applied.
HEADNOTE:
The defendant firm of accountants were employed as auditors of the core
assets of the investment agency (the BIA) established to hold and manage the
general reserve fund of the Government of Brunei and its external assets and to
provide the government with money management services. The plaintiff had been
the chairman of the BIA until his removal in 1998. For a period of 18 months
between 1996 and 1998 the plaintiff, acting in his personal capacity, retained
the defendants to act for him or one of his companies in private litigation in
which he was then engaged. In the course of acting for the plaintiff in that
litigation the defendant firm provided extensive litigation support services of
the sort usually undertaken by solicitors. In so doing the defendants were
entrusted with or acquired extensive confidential information about the
plaintiff's assets and financial affairs. The defendant firm employed 168
personnel on the plaintiff's litigation, which was settled in March 1998 and
were paid approximately L476m for that work. The plaintiff was subsequently
dismissed from his position as chairman of the BIA and in June 1998 the Brunei
government commenced an investigation into the conduct of the affairs of the
BIA, including the destination and present location of money which had been
transferred from the BIA's funds while the plaintiff was the chairman. The
government wished to retain the defendant firm to assist the investigation. The
defendants took the view that they could accept the instructions because they
had ceased to act for the plaintiff more than two months previously and he was
no longer a client but, .aware of the possibility of a conflict of interest
because the investigation was likely to be adverse to the plaintiff's interests
and they possessed confidential information relating to his financial affairs,
the firm erected an information barrier (a so-called Chinese wall) around the
department carrying out the BIA investigation on behalf of the Brunei
government. The plaintiff, who had not been informed by the defendants of their
instructions nor had his consent been sought, was granted an injunction to
restrain the defendants from continuing to work on the investigation. The
defendants successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which discharged the
injunction on the grounds that the defendants were only obliged to make
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reasonable efforts to protect the plaintiff's confidential information and that,
balancing the competing interests, the precautions taken by the defendants meant
that there was no real or appreciable risk that the confidential information(] (]would be disclosed. The plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords.
Held - Like a solicitor, an accountant providing litigation support services
owed a continuing professional duty to a former client following the termination.
of the client relationship to preserve the confidentiality of information
imparted during the subsistence of that relationship. That duty was unqualified
and required the accountant to keep the information confidential, not merely to
take all reasonable steps to do so, and also not to misuse it. Where,
therefore, a former client established that the defendant firm was in possession
of information which had been imparted in confidence, that he had not consented
to its disclosure, and that the firm was proposing to act for another client
with an interest adverse to his in a matter to which the information was or
might be relevant, the court would intervene to restrain the firm from acting
for that other client, unless the firm satisfied it, on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence, that effective measures had been taken to ensure that no
disclosuri would occur and that there was no risk of the information coming into
the possession of those acting for the other client. Although there was no rule
of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind were
insufficient to eliminate the risk, the presumption was that, unless special
measures were taken, information moved within a firm and, to be effective, those
measures had to be an established part of the organisational structure of the
firm, not created ad hoc. In the instant case, on the evidence, the defendant
firm had not discharged the heavy burden of showing that there was no risk that
information in their possession which was confidential to the plaintiff and
which they had obtained in the course of a former client relationship with him
might unwittingly or inadvertently come into the notice of those working for the
BIA. Accordingly the appeal would be allowed.
Re a firm of solicitors [1995] 3 All ER 482 approved.
Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke (1911-13] All ER Rep 813 overruled.
NOTES:
For an accountant's duty of confidence, see 8(1) Halsbury's Laws (4th edn
reissue) para 458.
CASES-REF-TO:
Carindale Country Club Estate Pty Ltd v Astill (1993) 115 ALR 112, Aust FC.
Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205, (1992] 3 WLR 936, PC.
MacDonald Estate v Martin (1990) 77 DLR (4th) 249, Can SC.
National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209, Aust FC.
Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke (1912] 1 Ch 831, [1911-13] All ER Rep 813, CA.
Russell McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co v Tower Corp (25 August 1998,
unreported), NZ CA.
Solicitors, Re a firm of [1995) 3 All ER 482, [1997] Ch 1, (1996] 3 WLR 16.
INTRODUCTION:
His Royal Highness Prince Jefri Bolkiah appealed with leave of the Appeal
Committee of the House of Lords given on 29 October 1998 from the decision of
the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf MR and Otton LJ; Waller LJ dissenting) delivered
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on 19 October 1998 allowing the appeal of the respondents, KPMG (a firm), from
the order made by Pumfrey J on 15 September 1998 granting the appellant an
iijunction restraining the respondents from continuing to carry out certain work
for the Brunei Investment Agency (the BIA) under instructions from the BIA to
[] []assist in establishing the extent of the withdrawal of funds by special
transfer
from the BIA, the use made of the withdrawn funds, the assets acquired with
them, the present location of such assets, and the identity of the persons or
entities now controlling them, and to work with the BIA's legal advisers in
obtaining evidence and where appropriate to trace, secure and recover assets
belonging to the BIA both in Brunei and overseas. The facts are set out in the
opinion of Lord Millett.
COUNSEL:
Gordon Pollock QC, Richard Meade and James Collins for Prince Jefri; David
Donaldson QC, Ali Malek QC and David Quest for KPMG.
JUDGMENT-READ:
Their Lordships took time for consideration; 18 November 1998. The House of
Lords gave judgment allowing the appeal for reasons to be given later. 18
December 1998. The following opinions were delivered.
PANEL: LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON, LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD, LORD CLYDE, LORD HUTTON
AND LORD MILLETT
JUDGMENTBY-I: LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON
JUDGMENT-1:
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON. My Lords, shortly after the conclusion of the
argument in this case we gave judgment allowing the appeal and granting an
injunction, saying that we would give our reasons at a later date. I have had
the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be given by my noble and learned
friend Lord Millett. It fully sets out the reasons which led me to allow the
appeal and grant the injunction.
JUDGMENTBY-2: LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD
JUDGMENT-2:
LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in
draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord
Millett. For the reasons which he has given, with which I agree, I also was in
favour of allowing the appeal and granting the injunction.
I consider that the nature of the work which a firm of accountants undertakes
in the provision of litigation support services requires the court to exercise
the same jurisdiction to intervene on behalf of a former client of the firm as
it exercises in the case of a solicitor. The basis of that jurisdiction is to
be found in the principles which apply to all forms of employment where the
relationship between the client and the person with whom he does business is a
confidential one. A solicitor is under a duty not to communicate to others any
information in his possession which is confidential to the former client. But
the duty extends well beyond that of refraining from deliberate disclosure. It
-s the solicitor's duty to ensure that the former client is not put at risk that
confidential information which the solicitor has obtained from that relationship
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may be used against him in any circumstances.
Particular care is needed if the solicitor agrees to act for a new client who
has, or who may have, an interest which is in conflict with that of the former
client. In that situation the former client is entitled to the protection of
the court if he can show that his solicitor was in receipt of confidential
H [Jinformation which is relevant to a matter for which the solicitor is acting,
against the former client's interest, for a new client. He is entitled to
insist that measures be taken by the solicitor which will ensure that he is not
exposed to the risk of careless, inadvertent or negligent disclosure of the
information to the new client by the
solicitor, his partners in the firm, its employees or anyone else for whose
acts the solicitor is responsible.
As for the circumstances in which the court will intervene by granting an
injunction, it will not intervene if it is satisfied that there is no risk of
disclosure. But if it is not so satisfied, it should bear in mind that the
choice as to whether to accept instructions from the new client rests with the
solicitor and that disclosure may result in substantial damage to the former
client for which he may find it impossible to obtain adequate redress from the
solicitor. It may be very difficult, after the event, to prove how and when the
information got out, by whom and to whom it was communicated and with what
consequences. In that situation everything is likely to depend on the measures
which are in place to ensure that there is no risk that the information will be
disclosed. If the court is not satisfied that the measures will protect the
former client against the risk, the proper course will be for it to grant an
injunction.
As my noble and learned friend has shown in his careful analysis of the facts
in this case, KPMG have been unable to demonstrate that they can provide the
protection to which Prince Jefri is entitled in order to ensure that there is no
risk that confidential information which they have acquired from him will be
disclosed to those engaged on Project Gemma. The terms of the injunction are
designed to protect him against that risk, while enabling KPMG to continue to
provide services to BIA as its auditors.
JUDGMENTBY-3: LORD CLYDE
JUDGMENT-3:
LORD CLYDE. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the
speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Millett. The reasons which
he fully sets out are those which led me to allow the appeal and grant the
injunction.
JUDGMENTBY-4: LORD HUTTON
JUDGMENT-4:
LORD HUTTON. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the
speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Millett. The reasons which
he fully sets out are those which led me to allow the appeal and grant the
injunction.
JUDGMENTBY-5: LORD MILLETT
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JUDGMENT-5:
LORD MILLETT. My Lords, the question in this appeal is whether, and if so in
what circumstances, a firm of accountants which has provided litigation support
services to a former client and in consequence has in its possession information
which is confidential to him can undertake work for another client with an
adverse interest. The question has become of increased importance with the
(][]emergence of huge international firms with enormous resources that operate
on a
global scale and offer a comprehensive range of services to clients.
Some time after the conclusion of the argument your Lordships gave their
unanimous opinion that the appeal should be allowed and stated that they would
give their reasons later. I now give my reasons for allowing the appeal.
The facts
Your Lordships have been supplied with an agreed statement of facts. It is
the principal though not the only source from which the following summary is
derived.
The respondents (KPMG) are a large and well-known English firm of chartered
accountants with associated but separate firms around the world. Their London
office employs almost 5,000 staff and has at least 350 partners working from
different offices. The staff of the forensic accounting department alone
numbers more than 100. RPMG are the auditors to between 20 and 25 of all
listed companies in the United Kingdom. They are one of the five largest firms
of accountants not merely in this country but in the world.
Ever since the Brunei Investment Agency (the BIA) was established in 1983
KPMG have undertaken the annual audit of its core funds. The BIA was formed to
hold and manage the General Reserve Fund of the government of Brunei and its
external assets and to provide the government with money management services.
The exact size of its core funds is secret but they are valued in many billions
of dollars. In the last three years, KPMG have undertaken over 6,000 hours per
year of chargeable time on the audit. The engagement partner responsible for
the audit work was Mr Peter Harrison. The affairs of the BIA are secret and
under its governing Act unauthorised disclosure is a criminal offence. The BIA
did not authorise the disclosure in these proceedings of the details of KPMG's
relationship with it until after the hearing at first instance, amd this has
caused KPMG difficulties in the presentation of their case which have led to
adverse criticism of their apparent lack of candour. In addition to their audit
work, KPMG also carried out associated advisory and consultancy work for the
DIA. On average, about 4,000 hours a year of chargeable time is spent on this
work. A long and close working relationship between the BIA and KPMG has
resulted.
The appellant (Prince Jefri) is the third and youngest brother of the Sultan
of Brunei. Until March 1998 he enjoyed a very close relationship with the
Sultan. He is a former minister of finance and was for many years the chairman
of the BIA. He is, however, no longer in favour. He has recently been removed
from his position as chairman of the BIA, and partners of Arthur Andersen have
taken control of his companies as executive managers under powers conferred by
emergency decrees.
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Over the years numerous large transfers of capital (the special transfers)
were made out of the core funds. The destination and use of these transfers did
not form part of KPMG's audit. KPMG were required to accept an annual
representation from the board of the BIA (of which Prince Jefri was chairman)
that the transfers were made on behalf of or for the benefit of the Brunei
government and accordingly carried out no further investigation of them.
U(1 
1
Over a period of 18 months between 1996 and 1998 KPMG were also retained by
one of Prince Jefri's companies on his behalf and at his request to undertake a
substantial investigation in connection with major litigation (the Manoukian
litigation) in which he was personally involved. The investigation, which was
given the code name Project Lucy, was mainly conducted by KPMG's London forensic
accounting department, though their taxation department was also involved. The
engagement partner on Project Lucy was Mr Adam Bates.
Project Lucy involved the forensic accounting department in the provision of
extensive litigation support services in the course of which they performed
tasks usually undertaken by solicitors. They investigated the facts,
interviewed witnesses with or without solicitors being present, searched for
documents, took part -in conferences, including telephone conferences, with
counsel and in the absence of solicitors, drafted subpoenas, reviewed draft
pleadings and prepared ideas for cross-examination. They took instructions and
obtained information directly from Prince Jefri's own staff without the
intervention of solicitors.
In the course of Project Lucy, as well as a number of other personal
assignments which they undertook for Prince Jefri, KPMG were entrusted with or
acquired extensive confidential information concerning Prince Jefri's assets and
financial affairs. In particular they became privy to a substantial volume of
information concerning the identity of his assets, their location, the legal
structure of their ownership, the identity and structure of corporate and other
vehicles used by Prince Jefri to hold assets, and the manner and financing of
their purchase. Altogether some 168 KPMG personnel, i2 of whom were partners
and 81 of whom were assistant managers or above, worked on assignments for
Prince Jefri between 1996 and 1998. KPMG were paid approximately L476m for
their work.
Project Lucy was subject to a degree of security, but the effectiveness of
the steps taken by KPMG to keep the work confidential is disputed.' After
January 1997 Project Lucy was accorded a separate area within the forensic
accounting department, and after July 1997 it was housed in rooms on a separate
floor with restricted access. Team members were forbidden to take work home to
avoid the risk of papers being stolen or mislaid. In briefings Mr Bates
stressed to members of the team.that Project Lucy was exceptionally confidential
and should not be discussed outside the team.
The Manoukian litigation was settled in March 1998, and thereafter no further
work was undertaken on Project Lucy. KPMG were formally instructed to
discontinue the project on 14 May 1998. Following the settlement of the
litigation the Inland Revenue served notices under s 20B(1) of the Taxes
Management Act 1970 on KPMG in respect of information in their possession
relating to the Manoukians. All documents in the possession of KPMG's tax
department were gathered together and delivered to their solicitors in March
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1998. Thereafter KPMG were involved in only two relatively minor assignments on
behalf of Prince Jefri, and work on these had also ceased by the middle of May
1998.
In June 1998 the government of Brunei appointed a finance task force to
conduct an investigation into the activities of the BIA. On 16 June 1998 mr
Harrison was summoned by the Ministry of Finance to Brunei where he attended a
meeting with the task force. He had been requested to co-operate with the task
force, and he explained the nature of his firm's audit of the core funds and
[] []what little KPMG as auditors knew of the special transfers. He was asked to
assist the task force in establishing the position of the core funds as at 31
May 1998 and to prepare a summary of movements on the core funds since the
establishment of the BIA in 1983. These movements included the special
transfers. All the information, necessary to perform this task was capable of
being extracted from the audited accounts and the auditors' working papers. The
work was carried out by members of the audit team and was covered by an
engagement letter negotiated by KPMG and eventually dated 2 July 1998. KPMG
reported to the task force on this project on 8 July 1998. KPMG are plainly
correct ii maintaining that the work thus far was a natural extension of their
audit function.
In the meantime, however, Mr John Ellison, a partner in the forensic
accounting department, was approached on 2 July on behalf of the BIA and asked
whether KPMG would be able to assist the task force in carrying out further
investigations into the destination and the present location of the money which
had been the subject of the special transfers. On 3 July 1998 Mr Ellison, Mr
Harrison and another partner Mr Michael Fowle met to consider whether KPMG could
properly accept these instructions. The meeting was attended by KPMG's
solicitors. Mr Ellison had spoken by telephone to Mr Bates beforehand and
discussed the matter with him. The view was taken that there was no conflict of
interest as KPMG had ceased to act for Prince Jefri more than two months
previously and there was no longer a client relationship with him. It was
concluded that the BIA's instructions could properly be accepted, but that it
would be necessary to establish special arrangements to provide additional
protection against the use or disclosure of confidential information relating to
Prince Jefri which was still in KPMG's possession.
On 8 July 1998 the BIA formally instructed KPMG to provide assistance in
connection with the investigation of the withdrawal of assets from the BIA by
means of the special transfers. It was at about this time that it became clear
that the assignment was at least in part adverse to Prince Jefri's interests.
The work was covered by an engagement letter dated 13 August 1998. This
required KPMG to assist in establishing the extent of the withdrawal of funds,
the use made of the withdrawn funds, the assets acquired with them, the present
location of such assets, and the identity of the persons or entities now
controlling them. KPMG were instructed to work with the BIA's legal advisers in
obtaining evidence and where appropriate to trace, secure and recover assets
belonging to the BIA both in Brunei and overseas.
This further assignment was given the code name Project Gemma and Mr Harrison
was appointed as the lead partner. He had never been in receipt of any
confidential information relating to Prince Jefri's business, financial or
personal affairs. Although he was to head the project, this was clearly not
simply an extension of the audit; it would involve the tracing and recovery of
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assets and might well lead to civil and even criminal proceedings against Prince
Jefri. It would be undertaken by members of the forensic accounting department
and would be likely to involve them in the provision of litigation support
services. It must have been obvious, and indeed is common ground, that some at
least of the confidential information obtained by or provided to KPMG in the
course of Project Lucy was or might be relevant to Project Gemma. It must also
have been obvious, and again is common ground, that in relation to Project Gemma
the interests of the BIA were adverse to those of Prince Jefri. KPMG did not
inform Prince Jefri of their new assignment, nor did they seek his consent to
their acceptance of the project.
1 []
KPMG employed some 50 people on Project Gemma, 11 of whom had previously been
engaged on work for Prince Jefri. Most of them worked in Brunei but never more
than 15 at a time. KPMG contends that none of the 11 was in possession of
information confidential to Prince Jefri.
Over 7,500 hours were spent on work for the BIA between 18 June and 15
September when Pumfrey J granted an injunction to restrain KPMG from continuing
with work on Project Gemma. A large number of transactions then still remained
to be investigated. KPMG allege that the work which they had already
undertaken, based on information provided to them by the BIA, had already
demonstrated that very substantial sums had been paid to or for the benefit of
Prince Jefri from funds of the BIA and appeared to have been used to acquire
assets for himself or for entities which he controlled.
When KPMG accepted instructions in relation to Project Gemma, Mr Ellison gave
instructions that an information barrier (popularly known as a 'Chinese wall')
should be put in place within the forensic accounting department, and special
arrangements were established from 3 July 1998 to protect the confidentiality of
information in the possession of KPMG which related to Prince Jefri. These
arrangements had two components. First, the selection of staff was intended to
ensure that nobody who was in possession of such information was permitted to
work on Project Gemma. Secondly, steps were taken to avoid the risk of such
information becoming available to those working on Project Gemma in the future.
It was made clear at a meeting on 3 July 1998 that no one who was in possession
of any confidential information deriving from Project Lucy could work on Project
Gemma. Staff were appointed to Project Gemma only after confirming that they
had no material prior involvement with Prince Jefri and were not in.possession
of any information which was confidential to him. Staff who had done work of a
minor administrative nature on Project Lucy were permitted to work on Project
Gemma but only after KPMG had satisfied themselves that they were not in
possession of confidential information relating to Prince Jefri. Most of the
work on Project Gemma was carried out in Brunei. Work in London was done in a
separate project room with restricted access in a building separate from that
which houses the forensic accounting department. Since the services of the
notices by the Inland Revenue the documentary records of Project Lucy had been
in the possession of KPMG's solicitors and were not available to those working
on Project Gemma. Separate computer file servers were used for Project Gemma,
and all electronic information relating to Project Lucy was deleted from KPMG's
servers.
In order to confirm the effectiveness of these arrangements, all Project
Gemma staff were interviewed by KPMG's solicitors about their knowledge of
Project Lucy. All those interviewed confirmed on affidavit that they were not
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in possession of confidential information acquired from Prince Jefri whether in
the course of Project Lucy or otherwise. The solicitors attempted to contact
all the personnel who had worked on Project Lucy or the other projects for
Prince Jefri. 146 persons were contacted and confirmed that they had not
discussed confidential matters outside the team. Twenty three could not be
traced because they were no longer employed by KPMG.
The decisions below
In the course of the hearing before Pumfrey J KPMG offered a voluntary
undertaking not to use or disclose any information about Prince Jefri's affairs
acquired in the course of Project Lucy. KPMG submitted that this was
[][ ]sufficient to protect Prince Jefri's interests and was the only relief to
which
he was entitled.
For its part the BIA acknowledged that it was not entitled to require KPMG to
make use for its benefit of any information which was confidential to Prince
Jefri. It protested that an order which prevented KPMG from continuing to work
on Project Gemma would cause unnecessary disruption to the investigations being
carried on in Brunei. KPMG confirmed its assertion that a replacement could not
readily be found since only a limited number of firms possess the necessary
skills and resources to undertake an investigation of the magnitude required.
The BIA added that it was reluctant to increase the number of people and
organisations in possession of information which was confidential to the BIA.
It expressed particular concern at the prospect that an injunction might prevent
KPMG from completing the audit of the core funds for 1997.
This evidence was challenged by Prince Jefri. It does appear that Arthur
Andersen were already retained to carry out certain work for the government of
Brunei (though not for the BIA), and that following the grant of the injunction
by Pumfrey J the scope of their instructions was extended to include some at
least of the matters covered by Project Gemma.
The judge found that KPMG had taken all the steps which could be expected to
minimise or avoid disclosure of confidential information. He declined to impute
to KPMG and their staff anything other than an honest intention not to disclose
confidential information and said that he was satisfied that they would do their
best to fulfil their obligations. These findings have not been challenged. But
the judge took the view that he was bound by authority to approach'any question
of the adequacy of the protective measures which KPMG had adopted with a very
critical eye. He said that the intrinsic difficulty with Chinese walls was
that, while they were well adapted to deal with foreseeable or deliberate
disclosure of information, they were not well adapted to deal with disclosure
which was accidental, inadvertent or negligent. He was firmly of the view that
a former client should not be exposed to the risk of such disclosure unless
there were powerful reasons for saying that he should. No such reasons existed
in the present case. Accordingly he granted an injunction which restrained KPMG
from continuing to carry out work on or covering the same subject matter as
Project Gemma.
In the Court of Appeal the majority (Lord Woolf MR and Otton LJ) did not
ic-cept, at least in the case of accountants, that there was inevitably a risk of
i.:;closure or that Chinese walls were incapable of removing any real risk.
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Favouring the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Russell
McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co v Tower Corp (25 August 1998, unreported), Lord
Woolf MR (with whose approach Otton LJ agreed) identified three questions for
consideration: (i) whether there was confidential information which if disclosed
was likely to affect Prince Jefri's interests adversely; (ii) whether there was
a 'real or appreciable risk' that the confidential information would be
disclosed; and (iii) whether the nature and importance of the former fiduciary
relationship meant that the confidential information should be protected by an
order of the kind sought. These questions were to be answered on the evidence,
balancing the different interests involved and remembering that the issues would
inevitably overlap. Taking into account the facts that as chairman of the BIA
Prince Jefri was aware when he retained KPMG that they had a long-standing
relationship with the BIA as their auditors and that this would involve them in
providing related accountancy services, and that Prince Jefri would have been
(]0aware that the BIA would be put to inconvenience and expense if his retainer
were to interfere with their use of KPMG's services, Lord Woolf MR considered
that KPMG's duty should be limited to making reasonable efforts to protect
Prince Jefri's confidential information and that it was not reasonable for
Prince Jefri to require KPMG to be dismissed unless he 'really would suffer
serious damage' if they were not. On the evidence Lord Woolf MR was not
satisfied that Prince Jefri would suffer any 'real prejudice' if the injunction
were discharged. When the undertaking which KPMG had offered was also taken
into account, he said, the balance was clear. The continuation of the
injunction would 'set an unrealistic standard for the protection of confidential
information' which would create unjustified impediments in the way large
international firms conduct their business.
The law
The issues raised in these proceedings have not previously been considered by
your Lordships' House. The controlling authority in England hitherto has been
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke (1912] 1
Ch 831, (1911-13] All ER Rep 813. The facts of that case were unusual. It
concerned a small firm of solicitors with only two partners who carried on what
amounted to separate practices, each with his own clients, without any knowledge
of the other's clients and with the exclusive services of some of the clerks.
The plaintiff consulted one of the partners in relation to a contentious matter.
After he had terminated his retainer, the other partner, who had never met the
plaintiff and was not aware that he had consulted his partner, was retained by
the party opposite in the same matter. The judge granted an injunction to
restrain the solicitor from acting. The Court of Appeal found that there was no
risk of disclosure of confidential information and discharged the injunction.
The case is authority for two propositions: (i) that there is no absolute
rule of law in England that a solicitor may not act in litigation against a
former client; and (ii) that the solicitor may be restrained from acting if such
a restriction is necessary to avoid a significant risk of the disclosure or
misuse of confidential information belonging to the former client. Like most of
the later authorities, the case was concerned with the duties of a solicitor.
The duties of an accountant cannot be greater than those of a solicitor, and may
be less, for information relating to his client's affairs which is in the
possession of a solicitor is usually privileged as well as confidential. In the
present case, however, some of the information obtained by KPMG is likely to
have attracted litigation privilege, though not solicitor-client privilege, and
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it is conceded by KPMG that an accountant who provides litigation support
services of the kind which they provided to Prince Jefri must be treated for
present purposes in the same way as a solicitor.
The basis of the jurisdiction
In Rakusen's case the Court of Appeal founded the jurisdiction on the right
of the former client to the protection of his confidential information. This
was challenged by counsel for Prince Jefri, who contended for an absolute rule,
such as that adopted in the United States, which precludes a solicitor or his
firm altogether from acting for a client with an interest adverse to that of the
former client in the same or a connected matter. In the course of argument,
however, he modified his position, accepting that there was no ground on which
the court could properly intervene unless two conditions were satisfied: (i)
that the solicitor was in possession of information which was confidential to
[]i]the former client and (ii) that such information was or might be relevant to
the
matter on which he was instructed by the second client. This makes the
possessioh of relevant confidential information the test of what is comprehended
within the expression 'the same or a connected matter'. On this footing the
court's intervention is founded not on the avoidance of any perception of
possible impropriety but on the protection of confidential information.
My Lords, I would affirm this as the basis of the court's jurisdiction to
intervene on behalf of a former client. It is otherwise where the court's
intervention is sought by an existing client, for a fiduciary cannot act at the
same time both for and against the same client, and his firm is in no better
position. A man cannot without the consent of both clients act for one client
while his partner is acting for another in the opposite interest. His
disqualification has nothing to do with the confidentiality of client
information. It is based on the inescapable conflict of interest which is
inherent in the situation.
This is not to say that such consent is not sometimes forthcoming, or that in
some situations it may not be inferred. There is a clear distinction between
the position of a solicitor and an auditor. The large accountancy firms
commonly carry out the audit of clients who are in competition- with one another.
The identity of their audit clients is publicly acknowledged. Their clients are
taken to consent to their auditors acting for competing clients, though they
must of course keep confidential the information obtained from their respective
clients. This was the basis on which the Privy Council decided Kelly v Cooper
[1993] AC 205 in relation to estate agents.
Where the court's intervention is sought by a former client, however, the
position is entirely different. The court's jurisdiction cannot be based on any
conflict of interest, real or perceived, for there is none. The fiduciary
relationship which subsists between solicitor and client comes to an end with
the termination of the retainer. Thereafter the solicitor has no obligation to
defend and advance the interests of his former client. The only duty to the
former client which survives the termination of the client relationship is a
continuing duty to preserve the confidentiality of information imparted during
its subsistence.
Accordingly, it is incumbent on a plaintiff who seeks to restrain his former
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:itor from acting in a matter for another client to establish (i) that the
:itor is in possession of information which is confidential to him and to
.isclosure of which he has not consented and (ii) that the information is or
-e relevant to the new matter in which the interest of the other client is
y be adverse to his own. Although the burden of proof is on the plaintiff,
not a heavy one. The former may readily be inferred; the latter will
be obvious. I do not think that it is necessary to introduce any
mptions, rebuttable or otherwise, in relation to these two matters. But
the basis on which the jurisdiction is exercised, there is no cause to
e or attribute the knowledge of one partner to his fellow partners.
er a particular individual is in possession of confidential information is
stion of fact which must be proved or inferred from the circumstances of
ase. In this respect also we ought not in my opinion to follow the
prudence of the United States.
e extent of the solicitor's duty
ether founded on contract or equity, the duty to preserve confidentiality
qualified. It is a duty to keep the information confidential, not merely
ke all reasonable steps to. do.so. Moreover, it is not merely a duty not to
nicate the information to a third party. It is a duty not to misuse it,
is to say, without the consent of the former client to make any use of it
cause any use to be made of it by others otherwise than for his benefit.
ormer client cannot be protected completely from accidental or inadvertent
osure. But he is entitled to prevent his former solicitor from exposing
o any avoidable risk; and this includes the increased risk of the use of
nformation to his prejudice arising from the acceptance of instructions to
or another client with an adverse interest in a matter to which the
mation is or may be relevant.
gree of risk
follows that in the case of a former client there is no basis for granting
f if there is no risk of the disclosure or misuse of confidential
mation. This was the ground on which the Court of Appeal discharged the
ction in Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke [19121 1 Ch 831, (1911-13] All ER
13. The test for disqualification was expressed in different terms by each
e three members of the court, but the case has been taken to indicate that
ourt will not intervene unless it is satisfied that there is O 'reasonable
bility of real mischief'. This test has been the subject of criticism both
is country and overseas, particularly in relation to solicitors, and a more
gent test has frequently been advocated: see for example Professor Finn
licts of Interest and Professionals' published by the New Zealand Legal
rch Foundation in Professional Responsibility cited with evident approval
mmow J in National Mutual Holdings Pty, Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209.
s been abandoned in Canada: see MacDonald Estate v Martin (1990) 77 DLR
249, where it has been replaced by two rebuttable presumptions: i) that
dential information will have been communicated by the former client in the
e of the retainer and (ii) that lawyers who work together share
dences. The clear trend of the authorities is towards a stricter approach.
Lords, I regard the criticisms which have been made of the test supposed
ve been laid down in Rakusen's case as well founded. It imposes an unfair
:n on the former client, exposes him to a potential and avoidable risk to
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should, without the consent of his former client, accept instructions unless,
viewed objectively, his doing so will not increase the risk that information
which is confidential to the former client may come into the possession of a
party with an adverse interest.
The adequacy of the protective measures taken by KPMG
Once the former client has established that the defendant firm is in
possession of information which was imparted in confidence and that the firm is
proposing to act for another party with an interest adverse to his in a matter
to which the information is or may be relevant, the evidential burden shifts to
the defendant firm to show that even so there is no risk that the information
will come into the possession of those now acting for the other party. There is
no rule of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind are
insufficient to eliminate the risk. But the starting point must be that, unless
special measures are taken, information moves within a firm. In MacDonald
Estate v Martin (1990) 77 DLR (4th) 249 at 269 Sopinka J said that the court
should restrain the firm from acting for the second client 'unless satisfied on
the basis 'of clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable measures have
[][]been taken to ensure that no disclosure will occur'. With the substitution
of
the word 'effective' for the words 'all reasonable' I would respectfully adopt
that formulation.
Application to the facts of the present case
Chinese walls are widely used by financial institutions in the City of London
and elsewhere. They are the favoured technique for managing the conflicts of
interest which arise when financial business is carried on by a conglomerate.
The Core Conduct of Business Rules published by the Financial Services Authority
recognise the effectiveness of Chinese walls as a means of restricting the
movement of information between different departments of the same organisation.
They contemplate the existence of established organisational arrangements which
preclude the passing of information in the possession of one part of the
business to other parts of the business. In their consultation paper on
Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules (Law Com No 124) (1992) the Law Commission
describe Chinese walls as normally involving some combination of the following
organisational arrangements: (i) the physical separation of the various
departments in order to insulate them from each other-this often extends to such
matters of detail as dining arrangements; (ii) an educational programme,
normally recurring, to emphasis the importance of not improperly or
inadvertently divulging confidential information; (iii) strict and carefully
defined procedures for dealing with a situation where it is felt that the wall
should be crossed and the maintaining of proper records where this occurs; (iv)
monitoring by compliance officers of the effectiveness of the wall; (v)
disciplinary sanctions where there has been a breach of the wall.
KPMG insist that, like other large firms of accountants, they are accustomed
to maintaining client confidentiality not just within the firm but also within a
particular team. They stress that it is common for a large firm of accountants
to provide a comprehensive range of professional services including audit,
corporate finance advice, corporate tax advice and management consultancy to
clients with competing commercial interests. Such firms are very experienced in.
the erection and operation of information barriers to protect the confidential
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information of each client, and staff are constantly instructed in the
importance of respecting client confidentiality. This is, KPMG assert, part of
the professional culture in which staff work and becomes second nature to them.
Forensic projects are treated as exceptionally confidential and are usually
given code names. In the present case KPMG engaged different people, different
servers, and ensured that the work was done in a secure office in a different
building. KPMG maintain that these arrangements satisfy the most stringent
test, and that there is no risk that information obtained by KPMG in the course
of Project Lucy has or will become available to anyone engaged on Project Gemma.
I am not persuaded that this is so. Even in the financial services industry,
good practice requires there to be established institutional arrangements
designed to prevent the flow of information between separate departments. Where
effective arrangements are in place, they produce a modern equivalent of the
circumstances which prevailed in Rakusen's case. The Chinese walls which
feature in the present case, however, were established ad hoc and were erected
within a single department. When the number of personnel involved is taken into
account, together with the fact that the teams engaged on Project Lucy and
Project Gemma each had a rotating membership, involving far more personnel than
were working on the project at any one time, so that individuals may have joined
from and returned to other projects, the difficulty of enforcing
0 (3confidentiality or preventing the unwitting disclosure of information is
very
great. It is one thing, for example, to separate the insolvency, audit,
taxation and forensic departments from one another and erect Chinese walls
between them. Such departments often work from different offices and there may
be relatively little movement of personnel between them. But it is quite
another to attempt to place an information barrier between members all of whom
are drawn from the same department and have been accustomed to work with each
other. I would expect this to be particularly difficult where the department
concerned is engaged in the provision of litigation support services, and there
is evidence to confirm this. Forensic accountancy is said to be an area in
which new and unusual problems frequently arise and partners and managers are
accustomed to share information and expertise. Furthermore, there is evidence
that physical segregation is not necessarily adequate, especially where it is
erected within a single department.
In my opinion an effective Chinese wall needs to be an established part of
the organisational structure of the firm, not created ad hoc and dependent on
the acceptance of evidence sworn for the purpose by members of stiff engaged on
the relevant work.
How should the discretion be exercised?
In the course of his submissions before your Lordships, counsel for KPMG
submitted that, whether the special transfers were proper or improper, Prince
Jefri was an accounting party in respect of them, and could not properly refuse
to provide the BIA with the information which it was seeking. This may or may
not be true, for the information which the BIA is seeking to obtain would appear
to go far beyond what a recipient of proper payments would be bound to disclose.
But even if true, it does not follow, as counsel for KPMG submitted, that KPMG
can discharge themselves from their duty of confidentiality to their former
c'ient, acting as judges of the question between him and their present client.
Thc information was imparted to KPMG in confidence, and they are bound to
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maintain that confidence unless and until they are relieved of that duty by
Prince Jefri's consent or an order of the court obtained at the suit of the BIA.
Conclusion
I am not satisfied on the evidence that KPMG have discharged the heavy burden
of showing that there is no risk that information in their possession which is
confidential to Prince Jefri and which they obtained in the course of a former
client relationship may unwittingly or inadvertently come to the notice of those
working on Project Gemma. It was for this reason that I was in favour of
allowing the appeal and granting the injunction in the terms proposed.
DISPOSITION:
Appeal allowed.
SOLICITORS:
Lovell White Durrant; Stephenson Harwood
